Double Trouble & Double Support
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
In this edition:
India-China Relations: Chinese Rhetoric on India-Pak Tensions
Guarding the Great Wall: Making the People Love the People’s Army
India-China Relations: Chinese Rhetoric on India-Pak Tensions
Anushka Saxena | Reposted from original source of publication: NDTV.com
In the aftermath of the terror attack on civilians in Pahalgam, Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiankun commented that Beijing firmly opposes all forms of terrorism. And yet, China’s posturing around the state of India-Pakistan relations has largely stuck to three assertions, which express its implicit support for Pakistan’s position.
The first is that China believes the incident was a result of unknown but positively local gunmen “shooting” civilians. This is evident from coverage on two of China's largest and most popular media platforms, Xinhua and CCTV, both owned and operated by the Chinese party-state. The only way Chinese articulation differs from that of Pakistan, in this regard, is that popular coverage has referred to the location of the incident as “India-controlled” or “India-administered” Kashmir, as opposed to Islamabad, which refers to it as “Indian illegally-occupied Kashmir.”
This approach undermines the idea that the incident was an act of terror, and pushes aside Indian concerns surrounding infiltration of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorists into Kashmir. In fact, coverage in leading Chinese state-owned media platforms like the Global Times feeds fodder to the authenticity of The Resistance Front (TRF)’s rather hasty withdrawal, wherein the terror group attributed its statement claiming responsibility for the attack to a cyber intrusion. On this account, the platform urged India to act “rationally” and “avoid premature conclusions.” To an informed audience, this is a blatant disregard for the history and context of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism on Indian soil.
The second assertion is that China formally aspires for both India and Pakistan to move toward a peaceful resolution of the dispute, and accept bilateral negotiations as the way forward. This was notably emphasised by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ishaq Dar on April 27. Further, the sentiment was reiterated by Guo Jiankun in his regular press conference on April 28, where he stated that “As a common neighbor of both India and Pakistan, China hopes the two sides will exercise restraint, move toward each other, and properly handle their differences through dialogue and consultation.”
There is some support for this position in scholarly circles. For example, Wang Shida, an Executive Director at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (a Chinese Ministry of State Security institution), argued in an opinion piece for Huanqiu (Global Times Chinese) that because India and Pakistan have a long way to go in terms of economic development, the two should focus on quickly resolving the dispute and moving on to their developmental agendas.
What is also interesting, however, is that the proposal for de-escalation doesn’t exactly seem to be motivated by a desire for peace. It rather comes across from commentaries in Chinese media that analysts believe India doesn’t have the capability to engage in and win a hot war on Kashmir with Pakistan, and that it will derail its goals and ambitions if it attempts to do so. Scholars like Wang put it more subtly, in that he says in his opinion piece, “If the situation in Kashmir further escalates—or even ‘explodes’—it would clearly not serve India's fundamental interests.”
Other commentators, such as Gu Huoping (a pen name for an account that frequently writes on military affairs concerning China), argue that in the face of India’s aggressive posture, Pakistan is right to not back down. In fact, in a recent article for the Chinese media platform NetEase, Gu opines that a hot war may be a test of all the ‘Made in China’ defence products the Pakistan armed forces are heavily reliant on. Using examples of India’s retreat in the 1962 war with China, and by misleadingly arguing that India has not held a clear advantage in its historic wars with Pakistan, Gu attempts to propagate the idea that Delhi should best back off.
Another angle that ties into this narrative on negotiation as the way forward, is Beijing’s willingness to play mediator. In his April 28 remarks, Guo Jiankun also stated, “China welcomes all measures conducive to de-escalating the current situation and supports the early launch of a fair investigation.” Interestingly, this statement was made in response to a question posed by a journalist of the RIA Novosti, a Russian state-owned media agency, based on the platform’s recent interview with Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif. In this interview, Asif said that he would find an international intervention by Russia, China, or any Western countries highly useful to figure out who was behind the incident, and added that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif supported this proposal.
Naturally, Beijing seems to believe that it could be the right actor to enable de-escalation of the situation, including by supporting the launch of a “fair and swift” investigation. In fact, coverage of Guo’s statements rarely acknowledges that Asif also called on other actors, including countries in the West, to support an international investigation. If one further looks at the Chinese transcript of Wang Yi’s phone call with Dar, Wang vouches for Pakistan’s sovereignty and “legitimate security concerns,” while again calling for an “impartial investigation.” By consistently iterating its ability to bring peace, Beijing is inadvertently supporting Pakistan’s internationalisation of what is clearly a bilateral issue, and undermining India’s opposition to global mediation.
It is important to note here that China’s official rhetoric surrounding negotiation and mediation to resolve India and Pakistan’s differences is not new. Similar statements were presented by the Foreign Ministry to respond to the Jaish-e-Mohammed attack in Pulwama in February 2019. Even then, spokesperson Geng Shuang had refused to acknowledge Pakistani involvement, arguing that India’s naming of the terror group responsible for the attack does not indicate a confirmed judgement, and this is likely to remain a rhetorical trend in China’s posturing vis-à-vis India-Pak tensions.
Third and final is the Chinese emphasis on the immorality and futility of India’s punitive measures against Pakistan. Some of this is reflected in the writings of commentators of Gu Huoping on the resilience of Pakistan’s China-backed armed forces in the face of Indian resolve. On a more nuanced level, rhetoric emerging out of Beijing is focused on opposing everything, from India’s decision to shut off its airspace to Pakistani aircraft, to its move to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance.
For example, a recent commentary on Sohu, a Chinese internet media and online search company, glorifies Pakistan’s retaliatory decision to shut off its airspace to Indian aircraft and halt bilateral trade as a landmark response to India’s punitive measures. The commentary is authored by a popular analyst going by “Global Defense Focus,” and has over 720 million+ reads. Similarly, on the issue of India’s “threat” to stop Pakistan’s water supply, a recent article on popular media site Guancha highlights support for Islamabad’s claims that India has caused moderate flooding in several low-lying areas in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Such rhetoric clearly ignores meteorological facts. Even if there are higher levels of waterflow recorded in Jhelum in the past few days, it is likely a result of seasonal melting of glaciers – something the Lahore Flood Forecasting Division itself warned residents of, on April 18.
Another angle to explain why Chinese narratives have specifically de-legitimised India’s countermeasures is that they potentially impact China’s interests in Pakistan. Comments on the incident by the popular analyst Liu Zongyi, Director of the South Asia Research Center at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (a government-affiliated think tank), inform readers that Beijing may be concerned about implications for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In fact, to further the cause of de-escalation and for Pakistan’s own “security interests,” he pointed out that Pakistan accuses India of supporting separatist and extremist groups inside Pakistan and Afghanistan—groups that threaten Pakistan’s internal security and disrupt CPEC.
In this regard, even as Beijing’s official rhetoric has been relatively mild and vague, the societal and analytical support for the strategic convergence between China and Pakistan is clearly evident. At a time when India-Pakistan relations are witnessing an intense shake-up, China is likely to sustain its posturing, including through proposals to mediate in the name of regional stability. From the Indian perspective, it is vital to assess how best to counter such narratives, all the while retaining its position on resolving issues with Pakistan bilaterally.
Guarding the Great Wall: Making the People Love the People’s Army
Anushka Saxena
April 15 marked the 10th anniversary of the National Security Education Day, and official coverage both of and since the event, is throwing up new emphases on embedding security within development and achieving development through security. More importantly, the sentiments expressed in said coverage in say, the PLA Daily or 81.cn, are premised on the idea that “A nation’s weight relies on the success of its military.” Subsequently, the threat perception is elevated, and the focus is on enhancing the efficacy of ‘double support work’ and the people’s unwavering reinforcement of national security and military priorities.
‘Double support work’ (双拥工作) largely refers to garnering support for the military and national defence from civilians, while also encouraging the military to back the government and the people.
In his article on the National Security Education Day, PLA Daily editor Du Shengzhi highlights how different stakeholders can ideologically bring China’s national security goals and the CPC’s military policy imperatives to fruition:
This year marks the final year of the 14th Five-Year Plan for military development and a critical year for achieving the centenary goal of building a strong military. Military units across the board should take National Security Education Day as an opportunity to carry out distinctive and effective law education activities.
Service members should be organised to deeply study President Xi’s important expositions on the holistic view of national security and his scientific assessments of the security situation. They should fully recognise the extreme importance and current urgency of safeguarding national security, and thoroughly understand the role of national defence and military development in the overall national security strategy.
In conjunction with the commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and the 75th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ participation in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, efforts must be made to enhance fundamental education on the military’s core functions, and to study war history, battle cases, and famous commanders. This will strengthen the sense of mission and responsibility to be ready for combat at any time and to win whenever called upon.
We must adhere to bottom-line thinking, intensify combat training and preparedness, continuously enhance strategic capabilities for safeguarding national security and development, and be fully prepared to respond to all kinds of complex and challenging situations. This will resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and provide security guarantees and strong support for building a great modern socialist country and realising national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernisation.
As Manoj Kewalramani explained in his June 2024 testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), bottom-line thinking is about striving for the best-case outcomes while preparing for the worst. Engaging in bottom-line thinking requires one to determine certain minimum standards, conditions, or thresholds that must not be breached or compromised in the course of a development.
One can apply this approach to the foreign policy domain through the establishment of clear red lines. Of late, the Communist Party has increasingly attempted to do so with regard to the Taiwan issue. For instance, in March 2024, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “China’s policy is quite clear—we will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity. China’s bottom line is also quite clear—we will never allow Taiwan to be separated from the motherland. Whoever engages in ‘Taiwan independence’ on the island will be held accountable by history.” A breach of this bottom line is considered a political failure.
Subsequently, as the National Conference on Naming Model ‘Double Support’ Cities (Counties) was held in Beijing on April 23, coverage on ‘double support’ work gained momentum, creating the rhetorical grounds for citizens to not only support the military, but also provide preferential treatment to military families.
Subsequently, the General Office for Organ Affairs of the Central Military Commission has increased its focus on implementing the “Four Outreach Activities” policy (science, culture, health, and law services to rural areas). Reportage indicates that it is doing so by donating educational supplies to related primary and secondary schools for the past nine years, and coordinating military training and national defence education for over 20,000 students.
Further announcements inform that Beijing’s Haidian District has (not surprisingly) fully leveraged its advantages as a major garrison area, military education hub, and technology center, winning the title of ‘National Model City for Double Support’ for ten consecutive terms, including in 2025. Huzhou was awarded the Model City (county) Plaque for 2025.
Subsequently, a report by 81.cn has recited how diverse provinces, autonomous regions, and armed forces are implementing the ‘double support’ mechanism.
BLUF: It can be quite insightful to gauge what diverse agenda items double support in specific and 'civil-military fusion in China in general, stand for. Unlike a democracy, where mandatory national military mobilisation is tough to see through (unless opinions can be united against a single enemy), and where people take their concerns about the military and the police to civilian leadership, China uniquely coerces its citizens to find love for their military and respect its authority. To many it may seem like just another day in an authoritarian China, but it still remains interesting to observe just how much such a leadership model can allow the CPC and the PLA to pull-off.
From using ‘Double Support’ as a narrative gift-wrap to push for civlian mobilisation on the internet or in conflicted border areas, to creating a positive image surrounding massive economic projects by giving them a national security angle, provinces are doing it all. And national defence education pilot schools become ground-zero for normalising love and affection for the military.
Two things emerge clearly from the coverage on ‘Double Support’ theory. First is that it cannot be possible to implement in practice without support from local governments (who are oft leveraged through a robust incentive structure, such as the plaque awarding ceremony discussed above). And second, is that consistent messaging around double support has the potential to shift public sentiment toward legitimisation of conflict, war, and aggression. Some degree of pedestalisation of military families may be its own set of incentives in this light.
And now, for a few excerpts:
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region. In recent years, Tibet has continued to deepen the “Five Shares and Five Strengthens/ Five Commons and Five Consolidations'“ (五共五固) initiative between military and local grassroots Party organizations along the border, constantly solidifying the Party’s ruling foundation, the foundation of ethnic unity, and the foundation of border stability. This speaks to the conformist and homogenising ideological leanings that even local officials are being encouraged to take up in Tibet. As Qiao Sen, Political Instructor of a border defence company of the Tibet Military Command, indicates:
We will firmly remember General Secretary Xi’s important instructions, serve as the Party’s fighting, working, and production teams in ethnic areas, consciously carry forward the army’s glorious traditions, treat our stationed areas as our homes and the people as our family, actively contribute to rural revitalization, help improve people's livelihoods, and strengthen the Party’s grassroots fortresses, building strong military-civil cooperation for border defense.
In recent years, Jilin Province has continuously improved its ‘Double Support’ work mechanisms, strengthened the implementation of policies supporting the military and their families, addressed the urgent needs of troops through itemized solutions, and widely promoted education, technology, and cultural initiatives supporting the military. Wan Chunjiang, Director of the Jilin Provincial Veterans Affairs Department, said:
Moving forward, we will use this conference as an opportunity to create more ‘Double Support’ work brands with distinct times and Jilin characteristics, contributing to the goal of building a strong country with a strong military.
The Rocket Force, while completing its strategic tasks, has vigorously promoted grassroots ‘Double Support’ activities, consistently engaging with local communities, and has especially run the ‘Rocket Force Sword Sharpening Scholarship Program’ (火箭军砺剑助学行动) for poor university students from ethnic minorities in western China. Over the past 22 years, they have provided political care, economic assistance, daily life support, and career guidance, inspiring young people’s passion for the Party, the country, and the military.
Xiamen’s Siming District in Fujian Province has fully implemented the ‘double list’ system for military and local needs, resolving soldiers’ concerns effectively.
Wang Lianxin, Director of the ‘Double Support’ Division of the Guangzhou Veterans Affairs Bureau, said:
We will focus on five areas: strengthen emergency support mechanisms, address troops’ post-service issues, boost technological and intellectual support for the military, establish direct communication channels for military needs, and involve enterprises and organizations in building a ‘Yangcheng Military Support Alliance’.
Over the past five years, Pingxiang City in Guangxi has innovatively created a ‘Party Building + Double Support + Border Governance’ (党建+双拥+边境治理) model, achieving nationwide model service station coverage. Wu Xiaohui, Secretary of the Pingxiang Municipal Committee, said:
We will deepen the ‘Five-in-One’ strong border defense system, enhance the ‘veterans evaluation’ mechanism, mobilise more ‘Border Volunteers’, and integrate smart support and industrial border protection, making every inch of land reflect the love between the military and civilians.
At the National University of Defense Technology, a graduate battalion has maintained over a decade-long partnership with the Qingshuitang Primary School North Campus in Changsha, Hunan, awarded the title of ‘National Defense Education Model School’, donating over 20,000 books, organizing more than 100 defense education activities, and supporting 67 poor students.
Political Commissar Yao Jia said:
We will deepen ‘Double Support’ cooperation, organize activities like ‘One Day in the Military Camp’ and ‘Youth Military Schools,’ and explore ‘Internet + Double Support’ models to further strengthen military-political and military-civil unity.
For Hainan province, Cao Shuyu, Mayor of Wenchang City, focused on continuously advancing ‘Double Support’ efforts to contribute to the Hainan Free Trade Port construction and the maritime defense.
Shannan City in Tibet borders India and Bhutan, with a border length of over 630 kilometers. Yang Hongbing, Vice Mayor of Shannan, said:
We will further strengthen foundations, address weaknesses, innovate methods, and deepen the connotation of ‘Double Support’, continuously expanding society-wide support for the military, and building an impenetrable border defense.
The Nujiang Detachment of the Armed Police stationed in Yunnan’s Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture has actively participated in rural revitalisation, border protection, and disaster relief, helping Nujiang’s transformation from backwardness to progress, from closure to openness, and from poverty to prosperity. Political Commissar Mei Jikun said:
We will continue to expand ‘Double Support’ activities, transform Xi’s important instructions into practical results, and further consolidate the rock-solid military-political and military-civil unity.
Subsequently, a commentary appearing in the PLA Daily discussed Xi’s important instructions on dual support work from the April 23 Conference. While a lot of it concerned following the CPC’s guidelines on loving the people and loving the military, as well as “comprehensively deepening reforms” in the tradition of dual support work, the interesting bit was about what the party-state has been doing to give preferential treatment to military families. A lot of it could speak to concerns PLA personnel (especially single male children) and their families may have.
In recent years, local governments have carried out special Spring Festival ‘visits and care’ (慰问) activities for troops stationed in border and coastal defence areas, working attentively to address issues related to the well-being of troops’ families and support networks. The military, for its part, has pushed forward the revitalization and development of 4,100 villages they assist, built 360 ‘August 1st Loving the People’ schools, and carried out programs such as military medical service trips to old revolutionary base areas and airborne tree planting projects, demonstrating their commitment to serving and supporting the people. A total of 16,000 military-civilian co-building sites have carried out routine cooperation and mutual development, with ‘city-company’, ‘city-ship’, and ‘unit-village’ partnerships becoming prominent brands.
The commentary also has some instructions for how the PLA should carry out ‘Double Support’ duties:
The military must undergo revolutionary tempering, always maintain its political character as the people’s army, and remain a force trusted, supported, and loved by the people.
It must persist in simultaneous struggle, combat preparedness, and construction, focus on strategic goals, strengthen planning and execution, and enhance its strategic capability to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests.
The military must fulfill its sacred duty of bearing arms and fighting for the people, resolutely accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned by the Party and the people in the new era.
Moreover, the military should actively support local development, bravely take on urgent, difficult, dangerous, and critical tasks, and contribute to rural revitalization with practical actions that benefit the people [As is evident from the examples of the armed forces helping out with flooding disaster relief in China, the PLA considers ensuring people’s lives through non-combat tasks to also be an important component of its role vis-à-vis the people].
It should also make full use of its advantages to work together with the civilian side to enhance national defense education, strengthen national defense awareness across society, and make caring for, loving, building, and defending national defense a common ideological consensus and conscious action among the people.
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Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
