Ending 2023 with Insights from the 7th NPCSC Session & the Diplomatic Work Conference
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
Hello to our readers! For our last, special EoC edition for 2023, we will be highlighting some of the developments that took place at the 7th session of the 14th National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and share a brief take on Xi Jinping’s speech to Chinese diplomats at the 2023 Diplomatic Work Conference.
We are grateful for your support to the newsletter, and we hope to improve upon it in 2024 with your valuable suggestions. So we encourage you to share your feedback with us via comments on this post, or you could send us an e-mail at indo-pacific.chair@takshashila.org.in.
With that we wish you a merry and prosperous ‘Year of the Dragon’, and happy reading!
Developments from the NPCSC Session
By Anushka Saxena
The 7th meeting this year of the Standing Committee of China’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress, took place between 25 and 29 December. Ideally, there were only 6 sessions of the NPCSC scheduled for 2023, but due to the convening of a special (4th) session to carry out emergency tasks such as the removal of Qin Gang from the post of Foreign Minister, there were 7 sessions held in the year. Many developments of note took place at this particular session which concluded 2 days ago, and we discuss some of them here.
Developments Concerning the Military
The NPC has announced the termination of the credentials of various PLA officials from various entities under the military apparatus, such as the PLA Rocket Force, Air Force, and Navy, as well as the CMC Equipment Development Department.
The announced terminations, under “relevant provisions” of the ‘Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses of the People’s Republic of China’ and the ‘National People’s Congress Representatives Law of the People's Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法), are as follows:
The Military Representative Conference of the Central Military Commission decided to remove Zhang Zhenzhong from the position of representative to the 14th National People's Congress.
Zhang Zhenzhong, former Deputy Chief of both the PLARF and the CMC Joint Staff Department, has already been under probe for corruption by the CCDI and its audit office.
The Military Representative Conference of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission decided to remove Zhang Yulin and Rao Wenmin from the position of representatives to the 14th National People's Congress.
Zhang Yulin has served as President of the National University of Defense Technology and deputy director of the CMC General Armaments Department (and then the CMC EDD), while Rao Wenmin has been a member of the CMC EDD.
The Naval Military Representative Conference decided to remove Ju Xinchun from the position of representative to the 14th National People's Congress.
Ju has been the Navy Commander and overall Deputy Commander of the Southern Theater Command since February, as well as the Chief of Equipment Department of the South China Sea Fleet.
The Air Force Military Representative Conference decided to remove Ding Laihang from the position of representative to the 14th National People's Congress.
Ding has been an Air Force Commander and a General (one of the three General-rank officials dismissed, the other two being Li Yuchao and Zhou Yaning).
The Rocket Force Military Representative Conference decided to remove Lyu Hong, Li Yuchao, Li Chuanguang, and Zhou Yaning from the position of representatives to the 14th National People's Congress.
Lu Hong has been the Chief of the Equipment Department of the Rocket Force. Li Yuchao was the Commander of the PLARF, before he was dismissed from that position as part of the probe launched in July. Li Chuanguang was another deputy commander of the PLARF alongside Zhang and Li Jun, and was previously also a Chief of Staff for a base of the Second Artillery (Base 63). Zhou Yaning was the PLARF Commander preceding Li Yuchao.
According to the relevant provisions of the National People's Congress Representatives Law of the People's Republic of China, the qualifications of Zhang Zhenzhong, Zhang Yulin, Rao Wenmin, Ju Xinchun, Ding Laihang, Lv Hong, Li Yuchao, Li Chuanguang, and Zhou Yaning have been terminated.
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses of the People's Republic of China, the corresponding positions of Zhang Yulin as a member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the 14th National People's Congress, Ding Laihang as a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress, and the Vice Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Committee, as well as Zhou Yaning as a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress and the Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, have been revoked.
Alongside these terminations, it must be noted that the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) took action of its own. On 27 December, the 12th Chairpersons’ meeting of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC revoked the membership of Liu Shiquan, the chair of the weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group; Wu Yansheng, President of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC); and Wang Changqing, a deputy manager of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).
Each of these individuals has been deeply involved in the development of China’s cruise missile tech ecosystem. Liu, for example, was Chief Designer of the programme to develop the Dong Hao-10 cruise missile, while Wu was leading China’s carrier rocket programme, especially the progress of the Long March and Shenzhou series.
My understanding from these developments is that the investigation of corruption and breach of discipline in the equipment bidding and procurement system of the PLA has now gained enough evidence for a mass purge to begin taking place.
When the first set of dismissals of PLARF commanders and deputies took place in July 2023, the EDD must have only started to collect evidence required beyond a preliminary investigation, upon realising the expansive extent of the corruption. That was also when the Discipline Inspection Committee of the EDD decided to make the matter public, by issuing on July 26, the ‘Notice on Collecting Clues Regarding Irregularities and Violations by Experts in the Evaluation of Equipment Procurement Tenders’. The notice clarified that the irregularities and violations under study are those that took place in equipment procurement tender evaluations since October 2017 (which is a month after Li Shangfu assumed the post of Head of the EDD).
Exactly a month after this, on August 29, Li Shangfu, the previous Head of the CMC EDD (from September 2017 to 2022), made his final public appearance at the 3rd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in Beijing. Since then, enough evidence to prove a major scandal may have been collected, which eventually led to his removal and that of so many other officials this month. Now, the investigation has expanded even beyond the CMC and PLARF to include the EDDs of the Navy and Air Force. It has also now come to include members of the military-industrial complex, such as high profile businessmen from SOEs like CASIC and CAS&TC.
It seems to me from these developments, that it isn’t necessarily power play or intense factionalism that is causing this (though the developments themselves may be beneficial to such power-brokering), but rather, a corruption scandal that is unravelling in the face of a discipline investigation campaign that may have started small.
Amidst all this, on December 29, the NPCSC also announced the appointment of Admiral Dong Jun of the PLA Navy to the post of Minister of National Defense, filling in the vacuum left behind by Li Shangfu. He is the first official to assume the position from the Navy and second (after Wei Fenghe) to come from a non-PLA Ground Forces-background. He carries with him extensive experience from the PLA Southern Theater Command and South China Sea Fleet, and could play a good role in amping up the public and diplomatic tones on China’s sea warfare capabilities ahead of Taiwan’s elections.
Legislations*
To begin with, the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on Ensuring Food Security’ (中华人民共和国粮食安全保障法), which was reviewed for the third time this session, was passed.
It’s purpose is to canonise the linkage between food security and national & social security, and “implements a national food security strategy centered on self-sufficiency, based on domestic resources” (article 2).
In its 6th Article, the Law encourages investment and incentivisation of food security processes by financial institutions. These processes include food production, procurement, storage, transportation, processing, and sales.
As per China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-25), “strengthening the regulation of food and drugs” is key to building a modernised governance system. In this regard, the Law also lays the foundation for increased regulation and governance by “…establishing a system of responsibility for food security and implements joint responsibilities of the party and government for food security” (Article 3).
Smart Agriculture": Articles 22 and 23 also emphasise the development of “green and intelligent” tech in agriculture to “enhances grain production efficiency.” This has been a repeated focus area for rural revitalisation and agricultural advancement, and was also discussed at the recent Central Economic Work Conference, where the establishment of ‘Agriculture Innovation Centers’ was discussed, with an aim to promote full-process mechanization in grain production, enhance yield, etc.
The full text of the Law is available here, and will be effective from June 1, 2024.
Next, the revisions to the ‘Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China (2007)’ (突发事件应对法) were discussed and went through a second review this session. The draft revisions are now soliciting public consultations till January 27, 2024.
The primary purpose of the proposed revisions is to clarify when this law applies to an emergency response situation, and when other specialised laws such as ‘Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases’ would come into play.
It also creates more legal responsibility for local governments for collecting, reporting, and handling emergency event information, and formulate emergency plans that should widely solicit opinions from all relevant stakeholders (some members of the Standing Committee, departments, local authorities, grassroots legislative contacts, experts, and the public).
Also, the revision argues that decisions, orders, and measures issued by emergency command institutions should have the same legal effect as decisions, orders, and measures issued by the local people’s governments. However, as Huang Ming, Vice Chairman of the Constitution and Law Committee of the National People's Congress put it, “Legal responsibilities shall be borne by the local people's governments and reported to the local Standing Committee of the People's Congress.”
Finally, the ‘Criminal Law Amendment (XII)’ [刑法修正案 (十二)] which was reviewed for the second time, also passed at this session. The amended law will be effective from March 1, 2024, and it is possible we see deliberations on its implementation take place during the next scheduled, February 2024 session of the NPCSC.
The amendments propose the inclusion of private sector enterprises operating in China under the ambit of the Criminal Law’s anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions. Previously, said provisions were applicable only to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public institutions.
The office has proposed amendments to articles 165, 166, 169, 387, 390, 391, and 393 of the Criminal Law, all of which concern punishments for bribery and corruption. Under articles 165, 166 and 169, for example, directors, managers, or any other personnel engaged in private entities are to be included in the fold of punishments previously applicable to SOEs and public institutions for the crimes of bribery and corruption.
The idea behind this move, as also articulated by Director of the Legislative Affairs Committee Shen Chunyao in the previous NPCSC session, is to bring parity in the treatment of SOEs and private enterprises, as well as to enforce the concept of “two healths” – the healthy development of the non-public sector of the economy and the sound growth of individuals engaged in the non-public sector. This concept was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech at a symposium on private enterprises in November 2018.
The amendments proposed to articles 390, 391 and 393 pertain to making sentencing heavier in serious cases of bribery – such as when bribes are given multiple times and/or to multiple people; when bribes are given in “key projects” or “major programs” (which may mean public-private projects that are closely associated with the state’s interests); when bribes are given in strategic fields such as law enforcement, justice, disaster relief, social security, and education and health; and when bribes were given to facilitate criminal activity.
Even though on multiple occasions, including in Shen’s comments, Chinese policymakers have described the acts of giving and taking bribes (with the latter often synonymous with “corruption”) as two “poisonous melons” growing from the same vine, these particular amendments take the crime of giving bribes more seriously in considering punishment. This may be attributable to the fact that, as per statistics declared by Criminal Law Office Head Wang Aili, the proportion of bribery cases to corruption cases in the past few years stands at 1:3, which means that the crime of giving bribes is being prosecuted much less.
The amended Criminal Law will provide a two-pronged impetus to Xi Jinping’s ambitious anti-graft campaign and increasing regulatory interventionism in the private sector. It may also be complemented by a “blacklist” system for businesspeople convicted of the crimes of bribery and/or corruption, a system the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced in 2021. It was implemented in Hunan province, where 106 “untrustworthy” personnel from six companies were put on a blacklist for giving bribes, and their market access was restricted. These numbers may see a surge across provinces with the force of the amended law behind them.
*(This section is non-exhaustive, and only discusses key provisions from some interesting legislations passed/ discussed at this session.)
Emphasising ‘High-Quality’
High-quality development has become a key Chinese ‘tifa’ (提法) to understand from 2023, and watch out for in 2024. At this recently concluded session of the NPCSC, the term ‘high-quality’ was used most often to describe the review and filing system the NPC is now trying to adopt with its ‘Decision on improving and strengthening the filing and review system’ (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于完善和加强备案审查制度的决定).
Adopted on December 29, this ‘Decision’ aims to lay down the guidelines for all key stakeholders of the Chinese governance system to file any legal texts and regulations with the NPC for record, and even request for review as needed. The list items for what must be filed include administrative regulations, supervisory regulations, local regulations, autonomous prefectural and county-level regulations, economic special zone regulations, Pudong New Area regulations, Hainan Free Trade Port regulations (collectively referred to as regulations), as well as interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate that belong to the specific application of laws in judicial and procuratorial work (referred to as judicial interpretations).
This ‘Decision’ has been taken in accordance with the deliberations at the 20th National Congress of the CPC, where it was proposed that there is a need for the country to “strengthen the implementation and supervision of the Constitution and improve the institutional system to ensure the comprehensive implementation of the Constitution.” Further, in December 2022, Xi Jinping had published an article the 40th anniversary of the promulgation and implementation of the current Constitution, outlining the requirements for enhancing the constitutional review, filing and review capacity, and quality.
In this regard, the NPC’s ‘Decision’ adheres to the guidelines laid down by Xi, and does the good work of reviewing good-faith implementation of the Constitution. Further, it is meant for “truly developing the people's congress system and comprehensively implementing the major principles of people's democracy throughout the entire process.” Overall, with a ‘high-quality’ filing and review system in place, the NPCSC aims to create a repository that manifests a “socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.”
The full text of the ‘Decision’ can be found here.
Insights from the Diplomatic Work Conference
By Manoj Kewalramani
Xi Jinping met with China’s foreign envoys in Beijing after the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference. He called on them to implement the outcomes of the conference. In his reported remarks, he made four points. Some of this is par for the course, but some of it does sound like a cautionary message amid the Qin Gang saga.
“First, keep in mind the original intention and mission and be loyal to the Party. Loyalty to the party, the country, and the people is the glorious tradition of the diplomatic front. Everyone travels around the world bearing the mission and must not forget why they set out. No matter where we go, we must not forget why we set out and keep the ‘sceptre’节杖 in our hearts. It is necessary to arm our minds with the Party’s innovative theories, cultivate a discerning eye for right and wrong, and always grasp the correct political direction. It is important to deeply understand the highest interests of the Party and the country and comprehend and implement the foreign policies of the Party Central Committee. The more than 1.4 billion Chinese people are the strong backing for diplomatic work. We must firmly carry diplomacy for the people on our shoulders and convey the warmth of the Party Central Committee to every overseas Chinese citizen.” 第一,牢记初心使命,做对党忠诚的笃行者。忠于党、忠于国家、忠于人民,是外交战线的光荣传统。大家肩负使命奔赴世界各地,不管走到哪里都不能忘记为什么出发,都要守住心中的“节杖”。要用党的创新理论武装思想,炼就明辨是非的火眼金睛,始终把准正确政治方向。要深刻领会党和国家最高利益之所在,领悟好执行好党中央对外方针政策。14亿多中国人民是外交工作的坚强后盾。要把外交为民牢牢扛在肩上,把党中央的温暖传递给每一位海外中国公民.
“Second, strengthen our responsibilities and become courageous pioneers. We must learn to understand and implement the Thought on Diplomacy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, face difficulties and take on our responsibilities. It is necessary to strengthen the construction of diplomatic capabilities, insist on seeking truth and being pragmatic, be sharp-minded, and use practical methods to serve the overall situation and solve problems; it is important to be adept at making both broad and deep friendships, and the work of winning hearts should be carried out not only in official circles but also by reaching into the grassroots; we must use tell Chinese stories well in international languages and methods, integrate China and foreign countries, connect ancient and modern times, and let the world better understand China in the new era.” 第二,强化担当作为,做奋勇开拓的创业者。大家要学懂弄通做实新时代中国特色社会主义外交思想,迎难而上、担当作为。要加强外交能力建设,坚持求真务实,做到耳聪目明,围绕服务全局、破解难题多出实招;要善于广交深交朋友,争取人心的工作既要做到庙堂,也要深入民间;要用国际化语言和方式讲好中国故事,融通中外、贯通古今,让世界更好认识新时代的中国.
“Third, dare to be good at struggle and be a defender of national interests. It is essential to enhance confidence, maintain strategic sobriety, firmly establish bottom-line thinking, and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests bearing the posture of readiness as though an arrow on a bowstring and with a firm will that is not afraid of strength/power. It is necessary to strengthen strategic planning and make good use of the magic weapon of the united front. It is important to make good use of multilateral mechanisms and rules, actively seeking understanding and support from the international community.” 第三,敢于善于斗争,做国家利益的捍卫者。要增强信心和底气,保持战略清醒,树牢底线思维,以箭在弦上的备战姿态和不畏强权的坚定意志,坚决维护好国家主权、安全、发展利益。要加强战略策略运筹,用好统一战线这个法宝。要善用多边机制和规则,广泛争取国际社会理解和支持.
“Fourth, persist in self-revolution and be the promoter of comprehensive and strict Party governance. Envoys should earnestly fulfil the primary responsibility of governing the Party and promote comprehensive Party building with the spirit of self-revolution. We must build a strong ideological defense line, constantly maintain self-discipline, self-reflection, self-vigilance, and self-motivation, and be someone who maintains steadfast political beliefs, strictly adheres to rules and disciplines, and possesses a clear understanding. A good team is built through training and management. It is essential to adhere to a strict tone, strengthen political integrity and discipline, place discipline and rules at the forefront, be strict with oneself, bear responsibilities with strictness, manage one’s jurisdiction rigorously, and forge a diplomatic force that is loyal to the Party, courageous in shouldering responsibilities, daring to struggle and is good at struggle, and is a disciplined iron army.” 第四,坚持自我革命,做全面从严治党的推进者。各位使节要切实履行管党治党主体责任,以自我革命精神全面推进党的建设。要筑牢思想防线,时刻自重自省自警自励,做政治信念坚定、严格遵规守纪的明白人。好的队伍是练出来、管出来的。要坚持以严的基调强化正风肃纪,把纪律规矩挺在前面,严于律己、严负其责、严管所辖,打造一支对党忠诚、勇于担当、敢斗善斗、纪律严明的外交铁军.