Noise in the Neighbourhood
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Worldview Weekly: Stories from China’s Relations with Maldives and Nepal
By Anushka Saxena
I. The ‘Maldives Angle’ in India-China Relations
On May 24, second batch of Tibet’s glacial water has been donated to Maldives by the Chinese government. With Mohamed Muizzu coming to power in the Maldives, and winning not just the presidential seat but also the parliamentary majority, we are witnessing the island nation take a pro-China turn. While from the Indian perspective, there are some positives vis-a-vis positioning itself as the lender of last resort for Maldives when it needs a bailout due to debt pressure, the geopolitical competition with China is indeed intensifying. And this is manifested in water politics.
Since Maldives is a nation facing a drinking water shortage for over a decade, it has imported much of its drinking water requirements. And while India has been a major exporter of drinking water to Maldives, China is stepping up its game. In 2014, when Maldives faced one of its worst water crises, India massively supported the island with ‘Operation Neer’. A decade later, between March and May, 2024, China has become a big donor of drinking water to Maldives, having already donated about 3000 tonnes in the given period. Hence, water may no longer be a coercive tool India can use to extract diplomatic or security-related concessions from Maldives, given that China is stepping in. It also indicates that China is playing the long game, and diversifying its relations with India’s neighbouring countries from just trade and commerce to even socio-political stability.
Weaponising Tibet
This water is coming from Tibet’s glaciers, where China has launched a project to extract clean, clear and mineral-rich water not just made for export, but also for supporting an expanding premium mineral bottled water industry. Hence, Tibetan autonomous region government officials have also been positioned on the front-foot to conduct water diplomacy with Maldives. In fact, it is believed that the deal to export water to Maldives in March and May this year were finalised when Tibet Autonomous region chairman Yan Jinhai visited the country in November 2023.
This is inducing politics of its own, because China is pushing the sinicised term ‘Xizang’ instead of ‘Tibet’ on all countries willing to engage with China on a broad spectrum of issues, and especially import of water. Since Maldives has little choice but to accept such a consignment, it is also liable to refer to Tibet as ‘Xizang’. Subsequently, Maldivian media and foreign ministry have done so, thanking the ‘Xizang Autonomous Region’ for its support to Maldives. The infliction of sinicized names is part of China’s cartographic aggression, because it enables the CCP to lay historic and politico-linguistic claims to the territory.
Naturally, with the extraction and export of large volumes of mineral waters from Tibetan glaciers, there are potential environmental repercussions that may not have been accounted for by the Chinese state at this juncture. For example, reports claim that in the past two decades, 15% of Tibet’s glaciers have shrunk in volume. As more glacier melting takes place, especially in the mountainous regions of Southern Tibet, it is only likely that the Chinese state will extract more of Tibet’s water resources for commercial benefits. But the most important challenge will be the coupling of commercial extraction with diversion of glacier water for hydropower projects (like big dams) in Tibet. The harm caused by bottled water or export of drinking water will pale in comparison to the harm such diversion will cause to glacier volume. And so a holistic approach to environmental conservation may have to be adopted in this regard.
In a way, Tibet is at the forefront of China’s water wars in the region. Tibet’s 8 major transboundary river systems have the capacity to turn China into ‘Asia’s water hegemon’, given that their water can be used for both domestic economic and foreign policy-related interests, as well as can be weaponized to cause harm to lower riparian states (especially India). In that light, China’s moves vis-a-vis export of water to Maldives cannot be isolated from the larger approach China is adopting to using Tibet’s water resources.
II. Footprints in Nepal
China and Nepal have elevated their relations to a ‘Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity’ in 2019, and ever since, relations have been expanding on trade, infrastructural and political fronts. Most recently, on May 25, China and Nepal jointly announced the opening up of 14 traditional border transit points between the two sides, which have remained closed since the COVID-19 Pandemic struck in 2020.
These border points have been critical to free movement of peoples and goods based around Nepal’s border with Tibet. Nepal has been consistent in demanding that these border posts be opened, for the “economic flourishing” of border residents. Nepal has also expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that China has undertaken unilateral measures to close off these border points, and so from Beijing’s perspective, it is an understandable diplomatic move to alleviate Kathmandu’s concerns and slowly open up the border points. Only four of the 14 points were opened up till May, and only during Nepalese Deputy PM Narayan Kaji Shrestha’s visit to Tibet recently have they all been announced open. So while China may have made a unilateral move to close the points off, pressure from Nepal has been vehement. And for China’s growing footprint in the Indian neighbourhood, the move to finally open up the border points makes symbolic sense to signal that China is invested in an expanding relationship with Nepal.
While India remains Nepal’s largest trading partner, both export and import numbers with China have seen a spike, leading China to become Nepal’s second largest trading partner. And the trade relationship is highly asymmetrically in favour of China, so granting Nepal’s wish for reopening the border points in full may also be a gesture of benevolent goodwill in the Chinese conception.
At the same time, it is not just the Nepalese economy that strategically benefits – China, too, has political and economic ambitions vis-a-vis regional countries like Nepal. This is especially true in the context of China’s stalled BRI projects in Nepal, which it attributes to Nepal’s revolving door politics. So in a way, both sides have concessions to extract and promises to fulfill.
Further, on the India-China competition vis-a-vis Nepal, China’s growing friendship with Nepal has some worrying signals for India. With the reopening of the border points for trade and travel, coupled with Beijing’s April 2024 announcement to grant free Chinese tourist visas to Nepalese citizens, China is lending a helping hand to Nepal’s economy. At the same time, China is internally sowing discord in Nepal against India.
For example, in a September 2023 speech given by Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Chen Song, he expressed that Nepal is “unfortunate” to have a neighbour like India, because India is not an open market to provide economic opportunities to Nepal like China is. He further said that “India's policy towards Nepal and other neighbours is not so friendly and not so beneficial to Nepal.” The Indian embassy in Nepal expressed its discontent with the remarks to the Nepalese Foreign Affairs ministry, but no action was taken. Instead, amidst already heightening tensions with India on the matter of disputed border regions, Nepal recently printed its revised map on its new 100 rupee note, wherein it shows Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura as part of Nepal’s territory. These are regions India has already claimed as its own for a long time, and this cartographic discord between the two sides has a sharp China-sword hanging over its neck.
Overall, China has played sides at a time when India-Nepal relations are not at their best. Through soft measures such as the granting of free regular visas to Nepalese citizens, opening up of border points after a long and anxious wait for border residents, and making incendiary anti-India remarks in the landlocked country, Chinese officials are attempting to further gain Nepal’s trust. In turn, this trust can be further utilised to fulfill China’s infrastructure-related and geopolitical goals, as well as to create new opportunities for expanding Nepal’s economic dependence on itself, such as by investing in border connectivity projects which Nepal longs for.
Not complete with a Tibet angle of its own…
There are obvious drastic implications for Tibetans, too. While Nepal recognised Tibet as a part of the PRC long ago, it has often witnessed border crossings by Tibetan refugees fleeing a repressive regime. Often, closed border points have served the purpose of restricting such movement. It cannot be said whether the opening of the border points may be a good thing for freedom of access for Tibetans, since both PRC and Nepal governments have tightened control over any such border crossings. This is especially true since September 2023, as more Tibetans have been reported to cross the border to Nepal since the Dram border point was opened up.
In fact, while Tibetan markets are most coveted for merchants on the Nepal-China border, internally in Nepal, the Chinese state encourages issuance of careful instructions on managing how the Tibetan dissident community expresses itself. Anecdotally, Tibetans in Nepal report that they even face the threat of deportation if they engage in mass movements, especially when Chinese officials visit Nepal. As Nepal begins to interact closely with Tibetan officials such as CCP Secretary for Tibet Wang Junzheng for maintaining effective cross-border relations, Tibetan authorities will be expecting Nepal’s cooperation to curb any refugee movement from the autonomous region.
Matters of Economics and Human Security
From Nepal’s push to reopen the traditional border routes with China, it is clear that reasons are economic. When the border points were closed between 2020 and 2023, it was reported that Nepal’s exports to China declined drastically, with China’s share in Nepal’s export basket declining from about 2.8 per cent in 2018 to just 0.5 per cent in 2022. All the while, some exports from China to Nepal continued, even though they declined as well, and led border residents to lose both access to Tibetan markets for trade and purchase of critical goods. During the time, Nepal’s former Ambassador to Denmark Vijay Kant Karna even remarked that import of Chinese essential goods’ containers to Nepal declined from 80-90 pre-COVID, to just 3-14 per day post 2020. And the availability depended on the mood of CCP officials.
In such a scenario, Nepalese border residents had to pay more for transportation of essential commodities from other markets within Nepal and in India. This was exacerbated by income instability, as Nepalese media reported that the border closure led to loss of livelihoods, with many seasonal workers and residents of several mountain districts left jobless.
It can be hence inferred that the border opening will alleviate concerns of traders and consumers alike. It will also bolster Nepalese citizens’ travels to Tibet, many of whom have families in the autonomous region.
At the same time, the China-Nepal border remains problematic for various reasons. An open border holds more floor-related risks for Nepal than China, since the Nepalese side doesn’t have the dam infrastructure to prevent flooding as a lower riparian state. Further, an open border leads Chinese cybercriminals to cross into Nepal, while allowing for movement of smugglers and human traffickers. Even though China and Nepal have been attempting to align policies towards protection of border areas against such issues, the lack of border security infrastructure, especially Integrated Checkposts (ICPs), has led the matter to deteriorate. In this regard, India, too has suffered, as smuggling of illicit items such as red sandalwood from China to India also happens via the open borders between China and Nepal and India and Nepal. So the wide opening of border points may require all three nations to strengthen border control collaboration.
But at the same time, India also has to navigate the issue strategically, attempting to temporarily keep disputes aside and discuss border control with Nepal. This is especially crucial at a time when the Chinese are demonstrating willingness to build a closer relationship with Nepal, and are weaponsing border issues in the process.
Further, Wang Junzheng recently commented that there is a need to “give full play to the role of coordination mechanisms such as Sino-Nepal border trade and cooperation affairs, [and] focus on building an important channel for opening up to South Asia.” Hence, expansion of trade and commerce between China and Nepal means the building of a more asymmetric relationship between the two countries – one that will favour China more and more and can be easily manipulated by it to coerce Nepal’s hand on critical issues. But India may capitalise on the fact that even though 8000 categories of Nepalese goods are declared zero-tariff by China, rules of origins-related conditions are making it harder for them to find their market. Hence, there may also be scope for India to provide for more market access for Nepalese goods, even though it already holds the largest share in Nepal’s export basket.
Worldview Weekly: China at the Shangri-La Dialogue
By Anushka Saxena
Cross-posted from the Takshashila blog
At a time when the world is in great flux due to many interconnected conflicts with spillovers in both military and socio-economic domains, leaders met in Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue between May 31 and June 2, 2024. Representing China, Defence Minister Dong Jun and former vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai, participated in deliberations to make a case for China’s vision for the global order. The stark differences in the positions they presented, as well as the questions they were prompted to answer, indicate two things about Chinese narratives on security issues – one, that there is an intense internal debate, and two, that they are becoming increasingly unconvincing and unpopular.
Dong Jun’s war of words
As a plenary speaker at the SLD, Admiral Dong Jun made 35-minute remarks on how China perceives global security and where its priorities lie. His primary argument revolved around the ironic position that while “dialogue and consultation have always been [China’s] favourite choice for resolving differences and disagreements,” it is the US that interferes in the Asia-Pacific order. Generalising for what he otherwise acknowledged was quite a diverse set of cultures and social systems, Dong further added that the “people” of the region have come to despise countries that “take orders from hegemonic powers [like the US].”
The most striking feature of Dong’s remarks, in this regard, was his excessive emphasis on harmony and solidarity among regional countries. It furthered the Chinese conception of common, comprehensive and indivisible security, which refers to the interlinkage between security priorities of all countries. This forceful abstraction of China’s threat perception vis-à-vis the US aims to shape the perception that the US is a challenge to all countries in the region, and not just China. Ironically enough, Dong also said in his speech that China “has never coerced others into taking sides,” all the while propagating the concepts such as “shared future,” “common development,” and “unity” of militaries.
During both his plenary remarks and audience engagement, Dong vehemently emphasised how the Taiwan issue is core to China’s interests. So much so, that even though he was asked five questions on issues ranging from cybersecurity and the South China Sea, to the nature of the newly established PLA information support force, in his cumulative response, all Dong talked about was reunification with Taiwan. And it seemed from his almost rehearsed answer on the Taiwan question, that Dong was setting the record straight, both internationally, and domestically.
Given that in the context of Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te’s recent inauguration, the Taiwan issue has become an important bone of contention between China and the US, Dong felt it right to use the spotlight to elaborate the Communist Party’s long-held position on the matter. And domestically, it seemed as if he was attempting to impress Xi Jinping himself, at a time when Xi has not shied away from acting against his loyalists and removing them from coveted positions, especially for political or ideological transgressions. Since one of the most recent victims of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is Dong’s predecessor, Li Shangfu, his evident approach to what he addressed or left out seems deliberate in that light.
Cui’s beliefs on deterrence
On one hand, Dong presented an incoherent but incendiary vision of the security architecture China envisions for the region and the world. On the other hand, Cui Tiankai, former Chinese Ambassador to the US and Vice Foreign Minister, had a different idea to present altogether.
In his panel on ‘Deterrence and Reassurance in the Asia-Pacific’, Cui remarked China does not perceive great power relations as a zero-sum game, and rather seeks cooperation with the US on key contemporary security issues. Differing starkly from Dong, Cui expressed support for common, cooperative and sustainable, but not indivisible security. He also shirked the idea that deterrence was a necessity; instead, he made the case that if countries could cull out the potential for cooperation from otherwise contentious or rivalrous relationships, there would be no need for deterrence. He even argued that a threatening posture cannot be coupled with assurances of peace, thereby calling out the hypocrisy in some actors’ approaches to security.
Cui’s relatively moderate approach is indicative of the internal debate between current and former Chinese party-state officials on security issues. While Cui has previously acknowledged that the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable red line for the Chinese, in his SLD remarks, he made no mention of Taiwan, and issued no warnings to “external powers” against regional interference. Chinese participants were visibly disconcerted, which is why during the Q&A for his panel, Zhou Bou, retired PLA Colonel and Tsinghua University Senior Fellow, remarked about how he now “worries more about Taiwan,” given that US aircraft and naval vessels conduct regular sorties in the region.
Why Chinese Narrative is Falling Apart
While unanswered, the nature of the questions Dong Jun was asked speaks to the reality that Chinese narrative is becoming increasingly unconvincing and unsustainable. He was called out on the fact that he advocated for peaceful resolution of disputes, but in reality, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy continues to be aggressive with Philippines’ vessels in the South China Sea. He was also pushed twice to talk about the “immediate and concrete” actions China is willing to take to bring peace to Ukraine, but to no avail. And with the PLA’s latest “punishment” drills following Lai’s inaugural speech fresh in the minds of participants, Dong was also questioned on China’s idea of “peaceful” reunification.
Because the format of the SLD is one where diverse regional and global views are presented without granting either the US or China a heavy hand, questions are unprepared and impromptu. Such a format can be especially disconcerting for Chinese officials, who are used to rehearsed press conferences. Hence, at the 2024 SLD, other Chinese officials present adopted their own measures to make the CPC’s case on the sidelines.
For example, to elaborate on China’s position on Taiwan, Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Deputy Chief of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, held a press conference in a booked room at the Shangri-La hotel, just a few hours after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin’s speech at the Dialogue. He invited a selection of 50 journalists to this press conference, and quite literally warned the room in Mandarin that “Taiwan independence” means war. He also took jabs at the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which Austin had propounded in his remarks, and in a usual manner, also blamed the US for enabling “Cold War mentality” through “exclusive military clubs” like NATO and the Quad.
A similar press conference was held by Lt. Gen. He Lei of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences in the same room at the start of the SLD. There, he talked about how the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s recent exercises in the Taiwan Strait meant to simulate conditions that “came close to real war.” It was clear that where China felt it did not have the final say, it created its own stage, rounded up its own audience, and made them listen to the country’s vision for regional security in Mandarin. This could also be a sign that while the 21st century may be an Asian one, people have heard enough of what China has to say.
Overall, the show Chinese representatives put up at the SLD was frenzied and incoherent. The Taiwan issue emerged as more important than ever as compared to previous SLD iterations, with more officials elaborating on it either during their remarks, or during the Q&A and press conferences. However, this time, other countries and participants’ responses to China were much more firm, in large part because Dong Jun failed in passing on a constructive message of cooperation. In doing so, he projected the image of a China that will not negotiate or accommodate, even if he meant otherwise. And Cui’s remarks, though balanced, would be perceived as less significant, given that he is retired from active political service. And so if the takeaway for most SLD participants is that China won’t listen, we may just see China struggle much more to gather listeners for its own cause.
More from Takshashila:
Your regular dose of all things technology geopolitics, with an upcoming particular focus on the technological potential of India, awaits you in the Technopolitik newsletter!
The Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin is a monthly dispatch of Geospatial insights for India’s strategic affairs. Subscribe now!
If you’re curious to learn more about Takshashila’s work in general, and read fascinating stories curated by our very own Sachin Kalbag, subscribe to the weekly Takshashila Dispatch!
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
To begin with, some brilliant news. On June 13, Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson for the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme (IPSP) and Fellow, China Studies, is testifying for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), on ‘The CCP’s Focus on National Security and Tools for Political Mobilization’. The Livestream and the transcript of his testimony will be available on:
In this latest episode from ‘All Things Policy’, Takshashila’s daily public policy podcast, Amit Kumar and Anushka Saxena, Research Analysts with IPSP, discuss the geopolitical flavour of the season – China-Russia relations. Tune in:
We at Takshashila write a bunch of stuff on how China plays the long game in India’s neighbourhood. Most recently, Akshaya Venkatakrishnan, a Research Intern with IPSP, has authored a three-part blog assessing China’s arms sales and defence engagements with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. The pieces on Sri Lanka and Bangaldesh are now released:
Secondly, Akshaya and Vanshika Saraf, Research Interns with IPSP, have authored a two-part, two-sided blog on Taiwan-Japan relations, and whether Japan benefits from aiding Taiwan’s defence (or not):
Rakshith Shetty, a Research Analyst with IPSP, is doing some detailed work on China’s green energy and environmental policy. Read one of his latest articles for The Diplomat on the subject:
Amit Kumar also shared some of his thoughts with Deutsche-Welle (DW) News on whether India can be a good fit in the ‘China+1 arrangement’. Read the DW piece with Amit’s comments:
Finally, Anushka Saxena appeared on two external podcasts. In her episode with ‘Policy Room’ by the Social Policy Research Foundation, Anushka discusses contours and dynamics of the India-China relationship with Nipunika Sachdeva.
In her episode with the Kubernein Initiative’s 8-episode Podcast, ‘Re-Imagining the Indo-Pacific’, Anushka discuss roles of India, Germany, US and China in the Indo-Pacific, with co-speaker Dr. Felix Heiduk.