Beating the 'Altitude Blues', PLA Style + ETW 05: Looking at a 'Green' China
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
Greetings to our readers – wishing you a merry Lunar new year!
A small note – this one is a joint edition, combining a section on the PLA and another on the Chinese technology ecosystem. We’ll be resuming our bi-weekly editions from next week. Till then, happy reading!
Guarding the Great Wall: Western Theater Command’s Altitude and Terrain Training Regimen
By Anushka Saxena
Combat training is a significant aspect of preparedness work being conducted by the People’s Liberation Army. But because of the geographic nature of theater commands, combat training is incomplete without terrain training. And in the particular case of the Western Theater Command, terrain training is a central pillar of its jointness capabilities, as the ability to achieve interconnected goals in complex environments would fundamentally shape the results of conflict. This is also a given because the WTC is the largest theater command by area and covers both the arid northwestern deserts of Xinjiang and the high altitude areas of Tibet.
Terrain training can be achieved through both combat and non-combat tasks in the WTC. Just yesterday (February 7), for example, a report in the PLA Daily highlighted how personnel deployed at the radar station of an Air Force brigade in the WTC (described as being situated in a snow-covered plateau at a height of about 4,000 meters; which indicates to me that this is Xinjiang) managed to connect its dormitories to a tap water pipeline. This is a development, among others, that depicts the emphasis on resource availability and terrain acquaintance work in the WTC. The commentary in specific also highlights (and in a very commonsensical manner) what the nature of the challenge is. It argues, for example, that in the past, due to factors such as the high altitude of the position, thick rock layers at the mountain top, and high technical requirements for well drilling, it was very difficult to lay tap water pipelines. Solutions adopted, in this regard, included the building of a large water tank close to the radar station, and the allotment of a detachment of water trucks which, every now and then, replenished the water tank – unless of course they were snowed in and couldn’t make it. This no doubt proved unsustainable, and active efforts were hence made to build a tap water pipeline. The next step of the air force brigade’s work would be to ensure water quality, filtering, and so on.
Similarly, shovelling snow in the Tibetan mountains or high-altitude Xinjiang is another core non-combat task WTC personnel are required to perform. While the nature of the task itself is non-combat, it has significant applications in combat work. A CCTV report from January 26, 2023, for example, highlights the significance of practicing to shovel snow for the Tieleketi Border Detachment of the Xinjiang’s Tacheng Military Region. Located at the foot of the Barluk Mountains on the China-Kazakhstan border, 200 days of gale winds in the new year period lead snow accumulation to be as high as 2-2.5 meters, and for as far as 60 meters. As per the report, during its training work this time last year, personnel of the Tieleketi Border Detachment undertook a border observation patrol, and encountered such a snow accumulation. It was then that they demonstrated their snow shovelling skills to clear the ‘snow ridge’. Even then, soldiers had to reach the final patrol point on foot.
Even though from this report it is evident that soldiers took turns shovelling snow by hand, by now, both the Tibet and Xinjiang military regions have inducted advanced bulldozers run by drivers of the company or brigade in question. The following is a still from a similar snow shovelling exercise in Tibet, conducted by a border security detachment in April 2019:
And following is a still from a Bayi (August 1; 八一) video from March last year, when a company in Xinjiang also used a bulldozer to conduct a snow shovelling operation on a border highland:
It is evident that in the past couple years, the make and feel of the bulldozers, too, has seen enhancement, as the WTC continues to engage in patrol operations especially along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Drivers assigned to brigades and companies too, have become specialised in training to drive such bulldozers.
Combat tasks, too, are formulated to prepare for the terrain and altitude conditions. Just earlier this year, for example, an Army Brigade of the WTC was conducting snowfield training to enhance combat preparedness under cold (high altitude; 高寒) and hypoxic (low oxygen; 缺氧) conditions. This is essential to meet the criteria of “effective training” in the PLA, wherein combat situations are simulated as accurately as possibly, and tasks are assigned to test multiple components of a joint operation. This exercise in particular, described the setting up of the scene as follows:
In the front, an engineering team uses the ice and snow environment to disguise their movements, opening up routes to assist the forward movement of artillery positions. In the rear, a communication team sets up a command system platform to ensure smooth communication. In the air, drones precisely detect and real-time transmit target location information. On the ground, the artillery team, with close coordination from various units, simulates precision strikes at extreme distances. (随战车穿梭训练场，实战气息扑面而来。前方，工兵分队利用冰雪环境伪装潜行，开辟通路助力火炮阵地前移；后方，通信分队搭设指挥系统平台，确保通信联络畅通；空中，无人机精准探测，实时回传目标位置信息；地面，炮兵分队在多方密切配合下，模拟实施极限距离精准打击……)
Developments on this front have in fact been underway since 2018, when the WTC personnel posted along the Kunlun mountains (covering both Xinjiang and Tibet) began constructing Army Command Posts concealed near snow lines at heights of over 4000 meters. Their goal has been to continuously lead troops to conduct effective on-site research, planning, and training in high-altitude zones. These command posts also formulate measures for high-altitude training and preparedness to be implemented across the board, and conduct concealment tests for personnel, vehicles, and tents, sometimes even changing locations every few months. Then, the personnel are required to pursue other combat preparedness tasks such as testing of marching speed over several hundred kilometers (more specifically, 800, from an exercise conducted in October 2018), as well as practicing live-fire shootings to determine the shooting parameters of artillery at various altitudes.
From the Indian perspective, this is significant because over time, some of these concealed positions and tactical arrangements have come to restrict our access to key patrolling points along the LAC.
There is also a concerted effort to make sure that border camps accompanying these positions are comfortable, well-endowed, and snow and water-proof. Since August 2018, for example, the Tibet MR has been focused on improving the accommodation and living facilities for high-altitude stationed officers and soldiers, accelerating the progress of a new round of barracks renovation. The ‘Gangba’ camp outpost was the first to be tested for windproof effect, by building of an exterior wall with thermal insulation mortar and of windows with broken bridge aluminium alloy double frames. A combination of waterproof coatings and waterproof rolls have also been used to ensure the effectiveness of the new barracks’ waterproofing (踩着边关大幅降温的脚步，西藏军区急事先办，抓紧检测岗巴“高原戍边模范营”哨楼的防风降噪、防漏保暖效果，确保哨楼功能齐全。8月26日下午，岗巴边防营所属一线连队哨所，已全部搬入新型保温营房。该营教导员洛松江措说：“入秋后高原天气多变、昼夜温差大，各级党委特事特办、集力攻关，紧前改善一线官兵住宿条件，我们提前入住温暖舒适的新家”).
Since August 2022, Border Defense Companies in Xinjiang are testing a new “integrated individual system,” which includes a new-type helmet, multi-function night vision goggles, portable computer, individual load carrier, assault rucksack and others. The challenge will be to integrate adaptedness to hypoxic conditions with the ability to carry heavy loads that come with this new integrated system (the material load seems to be about 30 kg!) Apparently, this new system is also integrated with “informatization and intelligence capabilities” that enable an individual soldier to be informed about the location and mission of their teammates. This indicates that the next step in combat altitude training in the WTC is for individual soldiers to become more independent and resilient.
Tech Weekly: China’s Dual Carbon Goals, Dual High Projects, and Dual Control Policies
By Rakshith Shetty
Another short note to our readers – As part of our ETW (Eco & Tech Weekly) editions, we’ll now be writing a new section, ‘Green China’, which will cover China’s Policies and Action Plans to tackle Climate Change and track its Clean Energy Technologies. Today, we take a peek at the Three ‘Duals’ of China’s Green Tech policies.
Globally, China is the largest Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter. But it has the world’s largest capacity for renewables and hydroelectricity and the second-largest for nuclear. According to the International Energy Agency, between 2019 and 2024, China will account for 40 per cent of global renewable capacity expansion, driven by improved system integration, lower curtailment rates and enhanced solar PV and onshore wind competitiveness. China is also set to lead global growth in biofuel production, given the rollout of ethanol blending in a growing number of provinces and increasing investments in production capacity. This edition will cover China’s Dual Carbon Goals, Dual High Projects and Dual Control Policies.
In the global fight against climate change, China stands out as a key player with its ambitious climate agenda. At the forefront of this agenda are the ‘dual carbon’ goals set forth by President Xi Jinping. These goals, announced during the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020, represent China’s commitment to tackling climate change on two fronts. Firstly, China aims to peak its carbon emissions before 2030. Secondly, the nation strives to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. However, some ambiguity surrounding whether this carbon neutrality target solely encompasses carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions or all greenhouse gases (GHGs). In a broader context, the ‘dual carbon’ goals encompass China's additional climate pledges for 2030. These additional targets include a 65 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP compared to the 2005 level.
It is worth noting that China does not use total CO2 emissions or total energy consumption as binding targets for its climate change agenda at present. Instead, it resorts to using ‘CO2 intensity’ and ‘energy intensity’, two measurements that tie emissions and energy consumption with economic growth. ‘CO2 intensity’ and ‘energy intensity’ stand for the CO2 emissions and energy consumption per unit of GDP, respectively.
One crucial aspect of China's climate strategy is addressing projects categorised as ‘dual high.’ These projects are characterised by both high energy consumption and high emissions. These two ‘highs’ initially referred solely to excessive energy usage and pollution. However, with President Xi's commitment to peak emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, the focus has shifted. Now, the emphasis is on scrutinising projects that don't align with emission reduction goals. Xi’s call for decisive action against such projects underscores the importance of transitioning towards low-carbon infrastructure while phasing out polluting industries.
China has implemented various policies to enforce these objectives, including the “dual-control policy.” Since 2015, this policy has set targets for the nation's energy intensity and total energy consumption. Typically, the energy intensity goal is binding, while efforts to adhere to energy consumption limits have sometimes led to power reductions in specific provinces. However, as China progresses towards its climate goals, there’s a notable shift in policy focus. During the 2021 Central Economic Work Conference, the government mentioned that the country should “create conditions” for a shift from controlling energy intensity and consumption towards a dual control of carbon emissions and carbon intensity. In July 2023, the central government released a series of policy documents reiterating the shift from the dual control of energy to the dual control of carbon. These policies also advocated reforming the electricity, oil, and gas markets.
In addition to policy shifts, China has also taken steps to integrate climate objectives into its governance structure. The Central Ecological and Environmental Inspection Team (CEEIT), a specialised unit led by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, plays a crucial role in assessing the implementation of peak emission action plans and other climate targets. With a particular focus on curbing the proliferation of dual-high projects, the CEEIT ensures that China's climate objectives are pursued in a “coordinated and orderly manner.”
Overall, China’s dual carbon goals, dual high projects, and dual control policies represent significant milestones in the nation’s climate agenda. With President Xi Jinping’s commitment to peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, China is taking decisive steps towards a greener and more sustainable future. As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China’s actions in the coming years will play a crucial role in determining the success of global efforts to combat climate change.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In his latest Op-Ed for Fulcrum Singapore, Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson of IPSP and Fellow, China studies at Takshashila, explores ‘India and China’s Volatile New Status Quo’. Here, he argues:
Sino-Indian relations have languished in a state of suspended animation for four years. A return to stability in the relationship would require, at the least, sustained high-level engagement.
In this podcast episode from Takshashila’s daily public policy podcast, ‘All Things Policy’, Dr. Sriparna Pathak of the O.P Jindal Global University and Rakshith Shetty from IPSP discuss ‘China’s Influence on Global Media’. Tune in below:
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
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