Ending the Year with a Bang – Literally!
Wishing our readers a very joyous and prosperous 2025.
Guarding the Great Wall #1: No ‘Joint Sword’ 2024-C
Anushka Saxena
December 2024 was moderately momentous for military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan. More specifically, two events of note took place recently, in line with what has been a series of small, medium, and large-scale military exercises to create a new normal around the island since 2022. The first was an aerial intervention which cannot exactly be referred to as a military exercise. Still, it did include the creation of seven reserved airspace zones (7个空域保留区) east of the Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian, for increased incursions by the PLA.
Interestingly, the official announcement for this event came not from the PLA or the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, but from the Taiwanese MoND, which launched counter-exercises to deal with an influx of PLA Air Force aircraft and PLA Navy vessels in the period between December 9-12, 2024. To that end, the MoND explained that by utilizing joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods, the Taiwanese armed forces tracked the activities of PLA Navy fleets and Coast Guard vessels from the PLA’s Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands. These units were, as per the MoND, observed entering areas around the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific to conduct extended-range maritime operations.
The interesting thing remains the PLA’s non-announcement of these “seven reserved airspace zones,” though it is clear that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was issued by the area control center for Shanghai (ACC Code: ZSHA; NOTAM #A4218/24 – now expired).
The motivations for this particular manoeuvre seem clear – it was intended to be a response to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s “transit” through the US. On November 30, 2024, before his onward trip to Taiwan’s Pacific allies, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, and Palau, Lai touched down at the US state of Hawaii for a two-day stopover. On his return, he made a stop on December 4 at the US territory of Guam, before eventually returning to Taipei on December 6. Shortly after, on December 13, right after Chinese incursions wrapped up, a US P-8 ‘Poseidon’ maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft also transited the Taiwan Strait “from North to South.”
But why Guam and Hawaii? A Taiwanese scholar based at INDSR says it’s a move for Taiwan, a “first island chain” territory, to link territories in the “second” (Guam) and “third” (Hawaii) island chains. Be that as it may, from Lai’s perspective, this first overseas trip would have meant a great deal to demonstrate support for the island’s last dozen remaining diplomatic allies. And the “transit” is not a mere cherry on top, but a calculated decision many of Lai’s successors have undertaken given the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the US. What may be slightly new, this time, is that the PLA’s response was quite moderate, given that when Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen, made a similar transit in March-April 2023, China launched expansive military exercises in the Strait.
This is not to that the Chinese MoND or Foreign Affairs Ministry were silent on the subject entirely. While they did refrain from commenting on the increased numbers of incursions on the given dates of the NOTAMs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian made it clear at a regular press conference on December 6 that Lai was a “separatist” for conducting the “transit,” and that “seeking ‘independence by relying on the US’ is a dead end.” Then, on December 13, the Chinese MoND’s spokesperson and Information Bureau Director Wu Qian made some interesting remarks while answering a question on whether the PLA would respond to the transit. He said:
Safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, upholding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and protecting the shared interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are the sacred duties of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). “Military tactics are ever-changing, like water taking different forms.” Whether to conduct exercises and when to do so is determined independently by us based on our needs & the situation at hand. Regardless of whether exercises are conducted, the PLA will neither be absent nor hesitate in combating “Taiwan independence” and promoting reunification.
[维护国家主权和领土完整, 维护中华民族根本利益，维护两岸同胞共同利益, 是人民解放军的神圣职责. 兵无常势、水无常形。是否举行演习、何时举行演习, 由我们根据自身需要和斗争形势自主决定. 无论是否举行演习, 解放军在打“独”促统方面不会缺席, 不会手软. 无论是否举行演习, 解放军在打“独”促统方面不会缺席, 不会手软.]
This was neither a denial of a military exercise in the works, nor a confirmation that there will be one. However, the “ever-changing nature” of military tactics that Wu Qian talks about unprompted seems to me like an acknowledgement that though there may not be a widespread military exercise likening to the ones previously conducted in response to say, Tsai’s “transit,” grey-zone tactics will be utilised to respond to the extent the PLA sees fit. And the reasons behind not conducting comprehensive exercises may be both internal and external. These could range from fatigue in military forces, to China’s wariness with regard to incoming US President Trump.
The second event was the completion of the PLA Navy’s Shandong aircraft carrier’s final sea training mission for 2024, in late December. The Shandong is China’s first domestically designed, constructed, and equipped conventionally-powered aircraft carrier.
Over the past five years since its commissioning in December 2019, the Shandong has transitioned from coastal operations to deep-sea missions, jointly conducting ‘dual-carrier’ exercises in twin Carrier Battle Group (CBGs) formations alongside the Liaoning. Further, the Liaoning has been deployed near the Bashi Channel for support to surface combatants and to the PLAAF’s aerial exercises during the ‘Joint Sword 2024-B’ drills against Taiwan in October 2024. While, in the August 2022 exercises, both carriers were involved. Subsequently, in late October last year, the PLA also deployed the dual-carrier formation in the South China Sea, in response to the KAMANDAG-8 Joint Exercise between the US and Philippines Marine Corps, as well as other allied forces.
In this regard, the PLAN’s power projection through carriers should be a matter of note in Taiwan, given that they are likely to be at the forefront of a PLA naval intervention in the Strait, and that, in Xinhua’s terms, they use “the open seas and oceans as their [sic] ‘training grounds’.”
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Guarding the Great Wall #2: A New Exercise, A Moderate Success
Anushka Saxena
It is now a known fact that achieving the ability to win ‘informatised warfare’ (智能化战争) lies at the underbelly of the present emphasis on combat-related efforts in the PLA. In the Chinese conception, victory shall be determined by the network centricity and information dominance of forces in battle. As argued in a commentary published by the PLA Daily in December 2019, “Unlike any other form of warfare in history, information warfare is not a simple additive or locally dispersed confrontation of various combat units or elements, but a comprehensive confrontation of systems against systems.” This hence defines informatized warfare as a method of combat that uses information technology as an “adhesive force” to convert individual services, platforms, and support arms into a warfighting “system.”
Such a network-dependent combat system is most likely to succeed because it can leverage battlefield intelligence information from various sources (such as space, unmanned underwater systems, and ground control), provide a decisive advantage by utilising information-based tactics of fighting and battlefield infiltration (such as through the use of electromagnetic warfare), and blur the lines between ground, air, naval, cyber, and other domains of warfare. Informatized warfare forms one of the three fundamental “-izations” (三化) of Chinese military modernisation — the other two being mechanization and intelligentization.
But running an informationised warfare campaign has a big internal challenge, which directly impacts the degree of harm an enemy can create for the system – the security of interconnected networks. And given that the PLA is preparing to fight using interconnected networks, it often attempts to incorporate a jamming and counter-electromagnetic attack component to its military exercises. Most recently, a brigade of the PLA Ground Forces similarly conducted a drill in early January 2025 – counter-training exercises between its electronic warfare unit and communications unit.
So what happened in the exercise? At the beginning, the electronic warfare unit intercepted “enemy signals” and reportedly, immediately deployed electromagnetic jamming. In response, the communications unit “quickly” countered with measures such as radio silence and feints (deceptive blows/ decoy signals) to evade the interference.
And then, there was a situation update from the command center: “Node 1 is under attack; the communication network has been disrupted!” That required an immediate response from Communications Unit Commander Gu Yu (通信分队指挥员顾雨), who reportedly ordered the activation of an emergency communication plan. Following the command, operators “swiftly” switched radio frequencies and employed effective strategies to break through the electromagnetic barrier. Shortly thereafter, the command link was restored.
Subsequently, on the training ground, the electronic warfare unit noticed its initial jamming efforts were ineffective and “immediately” recalibrated to re-capture the target signal, preparing for a second round of jamming. Meanwhile, the target signal suddenly disappeared from the radar screen. The unit’s commander promptly gathered key personnel to analyze signal waveform changes. After forming a preliminary judgment, the team relocked the target. The commander then ordered the jamming stations to execute “pinpoint” interference, achieving electromagnetic “suppression.”
Like all military exercises, this one too, ended with a “face-to-face” review and summary session. Both, the EW and Comms units “rigorously scrutinized the details, identified issues, and analyzed weaknesses.” The conclusions suggested that the inefficient responses to the surprise development were a failure, as the brigade leader commented:
An opponent is the best sharpening stone for honing skills. During training, we not only simulate special scenarios but also encourage participating units to challenge and set problems for each other, further refining combat capabilities and building confidence in victory.
[对手是最好的砺剑石。训练中，我们在导调特情的同时，引导参训分队互出情况、互设难题，进一步锤炼作战本领、增强打赢信心.]
Moving forward, the brigade has also planned to conduct drills of a similar nature in reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, as well as obstacle setting and obstacle breaking. They also intend to continue organising opposing units to practice offensive and defensive manoeuvres against one another – understood in the PLA as “back to back” training sessions.
Moving forward, PLA watchers may find more on China’s perceptions and simulations of a tactical systems warfare scenario, which is central to combat training and essentially refers to combat between two systems or two sides with one emerging decisively victorious. In this, the key element is coordination between command and communication, reconnaissance and intelligence, firepower, electronic warfare (EW) and cyber warfare, engineering, and battlefield management. Achieving such coordination requires top-notch aerial reconnaissance to provide information on enemy positions, heavy rocket artillery to overwhelm enemy C2 and air defence positions, and supplementary EW and cyber capabilities as countermeasures. This is also why over the years, anti-aircraft artillery units, together with ground-to-air missile units, as well as EW and comms units, have become part of the backbone of the military’s integrated capabilities.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In this latest podcast episode for ‘All Things Policy’, Vanshika Saraf hosted Riya Sinha of the Center for Social and Economic Progress, a Delhi-based think tank, to discuss her recently published ‘Sambandh Database & Map’.
From the inspiration behind the project to the challenges faced in compiling and maintaining the database, the conversation explores how India has stepped up its integration efforts with its neighbourhood.
Tune in:
Rakshith Shetty, in his latest piece for The Hindu, one of India’s most widely read English dailies, sums up his key findings and arguments from his research on ‘India’s Reliance on China for Critical Minerals’.
Does China have unparalleled dominance in the critical minerals sector? How was it able to do so? What are the minerals for which India is heavily dependent on China? Why has India not been able to excavate the lithium reserves found in Jammu and Kashmir? These are the pertinent questions Rakshith attempts to answer.
Manoj Kewalramani has kickstarted a much-awaited podcast as part of his daily newsletter, ‘Tracking People’s Daily’ – ‘The Great Power Show’. First up in an upcoming, star-studded list of podcast episodes: Ambassador Shivshankar Menon on ‘The Myth of World Order’. Tune in:
Finally, in her latest commentary for Life of Soldiers, a magazine and online dissemination platform run by Indian armed forces veterans, Anushka Saxena discusses ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare: Doctrine and Capabilities of the PLA Navy’.
She argues: “While China is increasingly focusing on ASW, as highlighted in the US Department of Defence’s recently published ‘China Military Power Report 2024’, the reality is that China lacks a robust deep-water ASW capability. This does not, however, mean that China is not invested in improvement.”
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
