From Docs & Laws To Foreign Policy Flaws
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
In This Edition:
NPC Watch: Two Sessions and Military Modernisation
Anushka Saxena
As the ongoing ‘Two Sessions’ in China unravel and reach their mid-way mark today, some really important documents and interesting discussions are making headlines. There’s the 15th Five-Year Plan, of course, the draft for which is now being finalised into a binding document, there’s Li Qiang’s Government Work Report, which doesn’t just talk about the strides and headwinds of the last year, but of the 14th FYP period as a whole, and of course, there are the Local Budgets and the National Economic & Social Development Plans.
What do some of these drafts, and the conversations around them, say about the trajectory and strategy for China’s national defence and military modernisation? What in particular did Xi Jinping say at the 7 March meeting with the delegations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP)? Let’s see.
Firstly, the 15th FYP draft discusses the key pillars that are likely to underpin China’s military modernisation trajectory till 2030. What are these?
Specifically, Section XV, on national defence and military modernisation, features two chapters: Chapter 55: Achieving the Centenary Goal of Building the Military on Schedule and Advancing the Modernisation of National Defence and the Armed Forces with High Quality; and Chapter 56: Consolidating and Enhancing the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities.
Firstly, the prologue for section XV highlights the PLA’s commitment new “three-step” strategy for the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces, as well as the ‘Five Methods of Strengthening the Military’. The three-step strategy was actually articulated as far back as September 2018, when the Central Military Commission (CMC) officially issued the ‘Mid-term Adjustment Plan for the Tasks of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Military Development’ and the revised ‘Roadmap for the Implementation of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Military Development’. In it, the CMC proposed that with this mobilisation order, the PLA is commencing the decisive battle to achieve the first step of the new three-step strategy for national defence and military modernisation by 2020.
The steps generally correspond to:
By 2027: Achieve the centenary goal of the PLA
Major progress in modernisation
Ability to fight and win modern wars
By 2035: Basically complete national defence and military modernisation
By mid-century (around 2049): Build a “world-class military”
Then there are the five methods of strengthening the military, which include:
Political Army-Building (政治建军), which pertains to ensuring absolute Party control over the military;
Reform-Driven Military Strengthening (改革强军), which refers to structural and organisational reforms;
Science and Technology–Driven Military Strengthening (科技强军), which focuses on technology modernisation in areas such as AI, cyber warfare, space capabilities, hypersonic weapons, advanced sensors and networks, and unmanned systems;
Talent-Based Military Strengthening (人才强军), which emphasises training highly educated officers, recruiting engineers and scientists, improving military academies, and building specialized technical personnel; and
Law-Based Military Governance (依法治军), which means governing the military through formal regulations, legal systems, and institutional rules.
In Chapter 55, the FYP proposes that the PLA must improve its capabilities to win war. In terms of accelerating the development of advanced combat capabilities, the document highlights the need to:
Strengthen strategic deterrence forces (which refers to nuclear modernisation, missile forces, long-range strike capability, and space & counter-space capabilities) and maintain global strategic balance and stability;
Promote the large-scale, combat-oriented, and system-based development of new-domain and new-quality combat forces; and
Accelerate the development of unmanned and intelligent combat forces and countermeasure capabilities, and strengthen the upgrading and transformation of traditional combat forces.
The FYP then instructs the PLA to coordinate the construction and application of network information systems, strengthen the development and utilisation of data resources, and build an intelligentised military system.
Further, in addition to building advanced military systems and acquiring top-notch defence technologies and weapons, the FYP demands that the PLA optimise policies and institutional arrangements for military human resources – in that, it should improve the educational and training capabilities of military academies, and build “high-quality, professional, new-type military talent.”
Finally, the chapter discusses the need to implement programs to advance the modernisation of military theory, which is something Li Qiang also emphasised in his Government Work Report. Section 2 of this Chapter then discusses advancing the modernisation of military governance.
It talks about improving the leadership and management systems and mechanisms of the PLA, and adjusting and optimising the joint operations system. It calls to deepen the coordination of combat, development, and preparedness, strengthen the guiding role of operational requirements, innovate management methods and tools, and enhance the operational efficiency of the military system and the effectiveness of the use of national defence resources.
Importantly, for major decisions and supervision of major projects, it calls for heightened consultation and evaluation – in simple terms, heightened oversight. It also highlights the need to advance reforms in military budget management, improve the military procurement system, and refine the statistical and evaluation system for military development. In this regard, interestingly again, the FYP highlights that the PLA should work on the principles of diligence and frugality, and pursue a path of high efficiency, low cost, and sustainable development. Political rectification and law-based military governance get the lip-service they deserve, too.
Chapter 56 talks about ‘Consolidating and Enhancing the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities’. When Xi had discussed this idea back at the ‘Two Sessions’ in March 2023, he had explained it in the following manner:
Highlighting the goal of maximising China’s national strategic capabilities, Xi called for efforts in integrating the strategic layouts, resources and strengths in all areas, in a bid to systematically upgrade the country’s overall strength to cope with strategic risks, safeguard strategic interests and realise strategic objectives.
Xi urged efforts to advance collaborative innovation in science and technology, with a focus on independent and original innovation, thus building high-level self-reliance and strength in science and technology at a faster pace.
Strategic capabilities in emerging fields must be bolstered in pursuit of new advantages in national development and international competitions, and the resilience of industrial and supply chains must be enhanced, Xi said.
Xi ordered coordinating the construction of major infrastructure, accelerating the building of national reserves, and making the reserves more capable of safeguarding national security.
Essentially, the policy of building and enhancing Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities refers to the whole-of-nation mobilisation of resources for common goals of national security and defence. These resources should ideally be available across provincial governments, civilian and military sectors, industry and state security instituions, etc., and should be available to readily mobilise for any matter of strategic and national importance – a ‘national unified market’ for defence, if you will.
In this regard, the current FYP calls on the PLA and the society-at-large to strengthen coordination between military and local strategic planning, the alignment of policies and institutions, and the sharing of resource elements, thereby promoting the simultaneous improvement of national defence strength and economic strength. Further, there should be deepening of cross–military-local reforms and establish a cross-domain working framework in which all parties perform their respective responsibilities, cooperate closely, and operate in a standardised and orderly manner. Essentially, it aims to promote the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement between new-quality productive forces and new-quality combat capabilities. As Professor Tai Ming-Cheung has said, the goal is to “unite these assets across jurisdictions to achieve an outcome that is greater than the sum of its component parts.”
There are other additional parameters of this society-wide fusion that the FYP emphasises. These include coordination between military and local authorities, deepening the joint construction and sharing of forces, key facilities, and general equipment, and the comprehensive implementation of national defence requirements in major infrastructure projects, so that everything is “pre-positioned” and geared towards national defence. This section, in particular, is quite telling as to the security anxieties of the party-state in the years to come.
The one thing that is important in both this Chapter, and in Li Qiang’s Government Work Report, is the emphasis on building an advanced national defence science and technology industry system, optimising the layout of the defence science and technology industry, improving the equipment procurement management system, and promoting the standardisation and interoperability of military and civilian standards.
At a time when the world is debating Chinese sales of weapons systems to the world and their impact on shaping the global arms trading order, while Beijing is internally cracking down hard on defence SOE leaders, rigged procurement processes, and corruption in equipment development and use, any policies that supplement the focus on building China’s Defence Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) must be closely watched.
One final interesting bit in the FYP about security is Section XIV, on ‘Advancing the Modernization of the National Security System and Capabilities; Building a Higher-Level Peaceful and Secure China’. While most of its sub-sections and chapters pertain to economic security, risks in “key sectors” (like real estate local government debt), and energy and resource security, a Chapter 51 particularly talks about ‘Strengthening the National Security System and Capabilities’. This is where the document upholds and emphasises the decadal ‘Overall National Security Concept’ (ONSC).
It requires upholding strategy as the guide, policy as the instrument, rule of law as the guarantee, and risk prevention and control as the goal. It calls to consolidate the centralised, unified, efficient and authoritative national security leadership system. It requires formulation and and implemention of a national security strategy, and improving the national security legal system, strategic system, policy system, and risk prevention and control system.
Further, like the ‘Integrated Capabilities’ section discussed above, Chpater 51 calls to strengthen coordination mechanisms in key areas of national security and important special projects, and enhance emergency response capabilities. It urges society-at-large to implement the national security responsibility system, promote coordination and linkage across the entire chain and all elements, and form systematic synergy. Most importantly, it calls for:
Placing the safeguarding of political security at the forefront;
Firmly maintaining regime security, institutional security, and ideological security;
Severely striking at infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and separatist activities by hostile forces;
Protecting state secrets in key areas;
Improving overseas national security mechanisms (like the Fox Hunt programme targetting Chinese nationals abroad),
Deepening international law enforcement and security cooperation; and
Strengthening national security education and fortify the people’s line of defence.
As always is the case with discussions on the ONSC, even here, it is evident that while national security is defined broadly, ultimately, it centers on protecting the CPC’s rule. Political security is therefore treated as the foundation of all other security domains. The party-state further emphasises the need to build a “people’s defense line” against espionage, separatism, leaking of state secrets, and subversion, effectively making citizens into vigilantes. More of that holistic approach is what the FYP recommends.
Coming to the most recent developments, we have the press release of Xi’s meeting with the PLA and PAP delegations – a regular affair at the annual Two Sessions.
To begin with, Xi emphasised in order to achieve the Centenary Goal of Building the Military on schedule in 2027 and to advance the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces with high quality in the 15th FYP period, it is necessary to uphold, apply, and further develop political army-building as an important “magic weapon.” It is essential to unwaveringly uphold and strengthen the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, fully leverage the distinctive advantages of political army-building, and unite hearts and strength to promote the steady and long-term progress of national defence and military modernisation. Political army-building, in light of everything that has recently unfolded in top echelons of the PLA and the CMC, seemed bang-on for the theme of Xi’s remarks. One can check out an article from 81.cn on the distinct themes of Xi’s address to 14 such PLA delegation meetings here.
Anyway, going further, Xi commented that the military is an armed force and commands the gun, but there must absolutely be no individuals within the military who harbour divided loyalty toward the Party, nor any place for corrupt elements to hide; the struggle against corruption must be advanced unwaveringly. From the very beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan.
He called for close attention to be paid to key links such as the flow of funds, the operation of power, and quality control. Oversight of major projects should be strengthened, and integrated military-civilian supervision reinforced, ensuring that construction and development proceed under effective supervision. Reform of military budget management should be advanced, a dynamic balance between military expenditure supply and demand should be maintained, and full-chain control and performance evaluation of fund usage should be strengthened so that every penny is spent where it is most needed.
Xi further pointed out that it is necessary to strengthen the development of a revolutionary and professional talent corps, persistently using the Party’s innovative theories to forge the soul and educate personnel, and solidify the ideological foundation ensuring that officers and soldiers listen to the Party and follow the Party. This will ensure that modern weapons and equipment are held in the hands of a revolutionary talent force. Systems and conditions that promote talent development should be improved, and the cultivation of four categories of personnel should be advanced in a systematic manner: joint operations command personnel, personnel for new-type combat forces, high-level scientific and technological innovation personnel, and high-level strategic management personnel. This will enable the capabilities and qualities of personnel to develop in coordination with the practice of building a strong military.
He concluded by iterating that everyone must ensure that “red genes are passed down from generation to generation” and upright new practices flourish. Grassroots units should be treated as fertile ground for carrying forward fine traditions. Active exploration should be undertaken of the laws and useful methods of grassroots development under new circumstances. Attention should be paid to work that addresses fundamental issues, benefits long-term development, and strengthens future momentum, thereby laying a more solid foundation for troop building and combat effectiveness.
Guarding the Great Wall: China’s Iran Strategy
Anushka Saxena
Since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28, China has mounted a communications blitz. Chinese media boasted that Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning fielded at least eleven Iran-related questions in a single press conference. Foreign Minister Wang Yi held back-to-back calls with counterparts in Russia, Iran, France, Oman, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Beijing has called the strikes a violation of international law, and has condemned not just the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei as an attack on a sovereign leader, but also broader US action as being unilateral and lacking the weight of UN Security Council authorisation. In fact, Wang explicitly stated that it was “unacceptable” to launch strikes during ongoing negotiations, still less to assassinate a head of state and instigate regime change.
Yet the substance seems strikingly thin. China has formally offered no military assistance, sanctions relief mechanism, or emergency arms transfers – nothing resembling the material solidarity that the rhetoric might imply. When the Iranian broadcaster IRIB pressed Mao Ning on how China, as a veto-wielding power and a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partner’, would actually prevent the US from carrying out unilateral actions, the answer defaulted to boilerplate – China stands ready to work with the international community, resolve issues through dialogue, and maintain peace and stability. The deliberate gap between the volume of China’s condemnation and the value of its action is the central feature of its response – which nonetheless remains valuable to assess.
Laying the Defender Conversation To Rest
Perhaps the most important pillar of the China-Iran relationship is the hydrocarbon trade. China absorbs approximately 80% of Iran’s oil exports. The defence ties are a distant second in vitality, given that Beijing’s approach to arming Tehran has been cautious.
Iran has been subject to a variety of international arms embargoes, from Australia, the US and the European Union (EU) placing stringent bans on the export and supply of arms and related material to Iran, to the UN Security Council approving a snapback provision allowing pre-JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action) sanctions on Iran to come back to life in August 2025. In this regard, China has broadly refrained from violating such embargoes (even though most of them are unilateral).
But, rising regional tensions following the ‘Twelve-Day War’ in June last year between Israel and Iran have led to a modest surge in Sino-Iranian military cooperation. For Beijing, selling Tehran arms at a moderate rate is killing two birds with one stone. It helps in securing a steady flow of heavily discounted crude oil, and in creating a persistent distraction for the US in West Asia without committing Chinese troops on the ground.
Tehran seems to have recently purchased and deployed advanced Chinese surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, including the HQ-9, HQ-16, and the highly mobile HQ-17AE short-range air defence systems. These systems have so far provided little help in defending Iran’s nuclear facilities and leadership compounds from American-Israeli strikes. Conversely, China’s YLC-8B anti-stealth radars have, so far, performed better, though much more hindsight is necessary. Their low-frequency operation reportedly allowed Iranian commanders to track incoming stealth assets further out than previous Russian-made systems, though they ultimately failed to prevent some significant fatalities.
Beyond defensive systems, Iran’s acquisitions from China intends to expand on offensive weaponry. Most notably, recent reports indicate that Iran is finalising a deal to purchase Chinese CM-302 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles - speculations around which China has declared as “untrue”. Boasting a range of nearly 290 kilometres and the ability to fly low and fast to evade shipborne radar, the CM-302 can target US aircraft carriers and naval vessels operating in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. Additionally, unnamed officials are informing curious ears that Beijing has stepped in to fill supply chain gaps left by a strained Russian defence industry, delivering loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) to Tehran to restock its depleted drone fleets for retaliatory strikes.
Apart from these unconfirmed arms transfers, the US Department of War’s ‘China Military Power Report’ said in December 2025 that Chinese satellite firms, like Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., have been supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Houthi militants in Yemen by providing them intelligence, while another company, MinoSpace Technology Co., has reportedly been in conversations with Tehran to provide it with satellite support.
Before that, in September 2025, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added eight Chinese firms in the designated category for supplying dual-use components and military-grade equipment to the Houthis as “procurement fronts” and for aiding the Houthis in their “commercial procurements” from China. Beijing, of course, has denied the connections, though it is highly probable that such a barter exists, simply because of the precedented nature of Chinese dealings with other conflict-ridden regions. In exchange, the Houthis likely guarantee safe passage for Beijing’s naval task forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Also prominent in the China-Iran relationship is the joint military exercises component. For the sixth time in February 2026, China, Iran and Russia conducted a combined naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz. Before that, in March 2025, the three forces conducted naval drills in the Gulf of Oman. The goal of these drills is to project the ability to exercise military muscle in regional seas, without necessarily indicating Beijing’s willingness to weaponise the maritime chokepoints.
In all of this, it is important to note that China officially refrains from highlighting any military partnership with Iran, referring to itself as a “responsible major power”. Beijing’s strategy in West Asia is fundamentally risk-averse. It has benefited from the region’s status quo and is aware of the tremendous costs the US has borne in its entanglements with the Middle East and North Africa region. Consequently, while Beijing values Iran as a defence partner and a crucial node for energy security, it neither seems to officially support Tehran’s nuclear armament programme, nor does it aim to go to war over Iran.
Diplomatic Wrangling & Sovereignty as Scripture
China’s official framing rests on three pillars that are repeated almost liturgically across every press conference and state media commentary. First, sovereignty is inviolable, in that no country has the right to use military force against another, assassinate its leaders, or attempt regime change. Second, the strikes violate the UN Charter and basic norms of international relations. Third, all parties must return to dialogue immediately. China has even appointed a “Special Envoy” for ‘Mediation in the Middle East’, to attempt to move the dialogue process along.
This framing serves Beijing on multiple levels. It reinforces China’s long-standing narrative on non-interference – a principle that, in part, can be used to counter any future external intervention with Taiwan or even Hong Kong. Every time Beijing condemns the targetting of a sovereign leader, it is also signalling to its own domestic audience and to Washington that it considers such precedents existentially dangerous. The Global Times enlisted international law professor Alfred de Zayas, who described the strikes as a civilisational regression to the logic of Thucydides, in which the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. This articulation should resonate with Beijing’s view that the ‘rules-based order’ is merely a euphemism for American hegemony.
Energy as The Achilles’ Heel
China has an acute economic problem in the Iran affair. It imports roughly 40-50% of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran supplied approximately 13% of China’s seaborne crude in 2025, virtually all of it routed through that same chokepoint. Qatar, whose LNG facilities were struck by Iranian drones, provides nearly 30% of China’s LNG imports. Hence, today, Chinese scholars are both, applauding Iran’s tough response, and still showing worry that, by virtue of spillover,” the “developing Middle East” may soon become the “conflicted Middle East.”
In terms of action, reports indicate that China privately pressured Iran to keep the Strait open and to avoid targeting Gulf energy infrastructure – even while publicly supporting Iran’s right to self-defence, and calling on all parties to protect transiting vessels. Further, when asked about reports that Iran had granted Chinese and Russian vessels an exemption from the Hormuz blockade, Mao Ning conspicuously declined to confirm or deny. On March 4, China’s National Development and Reform Commission reportedly verbally ordered its largest refineries to halt exports of diesel and gasoline. If true, it is a quiet but telling move to conserve domestic supply.
Restraint as Strategy
The planned Xi-Trump meeting at the end of March, so far, remains on track, and may be too valuable to jeopardise for Beijing. Probably, in this regard, Beijing views preserving détente with the Trump administration as a higher priority than defending Iran. The calculus of looking out for one’s own self, reflected in the proceedings of the recently concluded Sino-Russian Sanya Dialogue, where the director of the Russian International Affairs Council, Ivan Timofeev, outlined 7 lessons from the Iran crisis – a document that circulated widely on Chinese platforms via Huxiu. His most cutting observation was lesson 6 – partners can help in mitigating the impact of sanctions, but they cannot protect one from physical strikes. Timofeev explicitly asked whether China and Russia might one day face similar isolation as Iran, and urged deeper military-technical cooperation and a joint front.
This is the conversation happening beneath the official surface. Hence, Chinese commentators and thinkers may be watching Iran not primarily from the lens of a spreading ‘Middle Eastern crisis’, but probably from the lens of their own vulnerabilities. With greater hindsight, more discussions are likely to emerge in China about the assassination of a head of state, the destruction of command structures via precision strikes, and the failure of air defences in war.
The War Lens
Chinese military commentary seems restrained in public, but pointed in implication. Analysts like Lü Xiang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences emphasise that Iran had pre-positioned succession mechanisms, and so, regime change would not be quick. As a result, military operations are likely to be prolonged. The Sanya Forum report also made the military lessons explicit – modern air defences remain vulnerable to precision strikes, and the pattern of sanctions followed by military force now seems like doctrine. These reflect a genuine concern in Chinese thinking about the implications of American military adventurism.
Ultimately, one can look at Chinese discourse on Iran as reflecting both, Beijing’s vision for its limited role in West Asia, and its concerns vis-à-vis its economic stakes and military ambitions. In a situation where American power is arbitrary, and where China’s own patient accumulation of economic and military power represents the only durable alternative, the unanswered question at the heart of Chinese foreign policy is – does it hope to actually defend its partners, or just to eulogise them?
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
