In Review: Politico-Diplomatic Patterns of Nauru and Maldives
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
Worldview Weekly #1: Muizzu Visits China amid India Row
By Anushka Saxena
Between January 8 and 12, 2024, newly elected President Muizzu of Maldives made a State Visit to China to, among other things, lay down a wreath of flowers on the Monument to the People’s Heroes at Tiananmen Square, and elevate the China-Maldives partnership to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative’ one.
The Joint Statement reached upon between the two sides at the conclusion of the Visit is an interesting read. It shows just how pro-China Muizzu is, and how willing he is to turn Maldives away from its previous balanced but India-oriented foreign policy to one that is willing to accommodate China much more.
For example, as per the Joint Statement, on Taiwan, Maldives has promised the following:
The Maldives is firmly committed to the one-China principle, recognizing that there is but one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The Maldives opposes any statement or action that undermines China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, opposes all "Taiwan independence" separatist activities, and will not develop any form of official relations with Taiwan. The Maldives opposes external interference in China's internal affairs under any pretext and supports all efforts made by China to achieve national reunification.
This text looks like it was pulled straight out of one of Mao Ning or Tan Kefei’s speeches. The commitment was also followed up in another press statement made by Muizzu a day after popular elections in Taiwan. In this statement, he reiterated:
The Maldives is firmly committed to the one-China principle, which remains the bedrock of the Maldives relations with China. The rest, was a repetition of what was said in the Joint Communiqué.
In response, in what I can only perceive is a dig at India owing to the recent tensions between India and Maldives, China has promised its own commitment to Maldives’ sovereignty. The Joint Statement reads:
China firmly supports the Maldives in its efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, independence, and national dignity, respects and supports the Maldives in exploring a development path that suits its national conditions, and resolutely opposes external forces interfering in the Maldives' internal affairs.
Moreover, as per the statement Muizzu made to the press as soon as he landed at the Velana International Airport, China will soon be sending a technical and finance task force of sorts to Maldives to determine how it can grant concessions for the repayment of approximately 1.37 billion USD in direct loans. 20 per cent of Maldives external debt is money owed to China, and this leaders’ meeting has at least been successful in providing the island nation some respite in this regard. Much of it is owed to Muizzu’s pro-China posture.
It is also unlike 2020, when a twitter spat between Zhang Lizhong, the then Chinese Ambassador to the island nation, and Mohamed Nasheed, the then Speaker of Majlis, revealed that Maldives needs concessions on the loans, lest it goes bankrupt. The spat started when Nasheed tweeted that Maldives has to repay some 15 million USD from loans granted by a Chinese bank, which was then more than 50 per cent of the government’s income in the same period. To this, Zhang had replied that there is no such payment pending. As the twitter trolling fell just short of escalating into an official, diplomatic spat, Nasheed tweeted to Zhang, “Let’s not wait until the 11th hour; let’s be done with this debt problem. Maldives needs a further 2 year grace period, or we will never be able to repay these loans.” And in response, Zhang said, “I trust, with joint efforts, there will be a proper and mutually-beneficial arrangement to inject more impetus to economic recovery.” Maybe that was Zhang’s codeword for, “the Government just isn’t right today, but maybe tomorrow, it will be!”
In this light, it is also important to note that unlike preceding President Solih, who wanted to keep the Maldivian economy diversified and planned to mobilise concessional financing for development projects on the island with a role being played by the BRI, Muizzu seems to have agreed to rather more elaborate terms on the BRI’s significance in Maldives (at least, as per the Chinese version of the Joint Statement). It reads:
Both sides agreed to take the high-quality construction of the Belt and Road Initiative as a leading factor to strengthen strategic alignment, comprehensively implement global development initiatives, further elevate the level and quality of cooperation, enhance practical cooperation in areas such as green development, digital economy, blue economy, and achieve mutual benefit and common development (双方同意以高质量共建“一带一路”为引领加强战略对接，全面落实全球发展倡议，进一步提升合作水平和质量，加强在绿色发展、数字经济、蓝色经济等领域务实合作，实现互利共赢、共同发展).
The fact that there is now an acknowledgement that continued commitment to the BRI between the two sides is critical to forging ‘alignment’ is interesting and a matter of concern from the Indian perspective. Although, the Maldivian version of the Communiqué is slightly toned down on this bit:
The two sides agree to focus on pursuing high-quality Belt and Road cooperation in the efforts to better synergize their development strategies, fully implement the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and further enhance the level and quality of cooperation, and strengthen practical cooperation in green development, digital economy, blue economy and other fields, to achieve mutual benefits and common development.
The developments concerning Muizzu’s China Visit are all happening as Maldives and India are embroiled in a row over a couple things – the Maldivians believing that Indian Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to Lakshadweep islands is a deliberate attempt at undercutting tourism to the island, and Malé’s reported announcement that Indian military personnel stationed in Maldives will be required to withdraw from the island by March 15, 2024.
As has been highlighted by many, Maldivian political ecosystem has a pattern vis-a-vis being either India or China-oriented. Till 2013, India had a good time partnering with Presidents Gayoom and Nasheed. In 2013, Abdullah Yameen came to power and strategically aligned with China, enabling Maldives’ membership in the BRI and the signing of a free-trade agreement between the two countries. With Solih, as debts mounted, Maldives withdrew from said agreement and again developed stronger ties with India. This also created room for India to support Maldives’ debt repayments and infrastructure projects (including a cancer hospital, because till the time such a hospital is built, oncological care in Maldives is largely taken care of by visiting Indian doctors). With Muizzu in power, we may see a turn to Yameen days vis-a-vis the island nation’s foreign policy approach.
Worldview Weekly #2: Nauru has done it again
By Anushka Saxena
The breaking news from January 15 is that China has officially managed to turn another one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies into one of its own. This time, it is Nauru (again), a tiny phosphate-rock island in Micronesia, South Pacific.
As Nauru announced that it is choosing to recognise the People’s Republic, ROC/Taiwan (using them liberally-interchangeably in this piece) issued its own statement on breaking off ties with the island nation. Nauru argued that its decision to sever ties with Taiwan is in line with UN Resolution 2758 and is motivated by the fact that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legal government representing all of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. In response, Taiwan has argued that this is a misuse of the Resolution because even though it identifies the PRC as the sole legal government of China, it has no provisions for determining Taiwan’s status in international law, and therefore did not preclude it from forming diplomatic relationships with allies. The good thing is that this is not a popular reason for Taiwan’s former allies to use while breaking off their relations with the island, as per a diplomatic source’s media statement.
The US too, has expressed its “disappointment” in Nauru’s decision, with State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stating:
While the Government of Nauru’s action on January 15 to sever its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan is a sovereign decision, it is nonetheless a disappointing one.
Further, in a statement that would be quite hurtful to the Chinese and maybe even to the idea that the US supports cross-straits status quo, Miller added:
Taiwan is a reliable, likeminded, and democratic partner. The PRC often makes promises in exchange for diplomatic relations that ultimately remain unfulfilled. We encourage all countries to expand engagement with Taiwan and to continue to support democracy, good governance, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law.
And this has happened before. Between 1980 and 2002, Nauru had maintained official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, in July 2002, Nauru broke off its relations to recognise the PRC – a move the White House claimed was made after China offered a 130 million USD in aid to Nauru. The move was also made without parliamentary authorisation by the-then Nauruan President René Harris, and as had been put by the Taiwanese foreign ministry spokeswoman Chang Siao-yue at the time, “not everyone in the Nauru government was happy with the switch.” Chang also echoed the sentiment that even though Beijing had lured Nauru with a 60 million USD grant and had guaranteed to help the nation settle a loan worth 77 million USD with US’s General Electric, Beijing had no real intentions to help Nauru grow economically.
A couple years later, the Nauruans seemed to agree. In 2005, a year after Harris’s predecessor, Ludwig Scotty came to occupy the Presidency in Nauru, he re-established diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Even then, Scotty had said something like, “talks about financial assistance may come at a later stage.”
And for those who may choose to believe, an interesting cable from 2011, unveiled by wikileaks, discusses how dollar diplomacy hasn’t been a one-sided game played only by China. In fact, as per the cable, in 2007, Nauru Commerce Minister acknowledged that “both Beijing and Taiwan dole out cash to politicians, it is just a matter of to whom.” Taiwan allegedly provided each Minister about 5,000 AUD per month and all other government MPs 2,500 AUD per month in “project funding” that requires minimal accounting, and was actually used by one Minister to buy daily breakfast for school children in their district. That same year, Nauru authorities alleged that PRC agents bribed Nauruan voters with a total of about 40,000 AUD in order to help Harris and other Scotty opponents win that year’s election and shift allegiance back to Beijing. This is also reported to be one of the reasons why Scotty preponed the elections of 2007 from the scheduled time in October to August 25 – to prevent China from influencing voters under-the-table.
Now, the latest development is like a timely omen ahead of Lai Ching-Te’s Presidency, describing precisely the “dollar diplomacy” (sometimes, “bribery diplomacy”) threat that China poses – the threat that Tsai Ing-Wen personally has had to talk about at least 9 times during her two terms as President. As for Nauru-Taiwan relations, as the latter continues to literally “invest” in diplomatic relations and building its international space in the coming months and years, the former might just revert its “disappointing” decision.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
On the India-Maldives Spat and a history of the ties amidst the China factor, IPSP team Analyst Rakshith Shetty has authored a succinct blog for Takshashila.
Further, Manoj Kewalramani, IPSP Chairperson and China Fellow, shared his insights on Taiwan’s Elections and Nauru’s decision to build ties with PRC on TRT World. You can listen to his interview here:
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
