China Spotlights Territorial Integrity - With & Without India

Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.

The Takshashila Institution

Anushka Saxena

, and

Bharat Sharma

Oct 15, 2023

By Bharat Sharma

In a bid to continue resolution of the border stand-off at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India and China held the 20th round of the Corps Commander Level Meeting at the Chushul-Moldo Border Meeting Point on October 9-10.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs statement said that the two sides exchanged views “...for an early and mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issue along the LAC in the western sector, in accordance with the guidance provided by the national leadership of the two countries…”.

On the Chinese side, the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) also emphasised resolving issues in a “mutually acceptable manner,” a stance the Chinese side has maintained throughout these meetings.

There is an interesting Global Times article on the Chinese view of the Indian side with respect to the border issue. The Indian view is explained through numerous interviews with think tank experts in China. The article mentions that:

No breakthroughs have been possible in the ongoing corps commander-level meetings because India uses the talks to “compel China to withdraw and allow India to carry out patrols and occupy Chinese territories in certain areas.”
The Chinese view of the Indian strategic stance vis-a-vis the border issue is that India is engaged in a “non-treaty alliance partnership” with the United States; given the proximity between both, it allows for favourable geopolitical circumstances for India. Therefore, India “believes China needs to ease relations with India so as to deal with the strategic pressure exerted by the US.”
Long Xingchun, a professor at the School of International Relations at Sichuan International Studies University, said that despite India’s effort to play the US card (to use it as leverage against China), “China [would] not make major concessions to India on border disputes, particularly on territorial issues, due to concerns over India’s strategic drift toward the US.”
Long also adds that the talks are a form of diplomatic posture — they guard against any military confrontation or conflict between the two sides.
The border conflict depends on the two countries, “not any other third party.” Both are independent sovereign countries, and “...neither will allow a scenario which could turn themselves into cannon fodder of the US when the latter pursues its hegemonic self-interests.” It also mentions that China and India must be the ones to “bridge the gap” and avoid being interfered with by outsiders.
Then, it mentions that both countries are developing countries with aspirations for development; India needs a “stable peripheral and international environment, rather than pooling significant energy and resources to border disputes.” Therefore, India and China share a common interest, and managing the border dispute is crucial for both countries to achieve their developmental objectives.
Finally, it mentions the expert view that “India is the side that always wants more, and with US endorsement, refuses to make any compromise,” and this method of dealing with problems might backfire.

Guarding the Great Wall #1: The Institutionalisation of Xi Thought on Culture Brings Opinions on Military Culture to the Fore

By Anushka Saxena

On October 7, a ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Culture’ was introduced at the two-day National Conference on the Work of Public Communication and Culture (also known as the Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference). Held every five years, the Conference that concluded recently was Xi Jinping’s third as General Secretary of the CPC.

In the 2013 iteration of the Conference, Xi emphasised the need for excellence in propaganda and ideological work for the purpose of economic reconstruction and meeting the demand of the ‘overall situation’. At the 2018 Conference, he emphasised the ‘four confidences’ and the ‘four self-consciousnesses’.* With the 2023 Conference, one of the four confidences, that is ‘Confidence in the Culture of socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ (文化自信) has been canonised in the form of Xi Jinping Thought.

The Thought on Culture is the sixth in a series of Xi’s “Thought” legacies, the first five being economy, diplomacy, military, environment, and rule of law. With the canonisation of this ‘Thought’, public communication units (like media), which are meant to be at the forefront of the implementation of this Thought, have become proactive in promoting the Chinese idea of ‘Culture’ and its importance to political strength across elements of the party-state.

In a Commentary published by the PLA Daily on October 10, for example, Yang Lianzhen discusses the need to develop an ‘Advanced Military Governance Culture’ (先进军事治理文化).

His analysis makes an important distinction between ‘military governance system’, and ‘military governance culture’. The crux of this distinction is that while the former constitutes operational requirements and structural functions of military struggle and national defense, the latter constitutes the key values, core concepts, and ideological and psychological provisions that underpin the system.

Yang highlights the significance of a strong military governance culture by making two arguments (loosely translated):

First, governance culture, as the existence of an '“implicit order,” determines the scientific nature of governance activities’ values, rules, and structures.
Second, governance culture influences the beliefs, morals, and behavior compliance of the governing body in a “cognitive pattern” manner.

He further argues that there are three pillars to build an “advanced” military governance culture:

Cultivating military governance spiritual culture, which entails aspects of ideology, values, beliefs, thinking styles, and moral character embedded within concerned persons;
Shaping military governance institutional culture, which entails the concepts, values, and psychology upon which institutional design and implementation are based; and
Developing military governance behavioral culture, encompassing the correct modes of behavior, excellent work ethics, and good life habits developed in military governance practices. This third pillar overlaps with the first one, and further reiterates the need for military personnel to keep away from “bad influences.”

Finally, a unique aspect of any Chinese policy imperatives such as the Xi Thought on Culture, is that these are deliberately articulated vaguely, so that interpretors and implementors have some wiggle room to “innovate.” In the concluding section of his Commentary, titled ‘Practical Paths for Building an Advanced Military Governance Culture’, Yang argues just this (loosely translated):

“Military governance culture with Chinese characteristics not only carries and propagates the Party's innovative theories but also takes the Party's innovative theories as its fundamental guidance. Adhering to the guidance of the Party's scientific theories is a significant advantage and distinctive feature of our military's military governance culture.
The vitality of military governance culture lies in innovation. We must closely follow the pulse of the times, adhere to military practices, and meet governance needs. We need to promote development with new concepts, high-quality resources, and improved mechanisms. Chinese traditional military culture has rich wisdom in governing the military, and traditional military concepts such as "the military power is supreme," "using military force to stop war," "integrating ritual and law," "commanding like a mountain," and "defeating the enemy without fighting" are highly compatible with modern military governance.”

Here, the author is attempting to diffuse the notions of traditionalism and conventionality attached to the idea of “culture” by stating that the contemporary Chinese military governance system is already working hand-in-hand with the “rich wisdom” of Chinese traditional military culture (for example, it may mean that Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ is as fundamental to military modernisation today as it was to war conditions in 5th century BC!) This might also mean that going forth, any technological advancements and reforms in national defense, that have already been underway, will increasingly be attributed to the idea of innovating with traditional military culture.

Here, I would like to redirect our readers to an interesting discussion I recently had with Manoj Kewalramani on the Xi Thought on Culture. To listen, tune in to the latest podcast episode of ‘All Things Policy’ on Spotify:

*Note:
To understand the ‘four self-confidences’, refer to: www.yn.gov.cn/ztgg/xxgcxjpxsdzgtsshzysxztjy/fxpl/202308/t20230809_279681.html
To understand the ‘four self-consciousnesses’, refer to: en.qstheory.cn/2021-06/23/c_634828.htm.

India-China Relations #2: India Remained a No-Show at the Trans-Himalayan Forum

By Bharat Sharma

On October 5th, China hosted the 3rd Trans-Himalayan Forum for International Cooperation in Nyingchi, Tibet. This year’s theme was “promoting harmony between humans and nature, sharing the fruit of cooperation and development.”

The Trans-Himalayan Forum was formed in 2018 for deeper practical cooperation among Himalayan nations. The issues under consideration have been environmental protection, geographical connectivity, ecological preservation, and enhancing cultural links.

Among other participants, representatives from Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Mongolia attended the forum. India, a key trans-Himalayan actor, did not attend the forum; it is unclear whether it was invited. It also did not participate in previous forums in 2018 and 2019.

China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, called on countries in the region to respect each other’s territory to ensure stability, prosperity, and sustainable development. He said:

“We should respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, support each other on issues involving each other’s core interests, insist on resolving differences through dialogue and consultation, and work together to build a big family of unity around the Himalayas.”

Wang also called for cooperation on green development, citing past achievements, including environmental agreements with India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, and urged connectivity and regional integration through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The forum also led to the release of the Nyingchi initiative in a bid to deepen international cooperation in the region. One part of the initiative reads as follows:

"We will strengthen infrastructure development in railways, roads, power grids, communications and aviation across the trans-Himalayan region, build a three-dimensional trans-Himalayan interconnection network, further expand opening up, intensify economic and trade exchanges and cross-border cooperation, deepen agricultural cooperation and rural revitalization, and jointly build the Trans-Himalaya Economic Cooperation Belt.”

The initiative also mentions the need to “...promote clean and low-carbon energy and its safe and efficient use in the trans-Himalayan region, accelerate collaboration in new energy, environmental protection and other fields, and facilitate the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development in the region.”

Wang also held bilateral discussions with key countries, importantly Pakistan. Pakistani caretaker Foreign Minister Jalil Jilani, in his talks with Wang, highlighted the importance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Pakistan’s economic development and discussed ways to carry forward the project forward.

Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies team:

Anushka Saxena, Research Analyst with IPSP, reviews the book ‘Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ by Paul Scharre. Available in the latest issue of Indian Public Policy Review, Takshashila Institution’s flagship journal:
Read Here
In the October 5 episode of the ‘All Things Policy’ podcast, Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson of IPSP, is quizzed by Sachin Kalbag of the Takshashila, on ‘Understanding China’s New World Order Ambitions’. Tune in on Spotify: