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Guarding the Great Wall: Speculations Continue, and Articulations Appear
Anushka Saxena
As the announcement of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli’s discipline-related investigations enters day 2, speculation, analysis and assessment are rife with what’s been going on behind the scenes. And since it is always fascinating to engage with and in some of it, I was hoping to share bits of my thought process out loud as well – obviously, it stands that these are not final. Subsequently, I am sharing a rudimentary translation of a PLA Daily article from last night, which speaks much about why Zhang and Liu are being investigated.
Firstly: for a moment, let’s take “serious violations of discipline” to mean engaging in corruption or hiding corruption. Either wouldn’t be surprising, since Zhang was the CMC General Armaments Department/ Equipment Development Department (EDD) head before Li Shangfu. Li was his aide, and was removed less than 6 months into his new role as Minister of Defense because of corruption during his tenure as EDD head. So it could be that Zhang Youxia wasn’t prompt in pointing out any of Li’s malpractice, which eventually led to significant churn in the EDD, the PLA Rocket Force, and defence SOEs as well. In fact, if Zhang knew, and still let Li become Defense Minister, that’s worrisome. Essentially, the expectation mismatch between Xi’s vision for the PLA and the CMC, and the force's and officials’ actual capabilities and crimes, means that it would be pointless to promote someone as a “close aide” if they do not deliver. That imbalanced dynamic leads to disastrous outcomes, too.
Secondly: It could be that Zhang may have had principled disagreements with Xi Jinping over war plans or the future of the PLA. Given that there is a clear factional angle revolving around He Weidong (fmr. CMC Vice Chair) – who oversaw Taiwan/Navy-related promotions such as those of Miao Hua and Lin Xiangyang – it could be that Zhang Youxia felt for his beloved ground force, which has been facing repeated demobilisation anyway. Not to mention, when Li Shangfu was purged, that was also a personal dig at Zhang’s protégé network. This is not to say that Taiwan did not matter to Zhang, but if there were some disagreements over heavy defence budget prioritisation toward missiles, Taiwan, and the PLA Navy – it could have made the CMC day-to-day quite tense.
Thirdly: There may be an important personal angle to Zhang’s investigation. Xi and Zhang go way back – their fathers were revolutionaries together, and they also lived together in Shaanxi province. But it may be that Zhang simply didn’t like where Xi was taking the military and the country. It didn’t feel like friendship anymore. Or, from Xi’s perspective, Zhang may not have felt subservient enough. Again, one should be cautious about coup-related rumours, especially considering that Zhang Youxia is 76 years old! But how will trust remain if Zhang, as the topmost leader in military affairs, is basically overseeing a corrupt and inefficient PLA, and potentially challenging Xi’s ideas? Friends can be worse enemies than enemies themselves, and in the Xi-Zhang relationship, it possibly went both ways. For example, the way Zhang, a 75-year-old career military officer, was viciously taken down, speaks volumes about how Xi asserts power, or retains it.
As one reads the PLA Daily piece below, one realises that there is no way there isn’t a personal angle to all of this. The way the CPC Central Committee and not the CCDI is in charge of handling Zhang Youxia’s case, and the fact that the charges against him revolve around political influencing, ideological abuse, and “trampling on” the Chairman and the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, speaks to Xi’s power imperative in putting Zhang under investigation. And as Xi preps for 2027 and aims to build a clean military force to support all of China’s territorial ambitions, it is unlikely that Zhang’s investigation will result in anything other than a purge – again, considering that the PLA Daily piece literally speaks of “regenerating healthy organisational tissue.”
That said, it becomes important to assess what comes next.
On the question of war preparedness, many may disagree that the latest developments affect it. In fact, one way of thinking is that purges might leave only clean officials and efficient processes behind, making it more likely that China will try to take Taiwan. But I have a few reservations.
In the short term, PLA warfighting will face challenges, and lower-level officials will be targeted. One cannot possibly imagine that the Chinese military is the same beast when most of its most experienced commanders are purged, or when most theater and service leaders are being constantly replaced. Xi has indeed been targeting service and theater leaders constantly for the past 3 years. Wang Xiubin of Southern TC – purged. Lin Xiangyang of Eastern TC – purged. Wang Hajiang of Western TC – gone. Wu Yanan, Huang Ming and Wang Qiang of Central TC have been replaced in less than 2 years between 2023 and December 2025. PLA Army Commander Li Qiaoming and Political Commissar Qin Shutong, PLARF commanders Wang Houbin and Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, former PLA SSF commander Ju Qiansheng – all gone. Of course, trust, cohesion, logistics, training, hierarchy, and so on, will all be impacted.
Never say never to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the Himalayas. And of course, one cannot completely believe that a corrupt PLA cannot be strong. I am sure flybys around Taiwan will continue, and so will skirmishes with the Philippines in the South China Sea or with Japan around Yonaguni. But war is a different game. But one cannot have blind faith in Chinese capabilities to assume that the purges wouldn’t be demoralising. This is especially so, given that a major reason for them happening in the first place is corruption and inefficiency, and that Xi’s vision for jointness or informatisation is being hampered. Won’t that impact the will to fight, even if not the capability?
Finally, who may be under the radar? What I discuss now is not a prediction, but just a jab at decoding some patron-client networks. In fact, it doesn’t at all have to be that Zhang Youxia’s proteges are purged. But they can be demoted or removed from their current posts, as happened to Major General Gao Guanghui when former CMC VC Xu Caihou was purged.
If I was the Northern Theater Commander Huang Ming, I might be worried. Zhang Youxia served as Commander of the Shenyang Military Region for five years, from September 2007 to October 2012. During this period, Huang Ming served as Commander of a mechanised division in the Shenyang Military Region.
Wu Yanan, last known commander of the Southern Theater, too, has widespread experience working in Jilin province in the Northern Theater Command, where Zhang Youxia and Huang Ming both worked for many years. In fact, likely sometime between 2007 and July 2013, Wu was the commander of the Liaoyuan Military Sub-district under the Shenyang MR, which was at the time being headed by Zhang. So if I was STC Commander Wu Yanan, I’d be anxious too.
I am sure there are many leaders within the 15 departments, offices, and commissions of the CMC who would have Zhang’s fingerprints on their career trajectories. For example, the current director of the CMC EDD, Xu Xueqiang, may have worked with Li Shangfu as well as Zhang Youxia (when he was heading the PLA General Armaments Department), but there is no certainty on this front, especially considering Xu has worked for a long time in the Eastern Theatre Command.
While these networks merit deeper investigation, Xi Jinping’s choice boils down to decimating anyone who ever worked under Zhang’s patronage, or retaining experienced personnel within the force.
PLA Daily Article: Resolutely win the decisive battle, the protracted battle, and the overall battle against corruption in the military
The Party Central Committee has decided to place Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under case-filing review and investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and law. This once again demonstrates the Party Central Committee’s and the Central Military Commission’s clear stance of no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance in punishing corruption – investigating whoever is involved, however many are involved, and digging as deep as the connections go. It fully manifests our Party’s rock-solid resolve to carry the anti-corruption struggle through to the end, and solemnly declares that no matter who it is, no matter how high the position, corruption will never be tolerated.
The resolute investigation and handling of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli constitute a major achievement in the Party’s and the military’s anti-corruption struggle, an important demonstration that the Party and the military have both the determination and the capability to do so, and are of great significance for winning the decisive, protracted, and overall battles against corruption in the military. All officers and soldiers must resolutely support the decision of the Party Central Committee, consciously maintain a high degree of unity with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core in thought, politics, and action, resolutely obey the command of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi, and ensure the troops remain highly centralized, unified, pure, and consolidated.
Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, as senior Party and military officials, gravely betrayed the trust and heavy responsibilities entrusted to them by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission; seriously trampled on and undermined the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission; seriously abetted and exacerbated political and corruption problems that affect the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party’s governing foundations; seriously damaged the image and authority of the CMC leadership collective; and severely shook the political and ideological foundation of unity and striving among all officers and soldiers.
Their actions caused enormous harm to political army-building, the political ecology, and combat effectiveness construction, and produced extremely negative impacts on the Party, the state, and the military. Handling Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in accordance with discipline and law will further set things right at the political level, purge poisonous influences and eliminate abuses ideologically, and remove corruption and regenerate healthy tissue organizationally; consolidate and deepen the results of political rectification and training; and promote the People’s Army’s renewal and rebirth, injecting powerful momentum into the development of the cause of building a strong military.
Corruption is a roadblock and stumbling stone in the development of the Party’s and the state’s undertakings. Anti-corruption is a major struggle that cannot be lost and must not be lost. Since the 18th Party Congress, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi, the entire military has adhered to full and strict governance of the Party and the military, deeply advanced political rectification and training, rectification of work style and discipline, and anti-corruption; persisted in thorough investigations and root-and-branch elimination; resolutely investigated and punished corruption among senior military leaders; and focused on eliminating political risks. Through tempering and reform, the Party-led People’s Army has firmly safeguarded its roots and soul. Practice has fully proved that the more the People’s Army fights corruption, the stronger, purer, and more combat-effective it becomes; the more thorough the anti-corruption effort, the greater the confidence and resolve to realise the centenary goal of building the military.
A three-foot-thick layer of ice does not form in a single day, nor can it be removed in a single day. The current concentrated investigation of corruption problems is not “the more we fight corruption, the more corruption there is,” but rather “the deeper we dig, the more we uncover.” The historical tide is mighty, and the process of building a strong country and a strong military is unstoppable. No test of storms and waves can shake the People’s Army’s rock-solid faith in following the Party; no difficulties or obstacles can halt the People’s Army’s firm stride toward greater strength. We firmly believe that under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, the People’s Army will sweep away all negative and corrupt phenomena and always remain a heroic force that the Party and the people can completely rely on.
This year is the opening year of the “15th Five-Year Plan” and a critical year for achieving the centenary goal of building the military. The tasks of political rectification and training, rectifying work style and discipline, and combating corruption in the military remain arduous and heavy. The entire military must advance full and strict governance of the Party and the military with higher standards and more solid measures, press ahead without pause with political army-building, continue to deepen political rectification and training, and take an integrated approach to rectifying thinking, personnel selection and appointment, organisational construction, work style, and discipline. It must vigorously restore and carry forward the glorious traditions and fine conduct of our Party and our military, continuously purifying thinking, purifying the ranks, and purifying the overall ecology.
It must unwaveringly rectify work style, enforce discipline, and fight corruption; consolidate and expand the achievements of in-depth study and education on implementing the spirit of the Central Eight-Point Decision; promote the normalization and long-term effectiveness of work-style building; and advance in an integrated manner the mechanisms of not daring to be corrupt, being unable to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt. It must effectively address all kinds of corruption problems, further confine power within an institutional cage, and work hard to eradicate the soil and conditions in which corruption breeds. Party members and cadres in the military, especially senior cadres, must take the punished corrupt elements as negative examples; uphold the Party’s original aspiration as their own true intent and the Party’s mission as their very life; take the lead in strengthening ideological transformation, political tempering, and work-style shaping; consciously guard well the ideological defense line, the bottom line in exercising power, the red line of law and discipline, and the boundary of family conduct; and forever maintain a clean and upright political character. They must establish and practice a correct view of political achievements and, through concrete actions marked by conviction, pragmatism, responsibility, and self-discipline, grasp work, advance undertakings, and lead teams – resolutely implementing the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.
The new journey toward building a strong country and a strong military is inspiring. Let us unite even more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core; adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military and the military strategic guideline for the new era; profoundly grasp the decisive significance of the “Two Establishments”; enhance the “Four Consciousnesses,” strengthen the “Four Confidences,” and achieve the “Two Upholds”; implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission; bear firmly in mind the entrusted mission, take responsibility, and press forward with determination; faithfully fulfill the missions and tasks entrusted by the Party and the people; accelerate the building of the People’s Army into a world-class military; and provide strong strategic support for comprehensively advancing the building of a strong country and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-style modernisation.
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
These acts definitely and obviously does effect the morale and operational efficiency of the PLA. The sheer number of high level officers is truly worth noting and analysing.