Eye on China (4 February 2023)
Contents : Section A: India-China Relations; Section B: Chinese Domestic Politics; Section C: Economy and Tech; Section D: Foreign Policy Watch; E: Military Developments in China
Hi there! It’s been a while since the ‘Eye on China’ newsletter landed in your Inbox! This is because we were working on restructuring the format and expanding the team behind the newsletter. Since we’re coming back with the newsletter after a while, this particular edition will cover developments from the last few weeks, and we shall now deliver the newsletter to you every week by Saturday. Hope you enjoy reading this one!
Section A: India-China Relations
There have been some very interesting developments over the past few weeks, which are worth capturing in this week’s section.
First, the conference of DGPs and IGPs in India, from January 20 to 22, saw a lot of discussions related to China. For instance, there was a paper submitted to the conference, which criticized the Indian army for its “play safe” approach in eastern Ladakh.
The Hindu’s report quotes from the paper:
“Presently, there are 65 PPs starting from Karakoram pass to Chumur which are to be patrolled regularly by the ISFs (Indian Security Forces). Out of 65 PPs, our presence is lost in 26 PPs (i.e. PP no. 5-17, 24-32, 37, 51, 52, 62) due to restrictive or no patrolling by the ISFs. Later on, China, forces us to accept the fact that, as, such areas have not seen the presence of ISFs or civilians since long, the Chinese were present in these areas. This leads to a shift in the border under control of ISFs towards Indian side and a buffer zone is created in all such pockets which ultimately leads to loss of control over these areas by India. This tactic of PLA to grab land inch-by-inch is known as Salami Slicing.”
Source: New Indian Express
Also during the conference, there was a discussion on the functioning of Chinese commercial entities in India. The Hindu’s reporting says that
“According to the official, sustained investigation by the intelligence agencies since 2020 has revealed a ‘disturbing picture’ of the role of Chinese commercial entities in India. The investigation began after the June 15, 2020, incident in Ladakh’s Galwan where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)...The assessment by agencies found that the commercial entities operate in India with five primary objectives — influencing minds, build economic control, acquisition of data, for espionage and to target scientists to compromise innovation and intellectual property rights (IPRs), a preliminary paper prepared on the topic said. It said the objective of counterintelligence is pursued through top officials of Chinese companies in India, adding that small-size shell companies were also used as financial conduits to fund espionage rings and resident agents.”
The report also revealed that the “Intelligence Bureau created a new wing — China Coordination Centre — to collaborate with financial enforcement agencies to investigate Chinese companies.”
In addition, the Indian Express reported that the conference also discussed China’s influence in India’s neighbourhood. Papers presented on this argued that apart from China’s military and economic might, “India’s ‘big brother’ attitude and issues of NRC and CAA have created a chasm between India and its neighbours.” The report adds: “more than a dozen papers were submitted under the topic ‘Chinese influence in the neighbourhood and implications for India’ during the conference.”
Moving on, Reuters reports that India is considering a number of tariffs and non-tariff steps to cut imports of non-essential consumer and electronic goods, including from China. The report says that as many as 18 key government ministries, led by the trade ministry, met recently to firm up steps first aimed at cutting imports from China. The report adds:
“The government is considering ramping up investigations to weed out unfair practices on a "wide array" of imports, from China and elsewhere, one of the officials said, without specifying which goods or what the unfair practices were. The industry source said that so far this year anti-dumping investigations have focussed on products such as printed circuit boards and a type of toughened glass imported from China.”
Also this week, the Indian government put forward its annual budget. Defence allocation is now up to 5.94 trillion rupees ($72.6 billion) for fiscal 2023-24, up 13% from the previous period’s initial estimates. A total of INR 1.63 trillion has been allocated for defense capital outlays - an expenditure that would include new weapons, aircraft, warships and other military hardware.
Next, the US and India this week elevated their strategic partnership with the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology. This is a significant development with implications for Beijing. The new partnership covers working on innovation ecosystems, space, telecommunications, talent development, semiconductor supply chains and defense technology.
The defense technology points from the factsheet are worth reproducing here:
Developing a new bilateral Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap to accelerate technological cooperation between both countries for the joint development and production, with an initial focus on exploring projects related to jet engines, munition related technologies, and other systems.
Noting the United States has received an application from General Electric to jointly produce jet engines that could power jet aircraft operated and produced indigenously by India. The United States commits to an expeditious review of this application.
Enhancing long-term research and development cooperation, with a focus on identifying maritime security and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) operational use cases.
Launching a new “Innovation Bridge” that will connect U.S. and Indian defense startups.
The Hindustan Times reports that the Biden administration has given
“a green signal to GE, a world leader in military jet engines, to manufacture 98 kilo-newton thrust GE-414 engines in India in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and a still-to-be-identified private defense equipment maker. The India-specific GE-414 INS6 engine will power the LCA (light combat aircraft) Mark II, which will be rolled out by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) early next year and take to the skies by the end of 2024, and the under-development twin engine Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft.”
The report adds that the “GE-414 engine will be manufactured under terms that include 100% transfer of technology (ToT), with the deal likely to be sealed during the ongoing visit of the high-level delegation led by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s visit to the US.”
FT’s report on this development had this interesting bit:
“Sullivan said the initiative was part of Biden’s strategy to enhance ties with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific, citing the Aukus submarine pact with Australia and the UK, and the resurrection of the “Quad” — a security grouping of the US, Japan, Australia and India. “This is another big foundational piece of an overall strategy to put the entire democratic world in the Indo-Pacific in a position of strength.” One US official said the technology initiative, coupled with other actions, meant that 2023 would “probably be the most consequential year in US-India diplomacy”, adding that India was “the key” to US ambitions in the region. He said that India was aligning more with the US because of its tense relations with China, particularly after deadly border clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020. “The Indians don’t advertise this . . . but it had a kind of 9/11, Pearl Harbor-style impact on the strategic thinking of their elites.” Sullivan said the initiative “did not suggest a fundamental shift in India’s geopolitical orientation, but stressed that it underscored the impact that negative Chinese behaviour was having on countries around the world.”
Finally, reports also inform that India and NATO are scheduled to hold a dialogue in March this year. Senior officials from Nato, including from its policy planning division, and officials from India’s ministries of defense and external affairs are expected to participate. The dialogue will likely focus on a range of themes, including the possibility of a stronger partnership between India and Nato focused on geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
To read more on developments concerning India-China relations, please refer to :
India’s alarm spikes as China and Bhutan move closer to resolving border feud
"Unacceptable": US Senators On China's 'Aggression' Against India, Taiwan
A new Sino-Russian alliance: What are its implications for India?
India, China likely to drive half of 2023 global growth, says IMF
Galwan to Leh police report—Modi govt’s censoring information, China-style
Section B: Chinese Domestic Politics
For this week, we’ll only be covering the remarks made by Xi Jinping at the second study session of the newly formed Politburo on 31 January 2023.
The second group study session of Politburo of the 20th CPC Central Committee was convened on Tuesday where he stressed the need to “accelerate establishment of new pattern of development” as “only by doing so will China be able to better survive, compete, develop and sustain its progress amid all sorts of predictable and unpredictable storms and high winds, so as to ensure that the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will not be delayed or interrupted, and the goal of building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects will be realized… The new pattern of development is a strategic decision to realize the Second Centenary Goal and ensure both development and security.”
Below is a summary of the important bits from his speech as per Xinhua:
establish a new pattern of development based on modern industrial system with effective interconnectivity among industries
coordinating domestic demand expansion and supply-side structural reform to balance supply and demand so as to create a virtuous cycle of economic development
expanding consumption demand supported by income, investment demand and reasonable return on investment, consumer spending etc.
Accelerate building country’s self-reliance and strength in science and technology Xi said that China must quicken the pace to tech self-reliance to relieve the stranglehold on development of core technologies by some countries.
expand the space for effective investment, appropriately deploy new infrastructure construction in advance, increase investment in high-tech industries and strategic emerging industries, and continue to stimulate the vitality of private investment
take solid steps to advance new industrialization and move faster to boost China's strengths in manufacturing, product quality, cyberspace and digital development, so as to build internationally competitive digital industry clusters
Support enterprise's full participation in the global industrial division of labour and cooperation, promote deeper integration of domestic and foreign industries and build a modern industrial system that is independent, controllable, safe reliable and highly competitive. (special emphasis on deeper integration of domestic and foreign industries and a system that is ‘controllable’)
boost the rural consumption and production; and promote rural revitalisation
increase the driving force and vitality of domestic circulation and its interaction with the international market. We should advance reforms for the market-based allocation of production factors, put in place a high-standard market system, and to accelerate the building of a unified national market.
improving “mechanisms regarding intellectual property rights protection, market access and fair competition.”
promote high-level opening up and steadily push for institutional opening up regarding rules, regulations, management and standards, so as to strengthen China's voice in global economic circulation. Emphasis was also laid on the high-quality development of Belt and Road Initiative
participate in negotiations of global economic and trade rules to help establish an open, diverse and stable economic order.
Section C: Economy and Tech
There have been some very interesting developments over the past few weeks, which are worth capturing in this week’s section.
China’s Overseas Development Lending witnesses a decline; Lending to Pacific Islands also dips
SCMP reports that according to the data compiled by Boston University Global Development Policy Centre, the lending from China’s two policy banks - China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) extended 28 new loans worth US$10.5 billion in 2020 and 2021 - the lowest in recent years - revealing a declining trend in Chinese overseas development financing that peaked in 2016. The declining trend is visible in China’s financing of BRI projects as well.
The report adds that between 2008-2021, China’s overseas development finance commitments numbered at 1099 totaling US$498 billion to 100 countries. The study adds that the transport sector has witnessed a larger share of Chinese developmental support than the others and has also seen the least decline in lending.
It points out that around 59% of China's total loan commitments totaling US$296.3 billion are concentrated among its top 10 borrowers - Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia and Venezuela.
Various reasons could be identified for this trend from the shifting priorities of the Chinese government itself which seeks to now focus on high-quality “small and beautiful” projects as outlined by Xi Jinping at the third belt and road symposium in Nov 2021; increasing concerns and scrutiny of Chinese debt; failure on the part of the borrowing countries to service the loans etc.
The nature of Chinese lending differs from that of from World Bank in that the former is mostly directed toward infrastructure and extraction while the latter focus on supporting education, health and other public administration sectors.
Another SCMP piece reports that according to the latest data by Lowy Institute’s Pacific Aid Map that tracks development financing in the Pacific Island nations, Chinese aid to the region constituting 14 island nations fell to US$187 million in 2020 - the lowest annual level recorded by Lowy -on account of “declining appetites for new infrastructure lending and tightened capital controls in Beijing.”
China’s increased lending to the region in the last few years had piqued concerns among the traditional patterns in the region, namely the US, Australia, and New Zealand which have recently stepped up efforts to cater to the financial needs of the region. Between 2008 to 2021, the report finds that the Chinese committed US$498 billion in overseas lending compared to US$601 billion by the World Band during the same period.
China’s Patent-intensive industry
The SCMP reports that according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, in 2021, China filed 159 million patent applications which was more than double the number of patents filed by the US.
The significance of China’s patent-intensive industry lies in that it contributes around 12.4 percent of China’s GDP and employs around 6.5 percent of the workforce. In 2021, the added value of the industry stood at US$2.1 trillion, up 17.9 percent from the previous year.
However, even though China filed more patents than the US, its contribution to the GDP, generating employment, and value addition lagged behind. The corresponding figures for the GDP contribution and employment generation for the US stood at 24 percent and 13 percent, while for the EU the same figures stood at 17.4 percent and 11 percent respectively.
The report quotes Li Qing, executive director of the Beijing-based Global Talent Institute, “we have more application-level innovations.” The US-China tech competition and the US export controls on critical tech to China have enhanced the significance of this industry for China and its aims to catch up with the US and the EU and has set the target to increase the GDP contribution of patent-intensive industry to 13 percent by 2025.
To achieve this end, the government is looking at ways to attract overseas talent and retain local talent. The Ministry of Science and Technology recently stated that they are working to build a friendly ecosystem to attract overseas talent.
IMF revises China’s growth rate estimate to 5.2 percent
The IMF has upgraded its forecast for China’s 2023 GDP to 5.2 percent on account of the country’s full reopening. Last year, the Chinese economy grew by just 3 percent - the lowest in forty years. For the first time in decades, it fell below even the global average which stood at 3.4 percent. The news comes in the backdrop of the optimism that followed the lifting of the Dynamic Zero COVID restrictions and the growth in pent-up demand during the festive season.
However, the gains from the removal of restrictions have been affected by increasing COVID infections among the Chinese population which has impacted production activities. The report also warns of economic challenges from the real estate crisis and weak domestic demand - prospects for which remain gloomy in the immediate future.
In related news, Xinhua reports that the industrial profits of China’s major firm declined by 4 percent year on year in 2022.
The Chinese government has announced economic recovery as a priority for 2023 and has asked the provincial governments to extend support to boost economic growth. Several of China’s economic powerhouses such as Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Guangdong have already introduced fiscal and tax supports measures.
Chinese GDP Growth Rate, 2013-22 | Source: World Bank
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission Reforms China’s IPO process
The SCMP reports that the Chinese regulator has decided to “fully relinquish its role in reviewing initial public offerings (IPOs)” thus allowing the market forces to determine the share pricing. Quoting the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the report said the reform intends to make IPOs more transparent. The reforms would be implemented at all stock exchanges in Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen.
The existing process allowed the regulator to review listing documents and determine the final share pricing of the IPOs. The new system would be registration-based wherein the exchanges will require the companies to make full disclosure at the time of submitting their listing applications. The reformed system is inspired by the US model.
The move is consequential as it marks a course correction of the tech crackdown that began with the Ant Group IPO episode. The tightening of stock market regulations in the last few years had witnessed Chinese companies lose trillions of dollars in market capitalization.
Further, the move is expected to make the Chinese capital market, the second largest stock market, valued at $11 trillion, attractive to foreign investors. However, the reform still does not allow foreign companies to list in the Chinese capital market. The draft rules also state that only companies that comply with China’s industrial policies will be eligible for IPO issuance.
The step forms part of the larger trend of policy reversals in various sectors. Previously, the Chinese government had undertaken similar measures to ease the US$2.5 trillion worth of property sector by laying down 21 point plan and launching the ‘three arrows’ policy to support developers after its three ‘red lines borrowing’ restrictions had pushed the real estate sector into serious debt problems.
China’s 30 cities cut mortgage rates for first-time home buyers to below 4.1 percent, SCMP reports
In what is reflective of the further worsening real estate sector and property crisis in China, thirty mainland Chinese cities that include tier-2, tier-3 and tier-4 cities, have cut down mortgage rates for first-time homebuyers to below 4.1 percent in January, according to the Beike Research Institute. The number of such cities rose from 19 to 30 within two weeks. The move follows the central direction to the local governments to take steps to boost demand for new houses.
In January, the People’s Bank of China had allowed the local authorities to maintain, lower and even eliminate interest rates on loans for a first home if the prices for newly-built homes dropped for three consecutive months in a year.
Berke’s data show that the mortgage rates for first homes in 100 cities were at a peak of 5.74 percent in 2021. The rates in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen remain at 4.6 percent.
Section D: Foreign Policy Watch
There have been some very interesting developments over the past few weeks, which are worth capturing in this week’s section.
Qin Gang’s Africa Visit
Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang went on a five-nation tour in Africa from 9-16 January 2023, visiting Ethiopia first, and subsequently meeting representatives from Gabon, Angola, Benin, Egypt, the African Union Headquarters and the League of Arab States. The purpose of the visit has been to strengthen security relations between China and its strategic African partners, while bringing about “win-win cooperation.” Reportedly, Qin and the AU leaders also discussed AU’s membership in the G20, towards which China pledged its support.
Qin Gang meets United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) President
Csaba Korosi, the President of the 77th session of UNGA visited Beijing on 3 February, where he held meetings with Qin Gang. Both sides discuss emerging international challenges and the need for global governance and international cooperation. Qin Gang observed, “The United Nations General Assembly is the most universal and representative charter body of the United Nation and China will continue to fully support the work of the General Assembly and its President.”
Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministers’ telephonic conversation
In a bid to defrost their relationship, Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang and Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi had a telephonic conversation on Thursday night for about 5o minutes. This conversation comes against the backdrop of Japan and the Netherlands joining US-led curbs on Hi-tech cooperation with China. Qin urged Japan to “continue to uphold market principles and the spirit of freedom and openness to carry out economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation with China.” He also reiterated China's invitation for Hayashi to visit China, which was agreed on at a summit between the two countries in November. Hayashi underscored the need for peace and stability between both nations and raised his concerns over intensifying Chinese military activities near Japan.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China next week
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on 5-6 February 2023 has been postponed indefinitely. Reportedly, this is because of the detection of a Chinese ‘spy balloon’ hovering above the US Pentagon between 31 January-2 February. A brief official statement regarding the sighting of this balloon has been issued by the Government of Canada.
Blinken was scheduled to meet the Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang to attempt to find, restore and revive the rapidly deteriorating relationship between the two countries, marked by rising competition and intense geopolitical rivalry. It was speculated that Blinken will meet President Xi Jinping. If they would have met, it would have been the first in six years as no Secretary of State has met President Xi since 2017. The visit would have been a follow-up of the talk between President Biden and President Xi on the sideline of the G20 summit in Indonesia. Dennis Wilder, the White House Asia adviser to former president George W. Bush said “If President Xi Jinping decides to meet with Secretary Blinken it will be another in a series of recent signals from the Chinese leader of a desire to change the tone, if not the substance, of US-China relations.”
Section E: Military Developments in China
This week, the following developments concerning the Chinese military and police force, have grabbed our attention :
As various provinces across China are holding plenary sessions for their respective 14th Provincial People’s Congresses, secretaries of various provincial party committees have conducted meetings with delegations of representatives of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) stationed there.
On 14 January 2023, we see Xu Qin, the First Secretary of the Party Committee of the Provincial Military Region of Heilongjiang (China’s northern-most province), meeting with delegations of the PLA and PAP to discuss work reports of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress, the Provincial Court, and the Provincial Procuratorate, and even entertained suggestions of the representatives on how to improve economic and social development of Heilongjiang.
On 15 January 2023, the Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of Anhui, Zheng Shanjie, similarly met with representatives of the PLA and the PAP to discuss various political work reports, and to convey to them that their primary responsibility is to “combine "local needs", "people's expectations" and "military capabilities" for high quality social and economic development”.
On 16 January 2023, Zhang Qingwei, Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Director of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress, and First Secretary of the Party Committee of the Provincial Military Region, also met with PLA and PAP representatives stationed in Hunan and took their suggestions on national defense mobilization, maintaining stability and dealing with emergencies, and serving local development.
What is consistent across these meetings is that all provincial party secretaries lay great emphasis on the implementation of the spirit of the 20th Party Congress of the CPC and on Xi Jinping Thought. It’s almost as if the secretaries have been made to memorize a few talking points. Both Zhang and Xu also reiterate the “two establishments” and the “two safeguards” to further the idea of Party control over the army and the police.
As usual, a lot of combat preparedness and emergency response activity has taken place in the past few weeks and Xi Jinping has taken regular updates from various troops stationed across the country via teleconferencing to assess readiness :
On 16 January 2023, Chinese media CCTV aired footage of J-20s from the Eastern Theatre Command’s Wang Hai Squadron performing a mission of intercepting foreign warplanes in the Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the Taiwan Straits and East China Sea. Squadron commander Yang Jucheng also appeared in an interview in the same footage to say,
“No matter what happens in the air, even if it means sacrifice, we will never step back from our positions.”
On 17 January 2023, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command also conducted training exercises with the purpose of enhancing the speedy delivery of high-energy food that can be reheated on far-away deployments, instead of having to be made from scratch using raw material. The exercise focused on ‘field military fast foods rations support’, “to support companies or platoons, cook staple food or non-staple food, and be used on plateau or plain.” On the same day, soldiers assigned to a communication battalion under the PLA Rocket Force also demonstrated the use of a mobile command system to establish a wireless communication network during a communication exercise in freezing conditions, in a bid to enhance their field communication support ability.
On 18 January 2023, a group of self-propelled anti-tank missile launchers attached to an anti-tank missile element of a combined-arms regiment under the PLA Xinjiang (Western) Military Command conducted a live-fire training exercise on a plateau. The regime conducting the exercise was the 11th armoured brigade (Combined arms brigade no. LJ58).
On 26 January 2023, Two Chinese aircrafts of a naval brigade of the PLA Southern Theatre Command took a flight to conduct sorties above the South China Sea. This exercise was conducted with a particular focus on preparing to intercept foreign planes during festivals and holidays. Zhang Lei, commander of the Brigade said :
“Combat preparedness is particularly important during festivals and holidays. The number of aerial emergencies tends to increase significantly during holiday season, which means more tracking, surveillance and monitoring patrols and more frequent combat take-offs.”
On 30 January 2023, The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) announced that the AG600 Kunlong (water dragon) amphibious aircraft has gone into flight testing mode. The AG600 has been developed for the purpose of fighting fires, and it is a flying boat with fixed wings and the capability of landing on water. These airworthiness trials include the iron-bird test, lab validation test, static test, airworthiness validation flight test, and quality tests for airborne devices, and more. The location for these tests is in a flight base in China’s northwestern Chinese province of Shaanxi.
On the 18th itself, Xi Jinping conducted video calls with various units of the PLA and the PAP to assess their combat readiness ahead of the Chinese New Year (Spring Festival), scheduled for 22 January 2022. He conversed with a marine unit on patrol regarding their emergency response capability, with a Falcon Commando Unit of the PAP (a counterterrorism unit at the national level) regarding their readiness, and with the border defense station at Khunjerab in Xinjiang regarding their border management preparedness. He concluded by acknowledging and affirming combat readiness.
The conversation that took place with the border unit in Khunjerab has also been heavily featured in Indian media, considering the Xinjiang military command is the one actively deployed along the Indian border with China. The message for combat readiness conveyed to said command by Xi is being interpreted as a sign that things are going to heat up along the border. More on said coverage can be perused on the websites of The Hindu and The Wire.
Source: Xinhua
The next story is on the first round of military conscription in the PLA for the year 2023, which is now in session. As per a report published by PRC’s Ministry of Defense, in a teleconference on conscription conducted in Beijing on 18 January 2023, it was discussed that the focus is on recruiting high-caliber soldiers who are college graduates (especially with degrees in science and technology).
The aim therein is to build a “world-class military” that is ready for “short-term, high-intensity combat in localized regions.” Recruitment for the first half of 2023 will last from February 15 until March 31, while that for the second half of the year will run from August 15 to September 30.
China National Military Recruitment Website
On 28 January, a notice was also issued for the enlistment of officer cadets and non-commissioned officer cadets into military academies for the year 2023. This is for soldiers who have passed corresponding exams - officer cadets will receive a four-year undergraduate degree training, while NCO cadets will be given a three-year junior college training. There are also preferential policies and bonus points for candidates who have served in missions abroad, in naval escort taskforces and peacekeeping contingents, whose parents have served in the military, and students and graduates of civilian colleges and universities.
A lot of activity is being carried out by Chinese forces abroad, especially as part of the Spring Festival week between 21-27 January 2023. These forces include the Chinese Peacekeeping contingents across various African/ Middle Eastern countries, as well as its Support Base in Djibouti.
On 16 January, Troopers from the 13th Chinese Peacekeeping engineering contingent to South Sudan (Wau), returned after a week-long UNMISS-mandated road survey mission to assess damages across the main humanitarian aid supply route in Wau (northwestern South Sudan). They reportedly 700 km and used photo recording and 3D modeling technology to assess bridges, roads, and culverts damaged.
During the Spring Festival celebration week, the Chinese peacekeeping engineering contingent in the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo organized a garden party and art show for the spring festival celebrations. They were visited by MONUSCO force commander Lt. Gen. Affonso Da Costa.
In Mali, construction and repair work on the peripheral areas of the Super Camp in Gao was pending for a long time. Hence, during the spring festival holidays, Bian Long, deputy leader of the Chinese peacekeeping force in MINUSMA, and his team, undertook “heavy engineering construction tasks.” The Chinese engineering company is the only engineering envoy in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
The Chinese PLA Support base in Djibouti organized a festive cultural gala on the theme “Inclusive China, Win-Win cooperation,” and invited over 170 guests from Djibouti military, government, and Chinese-invested enterprises. Members of foreign troops in Djibouti were also invited.
In late January, the 13th Chinese peacekeeping contingent in Mali has received a deployment of new Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) type vehicles, with the purpose of providing protection from roadside bomb explosions in the Gao area. China started its mission in Mali in 2013 with a guard unit, and restructured it into a “base defense unit” in 2022. The unit is supposed to equip the contingent with better patrol abilities given that it is equipped with anti-Improvised Explosive Devices protection, defense, electronic interference, and observation capabilities.
On 30 January, the 26th Chinese peacekeeping medical contingent to the Democratic Republic of Congo was also inspected for the first time since its deployment under UN Operational effectiveness. The test was on combat readiness and training, medical support, epidemic control and prevention, etc., and the contingent passed with “high standards.”
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Army Procurement Network of the Chinese military has placed an order for tender for 2,600 spiked poles with electrical insulation and heat shrink wrap, to be delivered by 27 February 2023.
The following is an advertisement for the tender:
To read more on developments concerning Chinese military forces, please refer to :
Spacebattles (a more informal channel for public discussions
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
Contributors :
India-China Relations: Manoj Kewalramani
Chinese Domestic Politics; Economy and Tech: Amit Kumar
Foreign Policy Watch: Kingshuk Saha, Anushka Saxena
Military Developments in China: Anushka Saxena
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