Tightropes: What does China have to say about the Iran-Israel Fiasco? + A Decade of Comprehensive National Security
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Greetings to our readers!
Welcome to another edition of ‘Eye on China’. Before we dive in, we’d like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in an upcoming webinar being organised by the Takshashila Institution to try and answer the question, “Can the UN play a role in responding to a Taiwan Strait Conflict?”
The webinar is being conducted on OpenTakshashila.net, our free and open platform to reflect, educate and discuss. Eminent speakers such as Mr. Vijay Gokhale (senior non-resident fellow, Carnegie India & fmr. Indian Foreign Secretary) & Mr. Thomas J. Shattuck (senior program manager, Perry World House, U-Penn), will be joining as discussants, and the presenter is Anushka Saxena (China Research Analyst at Takshashila).
If the topic and the line-up interests you, please: RSVP Here.
We look forward to hosting you, and happy reading!
Worldview Weekly: Chinese Sentiments on the Israel-Iran Fiasco
By Anushka Saxena
As known to many of our readers, on April 13, 2024, Iran launched massive drone and cruise and ballistic missile strikes against Israel, retaliating against Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria on April 1, which killed various officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. And even though Israel has not retaliated to Iran’s strikes, amidst intense diplomatic efforts across the board, options to coerce Iran economically are being discussed in both the EU and the US, and at the same time, to put political pressure on it, US officials have reportedly roped in China, and have restricted Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s access to a few streets in New York as part of his visit this week to a UN Meet tomorrow (April 18).
China finds itself pulling on various threads in this fiasco. For starters, China has a position to defend vis-a-vis its increasingly discussed role as a mediator and peace broker in the Middle East. Iran’s retaliation against Israel has invited great flak from Western countries, given that it is isolated in comparison to Israel internationally. However, China considers itself a “comprehensive strategic partner” to Iran, and therefore finds itself in a precarious position vis-a-vis countries like Saudi Arabia that are negotiating normalisation with both Israel and Iran.
This is evident from the recent phone call on April 15 that took place between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his counterpart in Saudi Arabia, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud. As per the Chinese readout of the meeting, Wang emphasised to the Saudis that not only does Beijing condemn Israel’s attack on Iranian consulate in Damascus, which it believes violates international law, it also believes that Iran’s “counterattack does not target any neighboring country and that it is willing to continuously pursue a good-neighborly policy.” In vouching for Iran, Wang also said that “China stands ready to strengthen communication and coordination with Saudi Arabia, follow through on the important consensus reached by the heads of state of the two countries [referring most likely to the deal between China, Iran and Saudi on continuing normalisation of Iran-Saudi diplomatic relations], continuously deepen political mutual trust, and promote bilateral relations to higher levels.”
Potentially taking a jab at the US, Wang also noted that Beijing “appreciates Saudi Arabia’s emphasis on resolving issues through diplomatic means, adding that China is willing to work together with Saudi Arabia to avoid further escalation of confrontation.” Looking at the issue from the lens of its competition with the US, China’s emphasis on appreciating Saudi’s diplomatic posture and wooing it to build a stronger, “higher level” partnership, indicates that China wishes to position itself as a peace broker and a more preferable diplomatic ally for major powers in the Middle East.
Of course, this also means that China must have something to show for itself in its pursuit of peace in the Middle East. In this regard, Wang Yi, in his call with Iranian FM Abdollahian, has also made consistent efforts to convince Iran to not escalate the situation further, even while affirming Beijing’s belief that “Iran can handle the situation well, maintain its sovereignty and dignity, and avoid further instability.” With Iran, China is playing so far a careful game of balancing between supporting its actions of self-defence and persuading it to avoid creating a war.
Circling back to the US lens with which China is also viewing this fiasco, US’s intentions to sanction more Iranian oil exports, as highlighted in a speech made by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on April 16, are a cause of concern for Beijing. This is also because other senior US Treasury officials have also stated that they will be seeking help from China, G7 partners, and all other major suppliers in the world to help the US meet the goals of its sanctions and limit Iran’s military abilities. Further, in the EU, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has also announced the possibility of the EU countries collectively declaring the IRGC a terrorist organisation.
From the perspective of China-Iran diplomatic relations, this will ring huge alarm bells in Beijing, because Iran relies on China as a military and economic partner. Moreover, any declaration of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation would mean China’s interactions with it will also invite condemnation and lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Europeans, who China is also attempting to normalise and stabilise relations with.
At the same time, as much as Chinese media commentators are enjoying pulling the US down for “humbling itself and begging China for help” [read CCTV military comment expert Du Wenlong’s piece in Toutiao], the fact is that just a week ago, the US has added to its entity list two more Chinese companies – Jiangxi Xintuo Enterprise Company and Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology Company – for being involved in the Iranian and Russian drone programmes. So China has a tough choice to face if the US wields, as Chinese analysts calls it, the “sanctions big stick.”
Amidst all of this, my understanding is that China actually regrets Iran’s retaliatory attack. In fact, when Iran began deliberating a retaliatory strike before April 13, another commentary on Toutiao by a senior media official, Niu Tianqin, argued that a war is imminent, but Iran cannot “let anger cloud [its] judgment,” and cannot “let calmness destroy reason.” Another commentary on 163.com by Fan Hongda, a professor at the Middle East Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, tries to persuade and justfy the Chinese audience to empathise with Iran, arguing that “it’s worth noting that despite its diplomatic institutions being attacked by the enemy, military retaliation against Israel is not Iran’s first choice” [thereby indicating that Iran’s hand was so coerced that it had no other option]. To this end, Fan also cites reports from April 6, that Iran proposed to the US through Oman that as long as the US forced Israel to completely end the Gaza War and stop attacking the southern Gaza city of Rafah, Iran would not directly attack Israel. If this is true, then there was no way this demand was anyway ever going to be fulfilled. And now, as Dan Wenlong argues in his piece (cited above), the US can do all it wants to sanction Iran, but “the least desired scenario [Iran’s retaliatory strike] has already occurred.”
And the much worse is in the works, as Israel is planning its own retaliation against Iran’s counterattack, with reports suggesting that Israel is readying its fighter jets and planning a “strong and decisive response.” Once the response comes into play, there is little China will be able to do to stop any fallouts into armed conflict, except for pursuing diplomatic channels for de-escalation, especially with Iran, Saudi, and maybe even the US.
More on what the internal policy and academic debate in China on the issue is: On April 14, Tide News China conducted an interview on the Israel-Iran fiasco and the broader Israel-Palestine issue with three Chinese scholars – Yu Guoqing, a researcher at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Ma Xiaolin, Dean of the Mediterranean Institute at Zhejiang International Studies University; and Ji Kaiyun, Director of the Iran Research Center at Southwest University.
Some key excerpts:
When asked whether Iran took the action to retaliate seriously, or if it was just symbolic, Ji Kaiyun opines:
“From Iran’s perspective, revenge must be taken, both for national dignity and national interests, as well as to assert the legitimacy of the Iranian Islamic regime. Iran’s consulate was bombed by Israel, and two senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were killed, so the Iranian government must explain to the people and to the deceased soldiers. [However] Iran will not allow its country to be plunged into a state of war, nor will it allow the country to be engaged in a long-term war of attrition, as this would weaken Iran and endanger the long-term stability of the Islamic regime.”
The same sentiment of rationalising Iran’s actions on account of national honour and dignity, and at the same time, expressing the belief that Iran is a rational actor, is evident here.
When asked what Iran’s goals and targets were with its strikes, Yu Guoqing, rather candidly, argues:
“Iran’s choice of targets certainly includes military facilities, but most of the missiles and drones were intercepted midway, including interceptions by the US and UK forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Iran's direct strike against Israel is, of course, for retaliation, but it also has the factor of regaining face.”
When asked whether Iran’s actions under Article 51 of the UN Charter legitimately accounted for self-defence, Yu again candidly says, “this is only Iran’s unilateral explanation.” Note that this departs from Beijing’s official position, which agrees with the fact that bombing of diplomatic buildings is a violation of international law and warrants retaliation.
When asked what Israel may gain from its own retaliation against Iranian counterattack, interesting answers emerge. For example, Ma Xiaolin opines (albeit incorrectly, now that we know Israel is preparing for a counterattack):
“If Iran’s missile targets do not cause serious consequences, but only symbolic punishment, and with the interception and statements of support from the US, Israel may refrain from retaliation.”
In opposition, Ji opines:
“Although we can see that Iran’s revenge has limited goals and restraint, Israel must be prepared for a comprehensive response. They do not rule out the possibility that Iran will launch a large-scale attack and strike while the iron is hot. Therefore, all Israelis will be highly vigilant and prepared to respond to any potential crisis.”
Finally, on being asked whether the US will intervene in a potential Iran-Israel escalation and whether Israel expects it to intervene, the scholars again differ, albeit slightly. For example, Ji is somewhat suspicious of the idea that Israel wants complete US support in its attacks on Iran. However, he says:
“Israel is currently walking a tightrope, stepping into a gray area. They do want to drag the United States into the conflict, bring the United States into the war, and make the United States intervene to help Israel completely solve the threat posed by the "Shiite Resistance Axis" led by Iran.”
On that, Yu is much more sure, as he argues:
“Israel has absolute confidence in the United States' commitment to defending Israel's survival and security. They believe that the United States will stand firmly with Israel at a critical moment.”
And Ma opines on behalf of US policy:
“Israel is currently surrounded by wolves. The Gaza conflict has been dragging on, domestic anti-war sentiment and calls for early elections are growing, and there are civilian clashes between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank... In this situation, if the United States refuses to be dragged into the water by Israel, and Israel expands and escalates the war on its own, it is not a wise choice.”
Readers can peruse the full text of the interview here on QQ.
Guarding the Great Wall: A Decade of the ‘Overall National Security Concept’
By Anushka Saxena
On April 15, 2024, China marked a decade of the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘overall’ ‘national security concept’ (总体国家安全观). Announced in April 2014 by Xi Jinping, the comprehensive national security concept has, in the past ten years, donned many hats and gathered many meanings. In the most basic terms, as described in a special ‘National security education day’ column published by the China Nuclear Safety Administration published on April 15, 2017, the “rich connotation” of this overall national security concept is its five pillars – prioritize people’s security; with political security as the foundation; economic security as the basis; and military, cultural, and social security as safeguards; while promoting international security as the cornerstone. Over time, scientific and technological progress, security of the cyberspace and the physical territory of China, and building internal financial stability, have all become integrated into the five elements of the Concept.
One of the most controversial bits of the national security concept, as witnessed in the past few years under Xi, has been the securitisation of all spheres of governance in China, and the attempt of the CCP to balance “development” and “security.” As a result, we have witnessed the promulgation of a revised cyber-espionage and cyberspace laws, both of which focus on reducing foreign participation in China’s information and technology space (especially, for example, through the 3-5-2 project, which aims to make China completely self-reliant vis-a-vis computer hardware and internet software by 2025), and eliminating the possibility of any foreign entity operating in China leaking information abroad. This is also one of the reasons why business sentiment took a hit last year, when officers of US enterprises like Capvision and Mintz group were raided, and any foreign company consulting with Chinese clients had to over-bureaucratise processes of collecting, storing and sharing information collected from within the territory of the mainland, abroad.
Financial and economic security, too, are major parts of this Concept, and the balance between development and security again plays out here, as witnessed from the example of China’s crackdown on the real estate sector, and subsequent adoption of stimulus measures to ease the pressure on housing sales. As argued in the latest commentary from Xinhua (republished and picked up from the Zhengzhou Daily) discussing the implementation of the overall national security concept over the years, “in recent years, influenced by multiple factors, China’s real estate market has undergone adjustments. Promoting the steady and healthy development of the real estate market has become an important task for effectively preventing and resolving major economic and financial risks.” These risks include, but are not limited to, “cracking down on the disorderly and unchecked expansion of capital,” and bursting the bubble because of the over-reliance of the Chinese economy on real estate investment, household savings linked to it, and exports, and the lack of due regard to domestic consumption. The commentary also praises the Chinese government’s 50 billion yuan special loans for buying homes, the establishment of a 200 billion yuan loan support plan for buying homes, the establishment of a 100 billion yuan rental housing loan support plan, as pragmatic successes in reviving the country amidst an economic slump.
Due to its dynamic nature, the interpretation of the Concept and its pillars have also moulded themselves, as required by the need of the hour. For example, as per a CCP News piece from 2020 anniversary of the Concept, Xi Jinping’s war against the COVID-19 ‘epidemic’ is in keeping with the principle of “people’s security” as part of the Concept. Hence, the “blockade war” (as the commentary puts it) launched through severe lockdowns, harsh testing measures, and other prevention and control measures, were all justified by the existence of a widespread campaign to achieve overall national security.
In the contemporary geopolitical era, as China faces an increasingly unfavourable external atmosphere, the overall national security concept perhaps best manifests itself in China’s approach to international relations. From achieving food security through a ‘Grain Security Law’ set to come into effect on June 1, 2024, amidst US sanctions on Chinese food imports, to tackling “grey rhinoceros” and “black swan” events in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Straits and other “red line” areas of contention, through preparedness of the PLA, comprehensive security includes it all.
And at the center of everything, are the “Two Establishes” (两个确立) and “Two Upholds” (两个维护), which refer to the superior power of the CCP and the central authority of Xi Jinping. These concepts have permeated every policy decision, every economic plan, and every governance strategy in the past decade, and speak directly to the Concept’s pillar on “political security as the foundation.”
The Nodal Agency
A discussion on the Overall National Security Concept is incomplete without reference to the Central National Security Commission of the CCP (CNSC, 中央国家安全委员会). This agency, of which not much is known, was founded during the third plenary of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, and is described sometimes as one of the most important decisions of the Party Congress.
The idea of a Security Council for China goes way back to the suggestions made by Wang Daochan, the former Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, to Jiang Zemin. Xi’s implementation of the idea in 2013 has stirred up various discussions vis-a-vis the role of the institution, and the May 2023 meeting of the CNSC, which is the first publicised meeting of the Commission since 2014, gives us some idea. It’s role, as propounded by Xi to the attendees of the meeting, is to act as a coordinating body that is meant to speed up modernization of China’s national security system to ensure the integration of development and security and to shape a favourable external security environment for national security. From governing data and new technologies such as AI, to creating a robust national security legal framework in the country, various facets were discussed as duties of the Commission.
Last year, in a commentary published in Quishi magazine on the 2023 anniversary of the overall national security concept, the-then Minister of State Security Chen Yixin argued:
“At present, China’s development stands at a new historical starting point, and there have been significant changes in the external environment and security situation. Various foreseeable and unforeseeable risks, challenges, difficulties, and even turbulent waves have posed higher requirements for national security work. Only by accelerating the construction of a new security framework, firmly grasping the bottom line of security development, can we establish development on a more secure and reliable basis, can we ensure mutual promotion and advancement between the new security framework and the new development paradigm; can we ensure that the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is not delayed or even interrupted, and that Chinese-style modernization proceeds steadily and far.”
It tells me that in the next few years, as the Concept will continue to gain traction, the aspect of integrating development and security will perhaps be most pertinent to China’s goals. This is because the official roadmap for China’s comprehensive security going forward will be defined by the concept of “constructing a new security architecture and new development pattern” (以新安全格局保障新发展格局). Hence, security will continue to remain indivisible, and promoting the balance between “high-quality development” and “high-level security” will emerge as a key facet of achieving “great rejuvenation” and “Chinese-style modernization” in the “New Era.”
For more, I encourage readers to peruse this excellent brief by Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens for China Leadership Monitor (Fall 2023, Issue 77).
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In this long-form commentary for Institut Montaigne in France, Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme and China Studies Fellow at Takshashila, discusses “Supply Chain and Market Scale: India as the Next China?”
Next, in this episode of Takshashila’s daily public policy podcast, ‘All Things Policy’, IPSP Research Analyst Amit Kumar asks Dr. Michael Pettis, Professor of Finance at Peking University and Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the question – “Why China’s Economy May Never Grow at 6 Per Cent?” Tune in below:
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