2.0: Blinken, Beijing, Breakthroughs, Bans?
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Worldview Weekly: 2.0 of Blinken’s Beijing Visit – Overviewing Approaches
By Anushka Saxena
As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken begins his three-day visit to Shanghai and Beijing, there’s a bit of a deja vu at play (by the way, here’s our EoC coverage of Blinken’s China visit from last year). Like last year, Blinken’s visit comes at the heels of various high-level meetings between US officials and their counterparts in China, such as the meeting between Wang Yi and White House NatSec advisor Jake Sullivan in Thailand in January, third and fourth meetings of the US-China economic and financial working groups in February and April, visit of US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to Guangzhou and Beijing in early April, and the most recent meetings of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and National Security Council Senior Director for China and Taiwan Affairs Sarah Beran, with counterparts in Beijing.
Similarly, even this time, in anticipation of the meeting, many are thinking through the potential breakthroughs we may witness, while attempting to gauge the extent of differences the two sides are yet to mitigate. From more incoming ‘Entity List’ sanctions on Chinese firms for their involvement in Russia’s military-industrial complex, to tensions surrounding fentanyl, exit bans and Taiwan, everything is on the table for Blinken’s meetings [potentially with Xi Jinping and Wang Yi] in China.
But what is different is this time around, both sides seem to be acknowledging that hyper-diplomacy in the past year has led to relative stability in the ties between the two sides. This is compared to June of last year, when Blinken’s visit to China came at a time developments post Pelosi’s Taipei visit translated into a drastic dip in ties, further complicated by the “spy balloon” controversy. Now, both sides are in agreement that even though US-China competition cannot be wished away and will continue to remain a defining feature of the contemporary world order, the two can continue to invest in guard rails and open lines of communication.
This is perhaps most evident from the special briefing of a teleconference conducted four days ago by an anonymous senior State Department official previewing Blinken’s visit. At this teleconference, they argue:
“We [US and China] are in a different place than we were a year ago, when the bilateral relationship was at an historic low point. We have set out to stabilize the bilateral relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests. We also believe, and we have also clearly demonstrated, that responsibly managing competition does not mean we will pull back from measures to protect U.S. national interests.”
Further, they articulate that the goals of Blinken’s visit will be three-fold: “making progress on key issues; clearly and directly communicating concerns on bilateral, regional, and global issues; and responsibly managing competition, again, so that it does not result in miscalculation or conflict.”
The messages from the teleconference is clear – that the US shows no interest in backing down vis-a-vis its competition with China, that it is approaching the country with the sense that it is in a position of strength, and that there remains much work to do on “key issues.” These, as further highlighted through the teleconference, include “deep concerns regarding the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base,” “PRC provocations in the South China Sea,” “the role that chemical precursors [from PRC] play in the synthetization of fentanyl and what that means,” “concerns about specific cases involving detentions and exit bans,” and of course, the good ol’ “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
On the issue of concerns surrounding China’s involvement in Russia’s military programme, analysts are already reporting looming sanctions on Chinese entities that may follow Blinken’s visit, provided the conclusion of the deliberations remains unsatisfactory. To this end, it seems nearly impossible that China will make any hard promises vis-a-vis giving up exports of equipment-grade materials to Russia, but we can probably expect argumentation surrounding the civilian nature of China’s exports to Russia, and assurances that China’s stance on the Ukraine war has always favoured the side of peace.
One final bit that I found interesting in what was said at this teleconference, was on the question of what the US thinks about potential breakthroughs in this meeting. To that, the “senior state department official” responds:
“I want to make clear that we are realistic and clear-eyed about the prospects of breakthroughs on any of these issues, but we will continue to use diplomacy to communicate our positions and policies, clear up misperceptions, and underscore that we will continue to take actions to protect our national security and economy. Our primary focus is not solely on deliverables, but rather to have candid, direct, and constructive discussions that defend U.S. national interests and, again, prevent miscalculation.”
It is interesting but not surprising that this was said. In fact, it is, in so many words, a reiteration of what East Asian Secy. Kritenbrink said as a precursor to Blinken’s visit in June last year:
“We’re not going to Beijing with the intent of having some sort of breakthrough or transformation in the way that we deal with one another.”
The Chinese side, too, has set its expectations going into the meeting. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin, for example, shared his thoughts at a press conference yesterday on potential US sanctions against Chinese entities engaged with Russia’s military goals. To this end, Wang argued:
“On one hand, the US is enacting a large-scale aid bill for Ukraine, and on the other hand, it is baselessly accusing China of normal economic and trade exchanges with Russia. This practice is extremely hypocritical and irresponsible, and China firmly opposes it.
It must be pointed out that China’s legitimate rights and interests in conducting normal economic and trade exchanges with countries around the world, including Russia, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, cannot be interfered with or undermined.
We advise the US: adding fuel to the fire or scapegoating is not the correct way to solve the Ukrainian issue. Only by considering the legitimate security concerns of all parties, establishing a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security framework through dialogue and negotiation, can be the only correct choice.”
Two points of consideration hence emerge, proving the extent of differences on major issues:
It looks like China is sticking hard and fast to the provisions of its 12-Point Peace Plan/ “Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis"“ (published in February 2023). This plan effectively frames the problem not as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine or the inability of the international legal architecture to mitigate the conflict, which is well into its third year, but as the lack of a “balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture” and the existence of NATO’s “bloc confrontation mentality.” In doing so, it graciously legitimises all of Russia’s actions in the interest of “indivisible security.” And so, naturally, any sanctions or hard rhetoric from the US seem like scapegoating to China.
Today, the aforementioned “large-scale aid bill for Ukraine” (a legislation that approves $95 billion in war aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan) is passed by the US Senate by a 79-18 bipartisan majority vote, and is now with the POTUS desk for approval. Biden has vehemently supported it, and is also likely to sign it. Hence, the context with which Blinken is going into this meeting spells trouble for China, given that the US seems stronger than ever in its support for Ukraine and Taiwan, and its condemnation of any support to Russia in its invasion.
It is clear that neither side expects any breakthroughs from the meeting, only assurances that diplomacy can continue and interests can be communicated. And in this light, it also becomes important to define breakthroughs, to essentially mean that neither side will budge or concede on a “red line” issue like Russia-Ukraine, Taiwan, or even stances on the war in the Middle East. An emphasis on co-existence through stable competition will be the defining feature of this visit, and there will hopefully be more to analyse and conclude once readouts from the meetings are made publicly available.
Guarding the Great Wall: A New Force in the New Era
By Anushka Saxena
As many of our readers may know, in the past few days, reports have been rife with news surrounding the coming about of an “Information Support Force” in the People’s Liberation Army. Announcing a major restructuring, on April 19, the PLA unveiled that it will be disbanding its ‘Strategic Support Force’ (SSF) in favour of three specialised branches. While the pre-existing aerospace and cyber branches of the SSF will become independent aerospace and cyber ‘forces’, they will be joined also by a newly launched ‘Information Support Force’ (ISF).
The premise of the restructuring is that the SSF, which was one of two support arms of the PLA formed since the 2015-16 reforms were initiated (the second being the Joint Logistics Support Force), is now removed from the chain of command, and the aerospace, cyber and information support forces have become independent support arms under direct control of the Central Military Commission led by Xi Jinping as Chairman and Zhang Youxia and He Weidong as Vice-Chairmen.
At the founding meeting of this new force, Xi gave a speech and three aspects of the ISF’s mandate can be culled out from it:
Xi first stated that the founding of the ISF “is a strategic move to improve the layout of the new type of military branches and enhance the system of modern Chinese military forces, with profound and far-reaching significance for accelerating national defense and military modernization and effectively fulfilling the mission and tasks of the people’s armed forces in the new era.” Given that a key goal of military modernisation in the Chinese conception is to create a force that is mechanisation-based, informatisation-led, and intelligentisation-oriented, it may be so that to achieve the second stage of military modernisation, the creation of a formalised ISF was deemed necessary. This is also given that for more than two decades, the PLA has been referred to as a “half-mechanised, half-informatised” force.
Next, Xi argued: “[The ISF] holds an important position and bears significant responsibilities in promoting the high-quality development of the military and winning modern warfare. It must resolutely follow the Party's command, fully implement the fundamental principle and system of the Party's absolute leadership over the military, comprehensively strengthen the Party building of the troops, firmly uphold ideals and beliefs, strictly observe discipline and rules, promote fine traditions, and ensure that the troops remain absolutely loyal, pure, and reliable.” The context is simply understood – the ISF, which is placed under direct control of the CMC, has direct accountability now to the top leadership, including Xi. It is a clear attempt to eliminate any scope for corruption and disloyalty that was created by the insertion of the SSF command as a mediator between the CMC and the information/ space/ cyber branches. In fact, given that former SSF commander Ju Qiansheng has been missing like many others from the public eye since last year, is a sign that procurement and equipment management related fraud had already penetrated the SSF.
Next, Xi highlights: “[The ISF] must provide strong support for combat operations, adhere to information dominance, and achieve joint victory, ensuring smooth information flow, integration of information resources, strengthened information protection, deep integration into the overall joint combat system of the military, precise and efficient implementation of information support, and service support for military operations in all directions and domains.” Jointness, which remains a key goal of the “four services (军种) and [now] four arms (兵种)” of the PLA, can only be achieved if there is consistent sharing of resources between them, and if an institution like the ISF in specific can provide decisive battlefield support to the four services to ensure smooth information flow. The big picture of what such interoperability can achieve is quite promising, and if in this trial and error, the four support forces can realise their potential, China’s goals in new and emerging domains of warfare may actualise.
This restructuring is the third in a line of ‘trials and errors’ undertaken in the PLA to assess how best to position support forces in the aerospace, cyber and information domains.
The SSF was created by bringing together two operational forces – the Space Systems Department and Network Systems Department – each responsible respectively for establishing China’s dominance in space and cyber warfare. These, in turn, were formalised by incorporating various specialised sub-departments of CMC’s erstwhile General Staff Department (GSD). Such sub-departments included the GSD Third Department (3PLA), which handled espionage and technical reconnaissance in cyberspace, the GSD Informatisation Department, which worked on information systems security, and the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau under the GSD Intelligence Department. Now, it is clear that the GSD and SSF formats have failed, and going forth, it would be interesting to see new things the ISF-Cyber-Aerospace structure can bring to the table.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
Perspectives Unleashed
IPSP Chairperson Manoj Kewalramani and Research Analyst Amit Kumar write for Indian Express, arguing “Warmer Moscow-Beijing ties are a chilling signal for New Delhi”.
Manoj Kewalramani and IPSP Research Analyst Anushka Saxena also co-author a piece for NDTV, discussing “A Shaky World Order: Can India Navigate A Russia-China-Iran Axis?”
Anushka Saxena also writes for The Quint on the meeting that took place between Ma Ying Jeou and Xi Jinping on April 10, and what its message was for the Chinese and Taiwanese domestic audiences.