The “Secession” Bugle is Sounded ahead of Taiwan Elections
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
Greetings to our readers!
As the ‘Eye on China’ team is now home for Christmas and New Year, we have reduced the frequency of the newsletter in the past couple weeks. However, by year end, we hope to share with you another edition, in addition to this one, on the seventh meeting of the 14th NPCSC.
Till then, wishing you happy holidays, and hope you would enjoy reading our foreign policy and security weekly!
Guarding the Great Wall #1: TAO Accuses the DPP of ‘Green Terror’
By Anushka Saxena
Ahead of Presidential elections on the island of Taiwan, set to take place in January 2024, PRC’s rhetoric on subduing the island’s economic freedom and condemning Taiwanese ‘secession’ or ‘independence’, has intensified. In particular, spokesperson for the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Chen Binhua, who just made his debut in the post in September this year, had a field day with the press on the 27th of December, smashing the DPP nominee Lai Ching-Te’s stance on Taiwanese sovereignty and independence, while also defending China’s decision to suspend some benefits for Taiwan under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
It is a fact that Taiwanese businesses and investors are deeply interlinked with the Chinese economy. As of 2022, despite restrictions from the DPP and an overall increase in Taiwanese FDI going to other parts of the world, a majority of Taiwan’s FDI (about 53%), goes to mainland China. It is still a reduction of 9% from the peak of 62% in the 2013-2014 period (statistics are attributable to research conducted by PIIE).
For many years now, scholars have also debated whether this economic interdependence or co-dependence between the two sides of the Strait can lead to integration and dampen the will of independence for Taiwan, based on Keohane and Nye’s theory of economic interdependence, sensitivity and vulnerability (George Crane’s 1993 article is my favourite, in this regard). But even if the evidence to support integration may be weak, China has exploited favourable Taiwanese business sentiment to criticise the DPP’s policy emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence.
In this regard, the latest move made by the PRC State Council Customs Tariff Commission, under which tariff reductions on Taiwanese imports of some products within the ECFA, have been suspended. Chen has referred to this measure as being “reasonable, legal, and evidence-based, constituting normal economic conduct.” He contends that it is so because since the DPP came to power in 2016, it has refused to acknowledge the ‘1992 consensus’ and has continued to emphasise ‘Taiwan’s independence’, both of which are in violation of the fundamental principles underpinning the ECFA. It must be noted that from the Chinese perspective, when the negotiations for the ECFA and its implementation were underway in the 2010-2011 period, China had made amply clear to Taiwan that any economic cooperation between the two sides (under the ECFA or say, the Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum) will have to be built on the political foundation of mutual trust, mutual agreement to acknowledge the ‘1992 consensus’, and mutual opposition to Taiwan’s independence.
Now, Chen has argued that Taiwan is “external forces” to “declare independence,” and hence deserves the sticks of China’s carrots-and-sticks approach with the trade restriction policy in place. He stated further that if it weren’t for the DPP’s continued stance undermining political trust on both sides, “Any issues related to the ECFA could be properly resolved through cross-strait consultations based on the “1992 Consensus”.”
Next, Chen attacked the DPP and Tsai Ing-Wen’s 2022 decision to extend compulsory military conscription for Taiwanese men (born after 31 December 2004) from 4 months to a year, beginning January 1, 2024. The clear rationale was to create a powerful military and deter China amidst the growing tensions in cross-straits relations under DPP’s tenure. Even as per polls conducted by Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) and the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a majority of the surveyed population (between 70% and 95% of those aged 20 and above) supported expansion in the conscription service time (however, in case of the TPOF poll, it can be noted that the actual youth, i.e. those aged 20-29, actually oppose the extension [37.2% : 35.6%]).
This has rung obvious alarm bells for China, and in the run up to the elections, the TAO has chosen to discredit this DPP policy by arguing that “[when] DPP authorities introduced the so-called "3+1 program for studying while serving"… only 5 people applied” (presumably to the early registration programme for 3 years of schooling and 1 year of conscription in the same college degree).
Further, as part of his comments delegitimising DPP’s campaign in the upcoming elections, Chen added:
Responding to statements by Lai Ching-Te claiming that if elected, the "risk of cross-strait war would be minimized," Chen Binhua pointed out that the DPP authorities persistently adhere to the "Taiwan independence" stance, continuously escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, gradually pushing Taiwan into a dangerous situation of conflict and war. Many international media outlets believe that Taiwan is currently the "most dangerous place on Earth" and that the situation in the Taiwan Strait is at its "most dangerous moment." As a prominent figure in the DPP, Lai Ching-Te identifies himself as a "promoter of Taiwan independence" but claims that the risk would be lowest if he were elected. “Do you believe that? Will the Taiwanese people believe that? I doubt he even believes it himself.”
Chen further referred to Taiwan’s investigation of local neighbourhood leaders’ trips to China as DPP’s ‘Green Terror’. These investigations, targeting about 41 neighbourhood chiefs and their family members who took trips to China since June 2023, have been launched under the provisions of Taiwan’s ‘Anti-Infiltration Law’. So clearly, Taiwanese authorities have their guard up against any election interference, although such investigations themselves are not new. And according to Chen, this practice accounts for intimidation of the grassroots to cut-off any meaningful people-to-people ties with PRC.
In addition, answering a question on Taiwan’s defense preparedness ahead of elections, on December 28th, Director of the Information Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense and Spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense Colonel Wu Qian, stated:
The DPP authorities deliberately hyped up the so-called "mainland military threat" and exaggerated the tense atmosphere entirely for the purpose of seeking electoral benefits. As for the so-called Taiwan military dynamics, the People's Liberation Army has full control. We will, as always, take all necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The overall campaign is meant, as usual, to influence any readers of such rhetoric in Taiwan to not vote for the DPP in the January elections. The main tactic is the not-so-subtle de-legitimising of one of DPP’s key military policies, i.e. the extension of the conscription period, despite the existence of some positive numbers in population polls favouring the policy. It is also to conflate DPP’s pro-independence and military strengthening policy postures with the youth potentially going into the battlefield against China (which, as Lai Ching-Te is arguing, will not happen in his tenure).
Since a lot of these facets are dependent on how the youth in Taiwan feels about conscription, leaders’ stances on relations with China, and the success of China’s influence campaigns both in media and on TikTok, it might be worth to read this report (below) by Financial Times on how the youth feels about the elections.
In addition, it might also be of interest to our readers to peruse this piece in The Diplomat on the KMT’s stance on defense and relations with China, if KMT candidate Hou Yu-Ih comes to power.
Even though Hou has promised that he will conduct official negotiations with China in a bid to reduce cross-strait tensions, and has argued that communication is the only way forward, he has laid equal emphasis on strengthening the island’s defenses. According to his “3D” Strategy of dealing with China, the first step is ‘deterrence’, and then there’s ‘dialogue’ and ‘de-escalation’. In fact, one of the other things he has promised is to release a National Security Strategy for Taiwan during his first 10 months in office. But his narrative is more palatable, and so this far, it has remained untouched in the mainland.
Guarding the Great Wall #2: Looking Back and Moving Forward, PLA Style
By Anushka Saxena
As the Year of the Rabbit comes to an end in China, the PLA Daily has published an interesting commentary looking back at key military technologies from 2023. The examples they use to demonstrate the strides in each of these 9 technologies are foreign, ranging from the US Air Force’s testing of the use of AI LLMs in generating data for military tasks, to the research and development on hypersonic interception tech by the MBDA-led ‘Consortium of European Interceptors Against Hypersonic Threats’.
The technologies discussed include:
Generative AI Technology;
Shipborne Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Technology;
Anti-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Technology;
Military Robotics Technology;
Quantum Information Technology;
Hypersonic Weapon Interception Technology;
Sixth Generation Fighter Jet Technology;
Near-Space Aircraft Technology; and
New Materials Technology.
The PLA has been developing its own thinking and action plan for each of these technologies.
For example, on Generative AI, while the regulatory framework is currently focused on civilian applications, scholars in the military domain have highlighted both uses and challenges for LLMs. In March 2023, Retired General Hu Xiaofeng, who is now also a Professor at the National Defense University, wrote a comprehensive piece for the PLA Daily, titled ‘ChatGPT: How should we perceive/ think about it?” His three main arguments were:
Intelligence Collection and Data Analysis: In future information-driven intelligent warfare, personnel on the battlefield will possess robust intelligence gathering capabilities and near-real-time information perception. ChatGPT can be employed in basic tasks such as data analysis, decision support, and natural language processing.
Decision-making: Processing massive amounts of battlefield information through ChatGPT could significantly enhance the decision-making abilities of commanders.This might lead to transformations in some traditional job roles, potentially prompting reforms in military organizational structures.
Operational Planning: If further trained and integrated with other systems, it could be used for complex tasks like scenario-based training, generating operational plans, arranging combat strategies, formulating action plans, reviewing exercise results, among others, resulting in many adjustments in command and decision-making structures and potentially reshaping decision-making processes.
Although the US has demonstrated some capability in each of these verticals, the PLA is still in preliminary stages of thinking about its deployment, while grappling with regulatory and ethical questions. For those interested in understanding the PLA’s outlook on Generative AI in warfare further, do refer to this report prepared by Josh Baughman on ‘China’s ChatGPT War’. Below is a table from the report that summarises the potential applications of LLMs, as the Chinese security apparatus envisions:
Similarly, in terms of Anti-Drone systems, just last month in November 2023, China introduced its anti-drone rifle during joint military exercise Aman Youyi. According to a report presented by CCTV, “Having an appearance like a rifle with a scope, the [anti-drone gun] system can effectively detect, track, locate and recognize drones flying at low altitudes, according to the report.”
On developments in the PLA vis-a-vis Shipborne Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Technology, we throw some light in our paper on the Chinese Military UAV ecosystem, published in late September this year.
Looking forward, as the Year of the Dragon approaches, on December 25, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, and the Office of the National Leading Group on Supporting the Army and Caring for the Military jointly issued a notice on “Doing Well in the Work of Supporting the Army and Caring for the Military and Civilian Personnel During the New Year Spring Festival.”
The primary purpose of the notice is to remind all concerned to do a good job in promoting and practicing “Double Support work,” which refers to garnering support for the military and for national defense from civilians, while also encouraging the military to back the government and the people.
Interestingly, the a major chunk of the ‘Notice’ focuses on bringing about support for the military before and during war, and helping them in combat preparedness. It recommends that this can be achieved by “convening military-political symposiums, military-civilian joint meetings, plenary meetings of the Leading Group for Supporting the Army and Caring for the Military, and visiting and comforting troops stationed in various regions.” It also encourages “the broad mobilization of social forces and the aggregation of social resources to enrich and expand the content and forms of activities supporting the army, in fields like technology, education, culture, law, etc., to enhance the armed forces' capabilities.” These endeavours also further the cause of the Chinese military principle, ‘Military-Civil Fusion’ (军民融合).
In its concluding thoughts, the ‘Notice’ emphasises:
…All regions and units strictly adhere to the requirements and regulations concerning safety, confidentiality, military-civilian interactions, improvement of work style, and epidemic prevention and control during the organization and implementation of activities. They should aim for simplicity, frugality, safety, and orderliness.
With the PLA becoming increasingly assertive and confident in combat training and preparedness, the people need to be influenced and convinced time and time again to continue to support the PLA’s warfighting endeavours and the Party’s vision for the military. Notices such as these, in addition to military-related educational campaigns, also serve as excellent tools to mobilise talent in military innovation at a time when it is of utmost importance amidst geopolitical hostility. Going forward, ‘Double Support’ will be key to the PLA’s operational and political development.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In this Commentary for The Hindu, Anushka Saxena discusses insights from China’s December 2023 Central Economic Work Conference
In this episode from Takshashila’s ‘All Things Policy’ daily podcast, Amit Kumar speaks to Harshit Sharma on the Crisis in the Levant