Discreet Teeth
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
In this Edition:
Worldview Weekly: China’s Stake & Say in the Israel-Iran Conflict
As the state of Iran’s nuclear regime and the nature of a ceasefire become clearer, China will have to fine-tune its approach to Iran as an ally, the US as a principal rival, and the region as an evolving theater with no clear vision for stability.
Guarding the Great Wall: What is the PLA up to?
This particular drill on tank camouflage speaks volumes to how PLA personnel today are not reading their books right.
Worldview Weekly: China’s Stake & Say in the Israel-Iran Conflict
Anushka Saxena | Modified and Cross-Posted from the Original Source of Publication: The Indian Express (Web)
Since conflict broke out between Israel and Iran, countries around the world are calculating their options in the face of drastic spillovers. China, a party that considers itself a vital regional stakeholder and a peacemaker in the Middle East, is pursuing its own strategy – one which is primarily centered on preserving Chinese interests in the region. Even as China has expressed support for Iran’s right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while condemning Israel and the US for attacking its nuclear facilities in blatant disregard for international law, Beijing’s main concerns revolve around two aspects.
The first, is narrative control surrounding American and Israeli bugles of victory vis-à-vis Iran, and expressing explicit support for the latter. Iran is seen as an ally and counterbalancer of Western influence, and so for China, aiding its position and reputation becomes essential. At the same time, Beijing hopes to achieve this without disrupting the possibility of peace and stability. The second, is the uncertainty around its own interests. There is a threat of trade disruptions following Iran’s claim that it will consider closing down the vital chokepoint that is the Strait of Hormuz. There is also the impact that continued missile strikes would have on Chinese citizens in Iran. Hence, Beijing must find ways to secure its position through diplomatic means, in the face of volatility.
Maintaining Support, Controlling Narratives, Playing Safe
As we speak, Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh has arrived in Qingdao, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting. But regular diplomatic tête-à-tête between China and Iran has been underway for the past few weeks. A day after Israel launched its air attacks on Iran, on June 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. This was followed up with another phone call between Wang and Araghchi on the ten-day mark, on June 24. A day before that, on June 23, China’s Assistant FM Liu Bin met with Iranian Ambassador Ibrahim Fazli. That same courtesy was not extended to Israeli Ambassador to China Ibrahim Bey, even though both Bey and Fazli were presented their diplomatic credentials on the same day and at the same location.
In these meetings, Beijing iterated the same message – that it strongly condemns Israel's violation of Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, that it firmly opposes the brutal attack on Iranian officials that caused civilian casualties, and that the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities set a dangerous precedent that could have disastrous consequences. Further, during the June 24 call, Wang called for an immediate ceasefire, and stated that China upholds the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s role in providing safeguards for Iran’s nuclear facilities.
This is how the official narrative is being articulated. On a more nuanced level, each of these strands projects an important strategic gambit for Beijing. For example, China’s explicit support for Iran’s nuclearisation rights and sovereignty is directly interlinked with its vision to counter US influence in the region, and its bid to project the image that it does things by the book, within the constraints of the UN-led multilateral order. That said, it also seems that China has made peace with the fact that accepting US influence as a ceasefire-broker is better than seeing Washington succeed in establishing a puppet regime in Tehran.
A recent article by Xinhua argues that US President Trump should keep his claims of “destroying” Iran’s nuclear facilities in check, because US Intelligence Agencies suggest otherwise. At the same time, an article by CCTV expressed anxieties that Iran has threatened to remove IAEA safeguards from its nuclear facilities in the past, but the outright ban it has imposed this time is rare. Even though the piece reasons that Iran was dissatisfied with the international nuclear regime in the face of Israel’s blatant attacks, IAEA’s removal throws up vital concerns and may even lead to a “nuclear deal” with the US being put back on the table. If China is to be considered a rational actor truly advocating for peace in the region, it is no surprise that there is hope for nuclear control in Iran, even if not denuclearisation.
This does not, however, mean that Beijing accepts attacks that disregard international law and cause civilian casualties, no matter the kind of regime in Iran. Beijing must continue to project hope in the UN-led world order, even if it has its failings. This is evident from a press briefing conducted by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiangkun on June 23, where he said that even though the UN Security Council (UNSC) could not do anything about Israel violating the UN Charter by attacking Iran, China, Pakistan, and Russia have still gone ahead and co-sponsored a UNSC resolution to promote peace and security in the region. Clearly, China is facing divergent pulls, that require it to balance condemnation of American and Israeli aggression, commitments to Iran in the face of its political and nuclear regimes’ volatilities, lip-service to the UN-centered international order, and Beijing’s own economic, security, and great power interests in the region.
Protecting Interests
Another impetus for cessation of hostilities from the Chinese perspective, is protecting business as usual. Iran’s Parliament voted to shut off the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime trade route connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. Even though the final decision to go through with the action rests with the Iranian National Supreme Council (INSC), the threat architecture is laid out. There are obvious implications for the export of Iranian oil if the INSC goes through with the move. But because that may not be enough to stop Tehran in the face of hostilities, the US and China have undertaken their own manoeuvres to warn Tehran. The former’s approach has mostly pertained to threatening Iran about how such a move would be “tantamount to suicide,” but for the latter, diplomatic wrangling has been the preferred approach. Given that US State Secretary Marco Rubio also called on China to “prevent” Iran from barring access to the Strait, Beijing may also see an opportunity to establish its capabilities and power in regional dynamics.
To make its concerns heard, at his June 23 briefing, Guo called on the international community on June 23, to step up de-escalation efforts, lest there be drastic economic consequences. Further, the Commerce Ministry is deploying contacts at Chinese embassies abroad to make the case against economic disaster. A recent press release that went up on the account of the Chinese embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, discussed how Iran's possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would seriously impact Bosnia’s economy. Finally, on June 24, the China Shipowners’ Association (CSA) issued a notice to all seafarers that they must conduct real-time relaying of information to CSA when passing through the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf daily, till tensions cool down. Here, too, it is evident that China is walking the tight rope between supporting Tehran’s decisions and protecting its own economic and security interests.
It seems the one thing Iran has assured China of, is the safe evacuation of its people. Beijing has confirmed that over 3,000 Chinese citizens have been evacuated from Iran, and those who have insisted on staying there, are being protected by the staff of the Chinese embassy and consulate in Iran. Turkmenistan, the UAE, Oman, Jordan and other regional countries apparently also helped China in the evacuation process, which can be construed a positive sign in the face of geopolitical and military tensions.
What’s Next for Beijing
It is established that China has anxieties and stakes in the hostilities between Israel and Iran, which go beyond casualties and economic instability and extend to normative power and diplomatic standing. But so far, it has been a tangential actor in the dynamic, with little to do to bring actual peace or influence the historic conflict shaping the Middle East. As the state of Iran’s nuclear regime and the nature of a ceasefire become clearer, China will have to fine-tune its approach to Iran as an ally, the US as a principal rival, and the region as an evolving theater with no clear vision for stability. Like many other countries, it would also be forced to refine its trade policy through the Strait of Hormuz and the import of Iranian oil, requiring long-term concerted efforts toward finding viable alternatives.
Guarding the Great Wall: What is the PLA up to?
Anushka Saxena
In the past few days, the PLA Daily and the China Military Media Network (81.cn) have put out three interesting reports of military exercises and thinking & planning undertaken to test tank camouflage, use of drones in battle, and improvement in ideological and political training of the armed forces. In this edition, I hope to discuss some of the key insights from these reports.
Let’s start with the report on tank camouflage. An Army Brigade conducted an exercise sometime in mid-June, to test the ability of tank personnel to shield a stationary tank from being identified on the battlefield by aerial eyes, especially drones. Camouflage is commonly practiced in the PLA Ground Forces, and training is standardised across theaters. And yet, as the report informs us, in this particular drill, personnel failed to camouflage their tank in the face of drone reconnaissance.
The scenario unfolded during a solo equipment proficiency test at an undisclosed location. As part of the drill, a sudden “enemy drone reconnaissance” alert prompted a Sergeant Song Kangkang and his squad to halt their movement and rapidly conceal their armoured vehicle. The soldiers, as they were supposed to, responded like clockwork. They draped nets around the tank, covered any shiny surfaces to avoid glare visibility in imagery, and silenced their radios. This was not their first rodeo. They performed by the book, and did well across all metrics of camouflaging under rapidly changing conditions.
Yet, the tank caught enemy fire, and their position was compromised. Here’s the interesting bit, as they explain. Footage from the “enemy” drone was projected onto a screen in the assessment round. In it, while the vehicle was indeed wrapped tightly in a camouflage net and hidden among tall grass and trees, everywhere the net had been laid, the surrounding vegetation had been visibly trampled. White root stems peeked through the crushed grass, forming a tell-tale outline of the armoured vehicle. And this is evidence of activity not visible from the ground, but only from an aerial perspective. Hence, the drone, from about 100 meters above ground, was able to detect blades of disturbed grass through high-resolution optical analysis.
Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ talks about a fascinating concept called ‘Adapting to the Enemy (因敌)’. It instructs army personnel to modify their deployments based on enemy troop movements or their position at specific nodes. As per PLA doctrine, adapting to enemy actions requires forecasting their conventional/unconventional moves using reconnaissance or the 32 methods of enemy assessment. This allows for targeted preparations. This particular drill on tank camouflage speaks volumes to how PLA personnel today are not reading their books right.
Eventually, He Di, one of the drill coordinators, pointed out during the debrief: today’s drones are smarter, sharper, and less forgiving. Earlier training scenarios used drones for basic, high-altitude reconnaissance, looking for obvious shapes or patterns. Now, aerial surveillance is far more granular. Even subtle disturbances in the natural environment, like a ring of flattened grass, are enough to give a position away. At a review meeting soon after, a senior officer didn’t mince words too: “Our training mindset is stuck in the past. If we continue to rely on old experience, we will lose real battles,” he said. Camouflage, he reminded the troops, is not about checking boxes but fooling an intelligent adversary.
Speaking of drones, another report from the PLA Daily’s 19 June edition discusses the need for ‘Deepening the Understanding of Drone Operations on the Battlefield’ (深化无人机战场运用认识). It appears in the ‘Military Forum’ (军事论坛) section of the paper, which is one of the more interesting ones. The report in question discusses how drones are not just force multipliers anymore – they’re fast becoming both the “scalpel” and the “shield” in frontline operations.
What is most vital to take away from the article, I believe, is that it reflects to some degree Chinese military commentators’ thinking on different types of drones. Here are quick pointers of note:
Big Drones, Big Values, Bigger Challenges
Medium and large drones have historically been the pride of military drone fleets. But their shine, the article argues, is wearing off. They’re expensive, complex to maintain, and vulnerable targets for enemy air defences. As warfare intensifies, their survivability is increasingly in question. They remain indispensable for missions requiring long endurance, heavy payloads, or deep-penetration recon, especially when operating far beyond the front lines.
Smaller Drones as Budget Stealth Bombers
The article makes the case that smaller fixed-wing drones are emerging as the real tactical workhorses. They’re cheap, quiet, and hard to detect, making them ideal for slipping through enemy defences to scout, guide artillery, or carry out electronic warfare. Since they’re affordable, losses can be quickly replenished, keeping operations going without pause. The article encourages readers to think of them as the “foot soldiers of unmanned warfare”: expendable, reliable, and surprisingly lethal.
Thinking Scale with Kamikazes
Loitering munitions – what some call “suicide drones” or “kamikazes” – are becoming the go-to option for deep strikes. Their low cost makes them perfect for probing enemy air defences, soaking up incoming fire, and then breaking through to hit high-value targets. The article expresses the belief that they help offset the shortcomings of traditional artillery, especially when precision and timing are crucial.
Commercial is Key
Perhaps the most disruptive change is the rise of commercial drones in tactical operations, especially for their biggest producer – China. The article instructs PLA units are to create their drone teams using consumer-grade platforms for live aerial recon and fire adjustment. When deployed in swarms, these drones can offer a limited but real precision strike capability, especially in Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) scenarios. They’re cheap, [largely] effective, and when used smartly, can flip the battlefield asymmetry in one’s favour.
The article also has some recommendations on counter-drone systems and defence against kamikazes and swarms.
Shoot Them Down, But Do It Smart
Deploying dense air defence networks to swat drones out of the sky is the classic method. But there’s a catch: using million-dollar missiles to shoot down thousand-dollar drones isn’t sustainable. It’s a high-cost game that needs better efficiency. Hence, the article suggests layering multiple air-defence systems and having them target drones only outside the primary shielded area, so that missiles can target bigger fish, while more reactive and cost-efficient counter-swarm systems can take drones out closer to home.
Detect First, React Fast
Early detection is half the battle. The article suggests that PLA units must try to build a real-time, multi-source early warning system by integrating radar and optical sensors. Further, it adds that civilian-based crowdsourced early warning systems can also be mobilised, enabling people to report air strikes in real time. It suggests that in war, the PLA is looking at all-out mobilisation.
Jamming and EW are Vital
Deploying dense electronic warfare systems, down to squads or even individual soldiers, can neutralise incoming drones by jamming or forcing them to land. These systems can also disrupt drone navigation signals, preventing them from reaching target zones. In some cases, drones can be hijacked or rendered ineffective through signal manipulation, further limiting their utility. So, as the article lays out, the game winner is essentially the one who performs better in the network-centricity domain.
Going After Operators
The article suggests that enemy drone operators, base stations, and launch vehicles must be located and targeted using various positioning technologies. These coordinates can then be used to direct artillery or loitering munitions strikes. This approach shifts the fight ‘upstream’ from shooting down drones to destroying their command and control infrastructure.
Last Line of Defence
On the fallback, the article suggests hardening targets and deploying decoys. The idea is to mislead incoming drones or reduce the damage if one gets through. The article implores readers to think diverse – deploying decoys, installing protective gear, camouflage or fake heat signatures, and of course, reinforced hulls to absorb blast effects.
Finally, there was a report on June 26 assessing the Western Theater Command Air Force’s experimentation with with a “three-level integration” method (三级统融) for education in political and ideological alignment. As far as I know, this is the first time this “three-level integration” model in ideological and political education of the PLA has been introduced.
The WTC Air Force came up with this method at a study session for the Central Military Commission’s 2024 Political Work Conference, where subsequently it developed ‘Measures for Promoting the Implementation of the Ideological and Political Education System’. Per the measures, three-level integration means:
Senior officers (lieutenant colonel and above) conduct large-scale lectures on innovative theory, current affairs, and discipline;
Grassroots commanders give talks on the basic principles of being a good soldier, closely aligned with soldiers’ real thoughts; and
The “backbones of education” engage mainly in mass-led educational activities.
Subsequently, a WTC Air Force Unit also refined the method through a joint “education planning” meeting with its propaganda section, and training, organization, logistics, and discipline inspection departments. Apparently, the Unit monthly comes up with an ‘Integrated Education Management’ (教育统融图) table. In this table (potentially for May or June), following the “three-level integration” method of the Theater Air Force, nearly 20 educational topics were streamlined and merged into 10, and new grassroots-led training instructions were issued. Interestingly, these can be their own version of ‘three-level integration’:
Integration of education types: Education is categorized based on the nature of content, such as thematic education, basic education, regular ideological education, and other regulation-mandated topics. Direction, content, and objectives for each are clarified, and different levels are given autonomy in planning.
Integration of education time: Addressing the varying operational states of units, this idea allocates time within the annual education plan, prioritising thematic and basic education to focus on combat readiness, while ensuring regular ideological education takes up a substantial share to address trends and tendencies.
Integration of educational resources: This promotes a broad view of education, insisting that “leaders give big lectures, grassroots give small ones” and building horizontal collaborations (e.g., brigade-regiment, company-platoon). Outstanding political instructors are invited for mobile teaching, and quality lectures are shared on online platforms. On this front, the report talks of a radar unit stationed long-term in a high-altitude snowy plateau, which once faced severe shortages in educational resources and personnel. Upon learning this, higher authorities took two actions:
Sent experienced instructors to assist and help build the local political education team, encouraging use of nearby red (revolutionary) resources; and
Explored regional cooperation by inviting distinguished personnel from “Ganbala Hero Radar Station” and other units to deliver lectures and share resources. If you are interested in understanding a bit more about this ‘Hero Radar Station’, please check out this previous edition of ‘Eye on China’.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
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Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
