Expounding Security and Embargoing Sales
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Guarding the Great Wall: Xiang-Shan-Gri-La
Between September 12 and 14, the 11th Xiangshan forum (colloquially, China’s ‘Shangri-La’ Dialogue), was held in Beijing. This year’s forum hosted over 1,800 guests, including official representatives from more than 100 countries, international organisations, experts, scholars, and various national observers. Discussions at the event were fascinatingly usual and unsurprising.
Both Xi Jinping’s letter to the forum, and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun’s opening speech, revolved around the idea of “global changes of a magnitude not seen in a century,” and “fierce international competition and a complex international situation.” Dong also interestingly said that this is not a forum for “pointing fingers,” and went on to say something to the tune of, “major powers should not bully the small and the weak.” Hint: The “major power” he definitely isn’t talking about here is China!
Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Xiaodong also gave a keynote speech at the forum. It was largely aimed at expounding the value propositions and successes of the ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI), including the oft-repeated point about its vision being that of “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security”. Ironically, he also said, “the GSI calls for taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously, and peacefully resolving differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation, pointing the way for properly resolving hotspot issues.” Eyes are rolling here in India.
Charles Mondo, Minister of Defense of the Republic of the Congo, stated: “Global governance needs multipolar forces to participate. Countries, regardless of size, can play a role in global governance, which will create a more balanced approach to multilateral diplomacy.” Expectedly, a PLA Daily article interpreted the remarks in the following way:
“At a time when Global South countries must unite to confront threats and challenges, many forum participants agreed that China’s steadfast support for the Global South’s right to universal security and autonomous development demonstrates a strong commitment to true multilateralism and serves as an important model for uniting the strength of the Global South.”
It is important to note that there were, indeed, discussions on controversial issues at the forum in closed-door settings. For example, on day one, high-end interviews were conducted on topics such as ‘Security in Asia-Pacific’ (with Chinese and Indonesian participants), ‘China-US relations’ (with Chinese and American participants – the latter formerly from State Dept.), and ‘Security in Europe’ (with Chinese and Ukrainian participants).
Day two featured public sessions on multipolarity, regional order, Middle East security, and the Global South. Interestingly, in addition to Chinese and American participants, the Indian representative at Xiangshan was a speaker in the plenary on ‘The Right Way for China and the US to Get Along’ (there were two plenaries on this topic, by the way, and the second one had representatives from the UK, Israel, and South Korea too).
Even more interesting was the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum held in Lianyungang, Jiangsu province, on September 10.
This particular forum was about how law enforcement agencies globally can collaborate on common agenda items. China also proposed ‘10 measures to enhance global public security cooperation’ at this session, and reportedly, these measures focus on joint collaborations to crack down on cross-border crime and worldwide terrorism, build peaceful, safe, and open cyberspace as well as deal with risks brought about by the development of artificial intelligence (Global Times learned this from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security).
At this forum, Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong also held separate meetings with Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Zahid Hamidi, Minister of Home Affairs Saifuddin Nasution, Myanmar’s Minister of Home Affairs Yar Pyi, Zambian Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security Jack Mwiimbu, Nicaragua’s Director-General of National Police Francisco Díaz, and Russian Deputy Prosecutor General Dmitry Grudov. The message of ‘Win-Win’ cooperation was both the theme of the forum and the highlight of the meetings, in this regard.
In his meeting, the Burmese Home Affairs Minister apparently assured Wang that Myanmar would take effective measures to combat cross-border crimes, such as telecom fraud, and “ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Myanmar.”
In his meeting with Wang, Díaz of Nicaragua also expressed his country’s “eagerness to learn from China’s successful experiences and deepen practical cooperation in the field of law enforcement and security, bringing greater benefits to the people of Nicaragua.” This call to allow China’s interference in the security apparatus of a smaller, less powerful country is much to Beijing’s liking.
The concept document of the forum also had two interesting proposals, which one can watch out for in terms of future developments – first, it calls for the establishment and improvement of a global cybersecurity governance order and framework, and second, it calls on more countries to enhance intelligence and information sharing to effectively monitor and prevent global terrorist activities. Discussions at the forum also centered around a ‘global public security index’, although it is uncertain if a report was already developed around such an index, or the research report presented was geared towards building such an index collaboratively. In any case, Chairman of the forum, Zeng Weixiong, stated that a “report” is set to be published later in the year.
After a bunch of this chatter on sustainable and cooperative security, on September 22, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sanctioned 9 American companies – Sierra Nevada Corporation, Stick Rudder Enterprises LLC, Cubic Corporation, S3 AeroDefense, TCOM, Limited Partnership, TextOre, Planate Management Group, ACT1 Federal and Exovera – for selling arms to Taiwan. This decision followed a statement from the US State Department, who approved a potential sale of military spare parts worth about US$ 228 million to Taiwan. Earlier this year, in the run-up to the Taiwanese elections, China also sanctioned multiple US defence firms such as BAE Systems Land and Armament and Raytheon Technologies for their similar arms and equipment sales.
In the past few years, the US and Taiwan have developed closer relations as part of their bilateral efforts to counter Chinese aggression, and to also promote shared democratic values. This proximity has manifested itself in enhanced efforts to deepen political, trade, defence, and people-to-people ties. In some instances, it has also invited a starkly aggressive response from China – whose diverse response toolkit includes business sanctions.
Arms sales are a phenomenon precede Joe Biden’s presidency in the US – under Donald Trump’s presidency, for example, eight sets of arms and defence-related transactions with Taiwan took place in 2020 alone, amounting to approximately US$ 5.9 billion worth of transactions. Under Biden, there have been 15 such transactions since 2022, worth approximately US$ 4 billion. These transactions are diverse, too, ranging from sales of hard equipment such as main battle tanks and multi-role fighters and spare parts for wheeled vehicles, to transactions involving training of Taiwanese armed forces personnel.
The steady arms sales and training support provided to Taiwan is supported by the US’s commitments to the island’s defence under the ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ of 1979, as well as the understanding within some sections of the government that US’s interventions during a cross-Straits conflict scenario may not be enough. This is evident from the results of a tabletop war-game exercise conducted by the US House Select Committee on China in April 2023, where it was concluded through a bipartisan brainstorming process that any conflict in the Taiwan Straits will cost the US, Chinese and global economies real pain due to losses worth trillions of dollars.
Furthermore, results from tabletop war-game exercises conducted by American think tanks such as the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) respectively also show how even with the eventual victory of a US-led coalition in a conflict scenario, the conflict itself will be quite protracted, and “dozens of [American] ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service-members” will be lost. In this regard, the House Select Committee came to the conclusion that there is an urgent need to “arm Taiwan to the teeth,” and clear the US$ 19 billion worth of arms sales promised to the island.
On the trade front, the US and Taiwan are in the process of negotiating a ‘U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade’, and the Phase-I agreement for this Initiative has already been signed in June 2023. Through this agreement, the goal is to reduce tariff barriers between the two sides and coordinate labour and environment-related regulatory policies, so that there is increased business interoperability. Moreover, to ensure smooth flow of talent and industry personnel between the two sides, US Congressional delegations have been making frequent visits to Taiwan, while key Taiwanese politicians, too, have been making pit-stops in the US to engage with government, think tanks, and business. Two such visits – that of the then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei in August 2022, and that of Tsai to California in April 2023, where she met with the then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy – caused great concern in China, and even led it to conduct missile-firing exercises around Taiwan.
As the world looks to the Taiwan Straits and the continually evolving policies and tactics of the stakeholders involved, there is a consensus emerging that any conflict in the region will have drastic global economic and humanitarian implications. Moreover, the four above-mentioned factors remain fundamental in the making or breaking of the situation in the Straits, and have created fault-lines that are not easily resolvable.
In this regard, the hope for peace and stability lies in a few major bets – that China fundamentally alter its position on use of force with Taiwan, taking into account the costs of conflict, that the US’s deterrence tactics prove optimal, and/or that the Taiwanese population and political dispensation continue to support the status quo while investing in the island’s deterrence capabilities and diplomatic standing.
Worldview Weekly: What do Chinese Analysts Think of India’s ‘Global South’ Leadership?
Excerpts from Takshashila’s latest Issue Brief
At present, India-China relations are at their lowest since the 1962 war. Naturally, this is reflected in the two sides’ engagement with the Global South. So far, India has hosted three ‘Voice of the Global South’ Summits (VOGSS) – in January and November 2023, and most recently, on August 17, 2024. At each VOGSS, India refrained from inviting China. Even though New Delhi communicated the decision to Beijing, consequent non-invitations added to Beijing’s ire, and made the issue competitive in the Chinese perspective. To hence respond to India’s decision, in the aftermath of each of these summits, Chinese analysts took to the papers to express why a Global South without China is a fallacious or a ‘pseudo-proposition’ – a term popularised by a September 2023 Global Times article on the VOGSS.
Three major patterns of note emerge from Chinese analysts’ contentions on the subject:
Firstly, Chinese analysts have repeatedly emphasised the vagueness of the concept of the ‘Global South’, in a bid to legitimise their position that China is as much a part of the Global South as India, or the other 120+ attendee countries of the VOGSS.
Secondly, Chinese analysts contend that China’s role as a contributor to the growth and development of developing countries makes its participation in Global South-related endeavours, such as the VOGSS, critical. Zhang Jie, Dean and Professor at the School of International Relations, Xi’an International Studies University, ironically also argues that China’s “close ties and cooperation” with several developing countries makes China not just a developing country itself, but also a contributor to South-South cooperation.
Thirdly, most commentaries on the inclusion of China in the Global South grouping highlight the morality of Beijing’s arguments – that it stands for cooperation, inclusiveness, and mutual respect. For example, in a commentary published in June 2024 by two scholars at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, Lan Qingxin and Yang Penghui, they cite three reasons as to why China is a crucial member of the Global South. Of these, two of the reasons are that China’s approach to developing countries revolves around a “win-win” method of partnership with “mutual benefits,” and that China emphasises “harmonious coexistence” above competition. All the while, India’s bid for the leadership of the Global South is presented as opportunistic.
The twin goals of Chinese analytical narrative on the leadership of the Global South, are to garner legitimacy for China’s cause, and to simultaneously put India down. While the former is discussed above, the latter is achieved in two ways – by pointing to India’s economic or technological constraints, and by attempting to prove that India’s bid to become voice of the Global South is opportunistic and power-hungry. There are, again, three ways in which this exercise is undertaken to influence the reader’s perception of India’s Global South pitch:
Highlighting Limited Comprehensive National Power: Chinese analysts contend that one of the reasons why China is critical to the Global South, is because of its economic and financial contribution to the developing world. They point to India’s shortcomings in this regard, and question the numbers. For example, Chinese scholars cite a report published by the Asian Development Bank in 2017, which argues that till 2020, South Asian countries needed an annual investment of US$ 294 billion for their current infrastructural requirements, while the actual annual investment remained at around US$ 134 billion. For India, the estimated annual need was around US$ 230 billion, while its current investment stood at around US$ 118 billion. The numbers may now be obsolete, but Chinese analysts continue to use them to show that given the huge developmental requirements of South Asian countries, and India’s own difficulties in fulfilling its domestic infrastructural requirements, India cannot be the developmental leader Global South countries need.
Pitting Chinese Inclusiveness against Indian ‘Opportunism’: In how Chinese analysts assess India’s engagements with the Global South, they make India out to be an unscrupulous actor. This most prominently plays out in analysts’ descriptions of India’s engagements as ‘opportunistic’. In the own words of Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel of the People’s Liberation Army, “[Indian Prime Minister] Modi’s government is at best pragmatic and at worst opportunistic.” A detailed research report published in November 2023 in the Pacific Journal of the Eurasian System Science Research Association, a Chinese think tank, also claimed that the reason for India’s “re-kindled” diplomacy towards the Global South is that it needs the support of the grouping for power projection.
The ‘Pro-West’ Angle: A common concern reflected in Chinese analytical views on almost any issue pertaining to India, is the closeness between India and Western countries, particularly the US. India has often pitched itself as a ‘voice’ and not a leader of the Global South, and the goal of being this voice is to act as a ‘bridge’ between the Global South and the Global North (conventionally understood as a grouping of developed countries). Here, too, analysts find India’s proposal to be a bridge problematic, stating that its ‘pro-Westernism’ is a rebuttal to the Global South countries’ joint experiences with colonialism and financial repression. As explained by Hu Shisheng, Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), in an interview for Jiefang Daily in August 2024, “India’s major diplomatic strategy involves simultaneously engaging with the Global South and the West.”
In all, Chinese analytical views on India as the “voice of the Global South,” are deeply rooted in a sense of competition even though they project China’s willingness to cooperate more than compete. However, China and the Global South are presented as helpless, because of India’s “opportunism” and “pro-Westernism.” China’s indispensable role as a representative of the Global South, especially in terms of its contribution to developing countries’ growth and development, is again a feature of the competitive lens Chinese writings on the subject deploy, in that its economic might is contended against India’s lack of comprehensive national power. India’s ambitions to become a global power are shown as built on the back of support from the Global South, and its vision to act as a North-South bridge are hence portrayed as futile.
If you are interested in a detailed breakdown and assessment of some such comments presented by Chinese analysts in their writings, do check out my latest Issue Brief for the Takshashila Institution: ‘Cooperate or Compete?: What Chinese Analysts Think of India’s ‘Global South’ Leadership’.