I Spy with my Little Eye – on China!
Greetings to our readers!
Welcome to the first edition of a revamped ‘Eye on China’ newsletter. We’ve been going strong for about 5 years, and we’re now attempting to narrow our focus to Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
We hope you will enjoy reading the newsletter in this format, and as always, we welcome any comments/feedback, brickbats, and the occasional praises!
Worldview Weekly #1: Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy
By Amit Kumar
Last Monday, reports surrounding the arrests of two UK Parliamentary researchers for allegedly spying for China have rocked the British political brass. While the arrest was made in March earlier this year, it became public only last week. The media reports confirmed that the two researchers had connections with several Conservative Party MPs.
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said that he is “acutely aware of the particular threat to our open and democratic way of life” by China, and would “take all necessary steps to protect the country from foreign state activity.”
China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Mao Ning, during a regular press conference, described the allegations as “entirely groundless” and urged the UK to “stop spreading disinformation and stop political manipulation and malicious slander against China.”
Chinese Embassy spokesperson in the UK, while responding to the “spy incident,” dismissed the case as “completely fabricated” and “self-directed” and confirmed that “China lodged stern representations with the British side and strongly condemned it.”
The spokesperson further said:
“The incident shows that some British politicians have fallen into a surprising anti-China paranoia. Their baseless slander and accusations against China are intended to cover up their incompetence and failure in solving Britain’s domestic political, economic, and social issues and divert public attention.”
The Global Times took particular offense at Sunak’s phrasing of the allegations that described China as a threat to Britain’s “open and democratic way of life.” In a strongly-worded opinion, it said that the remarks were not only “irrational and disrespectful, but also reflect the inferiority, sensitivity and anxiety that British politicians have about China.”
The GT defense sought to rally the developing world and those with a history of colonial rule to describe allegations as “filled with subconscious arrogance” that should remind them of “the historical pain of countries that have been colonized by the West.”
It then makes a not-so-novel argument that the UK itself was once the world’s largest empire and that it built its so-called ‘open and democratic way of life’ on plunder and exploitation of other developing countries and thus has a mark of colonialism all over it.
It questioned Britain’s rightful position to even make accusations regarding foreign interference when it itself continues to interfere in China’s domestic issues - namely Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.
Adopting a sarcastic tone, the GT piece asks: '“How exactly does China threaten Britain’s ‘open and democratic way of life?’” It continues: “Is it through China’s supply of plenty of high-quality and low-priced products to Britain, or through the considerable income generation and jobs it brings to the UK in the fields of tourism, education, clean energy?”
Defending China’s intentions, and explaining the reality behind the ‘China threat, the piece argues:
“Like all developing countries, China has no interest in interfering with, altering, or ‘threatening’ the way of life of Western nations. The ‘China threat’ narrative has gained currency in the West because they feel “profound unease in responding to the strong calls for reforming the international political and economic order by the developing countries.” Also, the fact that China as the largest developing country has seen the most remarkable development in recent years has triggered the strongest apprehension among the Western nations.”
However, in the same breath, the piece argues that Sunak made the remarks under pressure from the radicals who have hyped the ‘China threat’, and who have criticised him for being “too soft” on China.
Then, Guancha.cn also featured a piece that interestingly and ironically questioned the British National Security Act, calling its definition of national security and coverage too broad and vague with extreme extraterritorial effects. The piece appears concerned that a new bill listed in the British parliament seeks to criminalise ‘foreign interference’ for the first time. It expressed worry that this “all-round siege”-style criminalization method has “strengthened the power of the British government to the greatest extent.”
The piece also expressed surprise at the mixed signals being sent by the British government vis-a-vis China. Quoting CNN, it said that on one hand, the British ‘Integrated Review’ on Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy described China as an ‘epoch-defining challenge’. On the other hand, the British government wishes to engage with China in a ‘strong and constructive’ manner.
Finally and funnily enough, on social media, several Chinese netizens opined that Beijing is being unnecessarily targeted while it is India that has infiltrated the British PMO. Oh well!
Guarding the Great Wall #1: Military-Civilian Fusion, but in furthering ‘National Defense Education for All’
By Anushka Saxena
September 2023 marks the annual celebration of China’s ‘National Defense Education Month’, with September 16 designated as the 23rd National Defense Education Day (the third Saturday in September has been designated for this commemoration since 2001).
Amidst speculations surrounding the removal of Chinese Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu for suspected involvement in corrupt weapons procurement activity, under the umbrella of national defense education (国防教育), emphasis is once again being laid on safeguarding the military from “erosion by decadent thoughts such as the pursuit of pleasure and selfishness” (利己主义等腐朽思想侵蚀). This, among many others, is a significant pillar of national defense education, as defined by Liu Hongshun of the Military Law Research Institute of the Academy of Military Science in the 14 September issue of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s mouthpiece, the PLA Daily.
Under Xi Jinping, transitioning China from a “big country in education” to an “educational power in the New Era” (新时代教育强国的) is a crucial agenda item. Naturally, as the party’s army, the PLA is also subject to the Chinese Communist Party’s educational endeavours, which largely focus on cultivating love for the party, realising the goal of comprehensive national security and development, and building ideological consensus on ideas such as ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’, ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’, ‘patriotism’, and ‘technological revolution’. Not surprisingly, these also happen to be some of the most prominent keywords of Liu’s article.
But in the context of national defense education, perhaps the most important pillar that emerges is the collaboration between the army and the people. Hence, defense education, despite what it might seem at the outset, doesn’t just mean mindset training for the PLA, but for the country as a whole.
For example, Liu makes mention of the 20th Party Congress report, in which Xi Jinping argued that “We will raise public awareness of the importance of national defense.” Similarly, the Draft Patriotic Education Law that has been under deliberation with the 14th Standing Committee of China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC-SC) since June 2023, provides in Article 13:
“The state is to employ diverse means to carry forward the Core Socialist Values and carry out publicity and education on the Constitution and rule of law, education on national security and defense, to enhance citizens’ knowledge of the Constitution and rule of law and their conception of national security and defense, and to guide citizens to conscientiously fulfill the obligations to preserve national and ethnic unity, and to preserve the nation’s security, honor, and interests.”
Hence, a major focus of national defense education activities has been to target citizens and inculcate in them a sense of love and respect for the armed forces in specific, and an “overall national security concept”* (总体国家安全观) in general. To achieve this, just after the 19th Party Congress, in December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Education issued a Notice announcing a list of primary and secondary “national defense education demonstration schools” (中小学国防教育示范学校).
It started out with the recognition of 618 schools across the country that were to act as demonstration zones for national defense education. This meant that students at these schools were required to engage in “immersive national defense education” through party education, ideological and political education, visits to military bases, and special reports on military-civilian co-construction, in order to achieve a three-fold aim: enhancing students’ national defense awareness, sense of national self-esteem and sense of self-confidence. It was announced in February this year that the MoE and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission have expanded the list of such nationwide demonstration schools to 2,687.
How is the Chinese official media narrating the impacts of this campaign?
Here’s an interesting story from a report (dated September 16, 2023) published by 81.cn, from the perspective of a ‘national defense education’ instructor at the Bayi Middle School, Nanchang City, Jiangxi Province:
“Teacher, I am now serving as an instructor at a local 'junior military academy,' inspiring more children to pursue their national defense dreams, just like you...”
On a day in early September, when a teacher who had previously served as an instructor in the school's national defense class handed me this letter, I was guiding the new cohort of national defense class students through parade training.
The letter was written by Ai Chong, the first student of our school's national defense class. In 2019, he gained admission to the People's Armed Police Force Officer Academy with outstanding results and is currently serving in the Zhejiang Provincial Armed Police Force. The teacher told me that many national defense class students who entered military academies often write letters to their alma mater, sharing their life in the military with their junior peers. Over time, writing “family letters” became a tradition for graduates of the school's national defense class.
During training breaks, I read this '“family letter” to the students, and everyone was excited, saying things like, “I hope to get into the military academy like the senior students” and “I hope to become a ‘heroic soldier’.” Seeing the students passionately discussing their dreams, as a dedicated instructor in the national defense class, I felt deeply gratified.
Chinese military media has an iconic storytelling style. This is a classic example of testimonials from the demonstration schools being used to show the zeal to become like ‘seniors’ who have graduated from the same programme before.
The goal of this initiative overall is clear: to recruit high-quality talent that, regardless of a civilian background, can appreciate national defense and security, and feel incentivised to become part of the armed forces.
This is well reflected in another PLA Daily commentary from September 13, 2023, which argues:
“The way to strengthen the military lies in obtaining talented individuals. With rapid advancements in technology, a large number of cutting-edge technologies are being applied in the military domain, ushering in a new wave of military technological revolution, and the nature of warfare is quietly undergoing changes. The people’s army can only build a strong steel wall by “gathering talents from all over the world and making good use of them.”
Since military modernisation has been underway, there has been immense focus on acquiring advanced talent to meet the ever-growing needs of modernisation, informatisation, and intelligentisation. National Defense Education is the absolute right opportunity to make this happen, through recruitment endorsements, training from current armed forces personnel, and of course, spreading awareness about the relaxation of induction requirements for those from civilian backgrounds.
Short Note:
*Overall National Security Concept (总体国家安全观): Under Xi Jinping, national security has become a more holistic concept than just guarding the borders. It has now integrated the concept of ‘development’ with ‘security’, and the concepts of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security. The narrative on ‘overall national security’ has evolved to this after a long journey, from solely advocating an ‘Asian Security concept’ in 2014, and further advocating ‘ethnic unity’ and ‘authoritative leadership of the Party’ since 2017. With the continued ‘securitisation’ of everything, the concept has become, in the truest sense of the word, ‘overall’.
Also Read:
6 types of activities to look out for as the country celebrates National Defense Education Month
Party Pushes National Defense Education for All (Jamestown Foundation)
Worldview Weekly #2: Who will pay for IMEC?
By Amit Kumar
During the 2023 G20 Summit, India, the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, the EU, Italy, Germany, and France came together to announce the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) – a connectivity project aimed at enhancing economic integration among partner countries. The corridor would comprise rail lines, a ship-rail transit network, and roadways.
Ever since the announcement, comparisons have been drawn between IMEC and China’s BRI, and rightly so. Jin Canrong, Professor at the School of International Relations, Renmin University of China, in an interview published on Guancha, raised doubts over the completion of the project. He said:
“Some people said this was to compete with China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. I think if they can really accomplish this, it will not be inconsistent with the purpose of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. However, it is difficult to say whether it can be achieved. How the United States, some European countries and India will implement it, how to ensure funds, and whether there is sufficient infrastructure capacity are all problems. In particular, the infrastructure capabilities of these countries are not even the slightest bit behind China’s.”
However, he admitted that the unveiling of the IMEC is yet another milestone in India-US relations. He said:
“But no matter how you put it, I think this is a pretty big achievement in US-India relations. The two sides have been getting closer in recent years, but there are relatively few concrete results, and the project proposed this time can be regarded as an achievement of Modi's diplomacy. This will definitely help India’s international status, India’s influence in developing countries, and Modi’s domestic political reputation, and deserves our close attention.”
Liu Zongyi, a Researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, also weighed in and appeared even more skeptical about the prospects of IMEC. Responding to the question, “To what extent do you think this "corridor" can replace China's Silk Road?,” he said:
“While the initiative could benefit the member countries, India and the US has proposed several such connectivity and infrastructure projects as alternatives to BRI such as the Cotton Road and Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative by India; and Blue Dot Network and Build Back Better World (B3W) by the US. However, none of the initiatives saw implementation. Similarly, Japan and India proposed the ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’ initiative but has failed to take off.
We can continue to observe how its implementation will be. They say they want to build railways and infrastructure. I don’t know where they will get the technology and experience they need, whether the funds are guaranteed, and whether it is geopolitically feasible. These are all issues worth observing.”
Taking a dig at the state of India’s infrastructure, he questioned the country’s capability to deliver big infrastructure projects. He said:
“If India’s own infrastructure is in such a state, it’s quite amusing to think they can export their technology and expertise. It cannot be denied that since Modi came to power, India has indeed achieved significant progress in infrastructure development. However, claiming that India has extensive expertise in this field is still somewhat bewildering.”
The Global Times opinion piece was meaner in responding to the comparisons between the BRI and IMEC and whether the latter can rival the former. It pointed out that the IMEC working group, tasked with drawing the plan over the next 60 days, will “confront some harsh economic realities relating to funding, material capabilities, and the ideological outlook of the main countries involved.”
It’s ironic for China to say here that differences in ideological outlooks of member countries may be a significant hurdle in the realisation of the project, in the same breath as funding. China builds it’s own capacity to deliver on developmental projects with other economies (such as those in Europe, with starkly different ideological leanings than its own) on the basis of “shared values,” and not necessarily common ideology. In fact, a pillar of Xi’s flagship Global Civilisation Initiative is indeed to allow partnerships between countries that are civilisations in their own right.
Further, emphasising the centrality of the railway linking to IMEC, GT opined:
“When it comes to infrastructure, the US and India do not set good examples for others to follow, yet they expect to compete with China which has first-rate infrastructure. Rather than build something abroad, based on hegemonic competition against China, it would be better for the US and India to demonstrate they can solve the basic democratic infrastructural needs of their citizens first.”
Finally, on whether IMEC can rival BRI, the GT piece said:
“The BRI is premised on long-term social economic planning. Some projects will not be profitable for decades - many will provide immense social-economic benefits but no profit extraction for private capital.”
The piece also seemed to hint that the IMEC project cannot be completed without Chinese help as several components will be sourced from China. It pointed out several rail linkage projects in Saudi Arabia being constructed by Chinese companies to rally the point that China continues to be the first preference for the Saudis in laying tracks.
It must also be acknowledged that this slew of critical narrative comes in the backdrop of reportage that Beijing actually “welcomed” the IMEC, provided that it does not become a “geopolitical tool.”
Tidbits #1: What are Cartoon Experts saying about Uranium Bombs?
By Anushka Saxena
In its ‘Military Situation Analysis’ (军情点评) column, on September 14, the PLA Daily reported on the US Pentagon’s decision to send anti-tank rounds containing depleted uranium to Ukraine in its war against Russia.
The PLA Daily comments:
“The United States providing depleted uranium munitions to Ukraine marks a significant step in its support for the Ukrainian military. Depleted uranium munitions have been used by Western countries in multiple regional conflicts since the end of the Cold War, primarily to enhance the armor-piercing capabilities of tank shells. The 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War demonstrated their striking power. However, due to the low-level radioactive element uranium, depleted uranium munitions pose significant hazards to soldiers, civilians, and the environment. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict began, the United States has provided Ukraine with billions of dollars in military aid. On the surface, it appears that the United States is supporting Ukraine, but behind the scenes, it is vigorously pursuing its own interests in maintaining its global hegemony” (美国开始向乌克兰提供贫铀弹，标志着其对乌军援又迈出一大步。贫铀弹在冷战结束后的多场地区冲突中被欧美国家使用，主要是为了强化坦克炮弹的穿甲破坏力。1991年海湾战争和2003年伊拉克战争均印证其打击威力。但由于带有低放射性元素铀，贫铀弹对士兵、民众和环境均构成极大危害。俄乌冲突以来，美国向乌提供数百亿美元军援。表面看，美国是在支援乌克兰，背后则是美无所不用其极地维护自身霸权私利).
Of course, Global Times didn’t let this go so easily, and produced iconic cartoons discussing it. For example, the caption on this one reads, “‘This is a commonplace type of munition,’ says John Kirby on US providing depleted uranium rounds to Ukraine”:
It’s interesting but not surprising to note that the cartoonist, Vitaly Podvitski, is of Russian-origin, and has been credited with some other artwork on the West’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war:
Further, Liu Rui of Global Times had more to add:
This one is a little hard to interpret, but we’re happy to hear your thoughts.
Also Read:
This succinct interview with Togzhan Kassenova (University of Albany), published by NPR, discussing the meaning and impacts of depleted uranium munitions.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies team:
Tune in to our latest episode on the Takshashila Institution’s ‘All Things Policy’ podcast, where Amit Kumar and Anushka Saxena discuss the recent Huawei-SMIC 7nm chip fabrication breakthrough, and the unveiling of the tech giant’s latest smartphone, Mate 60 Pro.
Do also read Amit’s piece in ‘The Hindu’ on the subject: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-signals-from-this-made-in-china-smartphone-story/article67296120.ece.
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
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