India-China Trade - China-Russia Ties - CCDI Plenum - CCTV Corruption Series - Intelligent Mfg & Platform Governance - Pak NatSec Policy - Xi's New Generals - Fan Yongpeng & Le Yucheng on the US
I. India-China Brief
By Suyash Desai
The latest data released by China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC) this week highlights that India’s trade with China in 2021 crossed $125 billion, with imports from China nearing a record $100 billion. This highlights the continued demand for a range of Chinese goods, particularly machinery. The value of goods imported by India from China in the past 12 months exceeded the total bilateral trade in 2019. This is when – a) Two countries have been involved in multiple stand-offs in the western sector in Ladakh for the past 20 months; b) India has adopted a subtle trade and economic decoupling process as a punitive measure and aims to reduce dependencies on core and critical sectors. But as Prof Srikanth Kondapalli argues, this increase in the number is mainly due to the surge in demand to counter pandemic infections and other goods in India.
The India-China bilateral trade reached $125.6 billion in 2021, with India’s imports from China accounting for $97.5 billion. India’s imports were higher by 30% from 2019, while its exports to China, amounting to $28.1 billion, were up by as much as 56%. Last year, the trade deficit reached $69.4 billion, up by 22% from the pre-pandemic figure in 2019. India’s biggest exports to China in recent years were iron ore, cotton, and other raw material-based commodities, while it has imported large quantities of electrical and mechanical machinery, active pharmaceutical ingredients, auto components, and over the past two years, a range of medical supplies from oxygen concentrators to PPE kits.
Ananth Krishnan’s report in The Hindu also offers some interesting details. He writes:
“Of the 8,455 different types of items imported from China between January and November of last year, a staggeringly diverse list covering everything from a range of chemicals and electronics to auto components and textiles, 4,591 showed an increase, according to an analysis of India’s Ministry of Commerce data. The top 100 items by value accounted for $41 billion, up from $25 billion in 2020, according to a study of the numbers by Santosh Pai, an Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. Most of the top 100 items — each of which accounted for more than $100 million in trade, and included a range of electronic products, chemicals, and auto components — showed sharp growth. The list included both finished and intermediate goods. Of the former category, integrated circuits were up by 147%, laptops and personal computers by 77%, and oxygen therapy apparatus by more than fourfold. Intermediate products, particularly chemicals, also recorded striking growth. One of those, acetic acid, was up by more than eightfold.”
He adds:
Among the reasons for the rising imports are a recovery in domestic demand for finished products from China, and an industrial recovery. Growth in India’s exports worldwide has also pushed up the need for many crucial intermediate inputs, and disruptions elsewhere have led to greater sourcing from China in the short-term, for instance in the case of coking coal previously sourced from Australia and Indonesia.
Meanwhile, despite increasing trade and economic interdependence, the border stand-offs between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue at multiple places in eastern Ladakh. The 14th Corps Commander meeting, held last week, failed to deliver a breakthrough. Both sides released a joint statement, a welcome development since the 13th round ended in a stalemate and without a joint statement. But both sides continue to deploy advanced weaponry on their side of the border. A regiment affiliated to the PLA’s Xinjiang Military Command recently held a commissioning ceremony of new additions to arsenal like the HQ-17A air defence missile system, the PCL-181 155-millimetre-calibre (155mm) self-propelled howitzer, and the PHL-11 122-millimetre-calibre (122mm) modularised multiple rocket launcher systems. This was reported in eastday.com, a Shanghai-based news website portal.
On the Indian side, the Indian Air Force has begun work on deploying its first unit of the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile defence system. All five units would be operational by next year and most likely be deployed on the border with China. The PLA, meanwhile, has already deployed two S-400 systems across LAC in Ngari Gar Gunsa (opposite Demchok) and Nyingchi (across Arunachal Pradesh), with the remaining three, deployed to tackle the threat on the eastern periphery.
Meanwhile, the Indian Army this week sought assistance from the PLA in locating a missing boy named Miran Taron from Arunachal Pradesh and returning him as per established protocol. The Army contacted the PLA as soon as it received the information regarding the missing 17-year-old. According to the Indian officials, the teenager, a native of Zido village in the Upper Siang district, was abducted by the PLA on Tuesday. The district authorities said the youth and others were hunting in the border area between both countries when the incident took place. This is not a one-off such incident in recent times as the PLA had abducted five youths from Arunachal Pradesh's Upper Subansiri district and released them after about a week in September 2020.
Elsewhere, in the first export order for the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system, the Philippines has approved a $374.96 million contract to purchase a shore-based anti-ship variant of the missile from India. Many other Southeast Asian countries are also discussing similar purchase agreements with India, which is a welcome step towards boosting India’s moribund defence exports industry.
Also Read:
An Indian Tale of Xian Lockdown
India’s Sea Trails with Indigenous Aircraft Carrier Vikrant and Rafale
Pakistan-India Arms Race
Pakistan’s National Security Policy on China, US and India
Indian Media uses China’s Space Developments to defend its Ambitious Plans
Gen Naravane’s Legacy
II. CCDI’s 6th Plenum
by Manoj Kewalramani
There were two big speeches that Xi Jinping delivered this week. First, he addressed the World Economic Forum. You can find my full breakdown of that speech here. In this section, we’ll focus on the second speech and the 6th Plenary Session of the CCDI. Xi said that the Party’s exploration had led it to certain understanding of what kind of a Marxist party must be built and how this should be done. Self-revolution, he argues, is key to this. He said that:
The outcome of the Party’s exploration has been the understanding that “we must adhere to the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee, insist on strict and comprehensive governance of the Party, adhere to the guidance of the Party’s political construction, persist in carrying forward the spirit of nailing nails, strengthen the work style construction, persist in punishing corruption with a zero-tolerance attitude, persist in correcting all corruption and unhealthy practices that harm the interests of the masses, persist in improving the Party and government supervision system, and strengthen the supervision over the ‘key few’...’ 这就是坚持党中央集中统一领导，坚持党要管党、全面从严治党，坚持以党的政治建设为统领，坚持严的主基调不动摇，坚持发扬钉钉子精神加强作风建设，坚持以零容忍态度惩治腐败，坚持纠正一切损害群众利益的腐败和不正之风，坚持抓住“关键少数”以上率下，坚持完善党和国家监督制度，形成全面覆盖、常态长效的监督合力.
He then outlined seven action points. I am sharing a few below; you can read the rest of the breakdown here.
First, “thoroughly study and implement the spirit of the 6th Plenum of the 19th Central Committee, persistently promote the study, education and publicity of Party history, guide the whole Party to strengthen its historical self-confidence, let the original mission truly take root in the heart, put loyalty to the Party and the people into action, inherit and carry forward the Party’s glorious tradition and fine work style, sincerely contribute to the cause of the Party and the people…”
Second, he called for strengthening “political supervision” “to ensure the complete, accurate and comprehensive implementation of the new development concept.” He called for the implementation of the CPC Central Committee’s decisions and arrangements. He warns that there must be “no compromises, no going through the motions, no selfish departmentalism and protectionism, do not resort to petty tricks for the purpose of local or short-term interests, ensure the implementation has no deviation, no compromise and no distortion.” 要把握新发展阶段、贯彻新发展理念、构建新发展格局、推动高质量发展，引导督促党员、干部真正悟透党中央大政方针，时时处处向党中央看齐，扎扎实实贯彻党中央决策部署，不打折扣、不做表面文章，纠正自由主义、本位主义、保护主义，不因一时一地利益而打小算盘、耍小聪明，确保执行不偏向、不变通、不走样。
Third, Xi talked about maintaining the “political resolve” to fight corruption. He said that “we should be aware that the fight against corruption continues to rage.” SCMP has a good translated summary of the next bit: “there is still a long way to go to prevent all kinds of interest groups from converging and corrupting our officials. There is still a long way to go to effectively tackle the more invisible, deep-rooted corruption and we still have a long way to go to eradicate it completely.” Xi then called on leading officials, especially senior ones, to take the lead in strengthening the development of a culture of integrity and honesty, strengthen the ideological foundation, enhance the Party spirit consciousness and enhance the ability to resist corruption and prevent degeneration. Leading cadres should “enhance their political acumen” and “must attach importance to family education, lead by example, manage their spouses and children well, behave themselves and act with integrity.” 领导干部特别是高级干部要带头落实关于加强新时代廉洁文化建设的意见，从思想上固本培元，提高党性觉悟，增强拒腐防变能力。领导干部要增强政治敏锐性和政治鉴别力。领导干部特别是高级干部一定要重视家教家风，以身作则管好配偶、子女，本分做人、干净做事.
Later in the week, the communique issued after the plenary session had a lot of praise for Xi. Again, I am summarising two key points below, but you can read the full breakdown here:
Taking welcoming and opening the 20th Party Congress as the main line, we will thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, deepen the application of the Party's historical experience of self-revolution, and consolidate and expand the achievements of Party history study and education campaign. Focus on the decision-making arrangements of the CPC Central Committee; focus on major strategies such as grasping the new development stage, implementing the new development concept, building a new development pattern, and promoting high-quality development; focus on key tasks such as comprehensively deepening reform and opening up, promoting common prosperity, promoting self-reliance in science and technology, and preventing and defusing major risks, strengthening supervision and inspection, promoting implementation, and ensuring no bias, no flexibility, and no distortion; pay close attention to the ‘key few’, and strengthen the supervision of the ‘top leaders’ and leading groups in terms of their implementation of the comprehensive and strict management of the Party’s responsibilities and democratic centralism, and to ensure that they exercise their duties and powers in accordance with regulations and the law. Ensure strict discipline, investigate and punish the acts of canvassing for votes, bribery, intercession and sabotage.
show no mercy to those who engage in political gangs, small circles and interest groups within the Party, and strictly supervise the education, management and supervision of young cadres. Efforts will be made to investigate and deal with corruption behind disorderly expansion of capital and platform monopolies, and sever the link between power and capital. Tighten financial discipline and work to forestall and defuse hidden local government debt risks…resolutely investigate and prosecute corruption in infrastructure construction and the transaction of public resources, continue to fight corruption in the financial sector, deepen anti-corruption work in state-owned enterprises, and intensify the campaign against corruption in grain purchase and sale.
III. CCTV’s Series on Corruption
by Swayamsiddha Samal
China’s state broadcaster CCTV aired a five-part documentary on corruption over the past week. We thought it would be useful to do a breakdown of the cases and people discussed in the series. The original videos are available on the CCDI’s website. Here’s a brief breakdown:
Episode 1:
Sun Lijun is a former member of the party committee and deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security. While in power, he abused his position by accepting huge amounts of bribes (approximately 450 million yuan), market manipulation and the illegal possession of firearms. He was first placed under investigation in April 2020, was expelled from the party and dismissed from his post in September. In Changchun, Jilin Province, he was charged by state prosecutors and will be tried soon.
Ma Linkun, the former deputy secretary and president of the party committee of the Second Affiliated Hospital of Kunming Medical University, was first put under review in December 2020. Along with his brother-in-law and other intermediaries, he procured medical equipment and other businesses illegally. He was expelled from the party and his prosecution case is still going on.
Hu Huaibang served as the Secretary and Chairman of the Party Committee of China Development Bank from 2013 to 2018. He approved huge loans by Huaxin Energy Co., Ltd. and accepted bribes from company owners. He accepted bribes of more than 85.52 million yuan and was sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2021. Huaxin and its subsidiaries are in heavy debt now.
Episode 2:
Wang Fuyu served as a provincial and ministerial-level leading cadre for more than 20 years. From 1995 to 2021 he sought benefits in matters such as business operation, planning approval, and job adjustment, which he illegally received directly or through others. Even after resigning, he used his influence to receive property equivalent to more than 17.35 million yuan. He was under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervision Commission in February 2021 for suspected violations of discipline. Wang Fuyu pleaded guilty in court and his sentence will be announced at a scheduled date.
Zhao Yonglian was the director of the Yongdeng County Subsistence Allowance Office in Gansu Province. She took advantage of poor families' by lying to them saying that she could find acquaintances to assist them. Zhao Yonglian fraudulently received more than 550,000 yuan from thirteen victims. In November 2019, Zhao Yonglian was sentenced to three years and six months in prison and a fine of 100,000 yuan.
In 2019, a series of cases of state-owned grass-roots grain stations were investigated and dealt with by the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision of Yizheng City, Jiangsu Province. A total of 22 people were punished by party discipline and government affairs after a number of prominent cadres of the Yizheng City Grain Bureau and the main group of the Grain Purchase and Sales Corporation were held accountable. Gao Shilin, the former head of the Chenjiliang Station, obtained more than 100,000 yuan this way.
Episode 3:
Chen Gang is a former member of the party and secretary of the China Association for Science and Technology, served as director of the party group of the Beijing Municipal Planning Commission; member of the Beijing Municipal Committee and deputy mayor. The Central Commission for Discipline began investigating him in January 2019. In February 2021, the court held that he illegally accepted more than 120 million yuan in other people's property, committing the offence of receiving bribes. However, as he had surrendered voluntarily, he received a jail time of 15 years.
Liu Guoqiang, former deputy secretary and vice chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Political Consultative Conference, and deputy governor of Liaoning Provincial Government, retired in January 2017. He was reviewed in a July 2020 investigation. In August 2021, the court conducted the first trial, and he was accused of accepting more than 350 million yuan in illegal property.
Liu Chuansheng, who served as Secretary of the Beijing Normal University Party Committee from 2005 to 2016, retired in September 2018. She voluntarily submitted to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on July 5, 2021. She explained that she sought private interests for her son in running schools during her tenure as secretary of the party committee. She was expelled from the party in December 2021.
Episode 4:
Bai Xiangqun, former Vice Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government was investigated in April 2018 and sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2019. Yun Guangzhong, who served as the mayor and secretary of the Municipal Party Committee of Ordos City was investigated in June 2019. In 2020, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison.
Yun Gongmin, former vice chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, was reviewed in October 2019. In November 2020, he has been indicted on suspicion of accepting bribes. All three were involved in coal corruption.
Sun Deshun, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and President of China CITIC Bank Co., Ltd. He used public power in China CITIC Bank to approve loans for corporate bosses. He was expelled from the Communist Party of China. In February 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission issued a huge administrative penalty fine of 22 million yuan to China CITIC Bank.
Yang Hongwei, former secretary of the Chongqing Qianjiang District Party Committee, was suspected of taking bribes in the engineering field. In May 2019, the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision formally filed a case against Yang Hongwei for review. He took bribes of more than 34 million yuan.
Episode 5:
Zhou Jiangyong, when he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee, was placed on file for review in August 2021. Many of Zhou Jiangyong's friends and family members had won project tenders in the areas that he administered. His family members were arrested and Zhou Jiangyong was expelled from the Communist Party of China.
Zhang Yujie, is a former staff member of the Center for Real Estate Registration Chuzhou. An online gaming enthusiast, he embezzled more than 69 million yuan in state money by failing to register receipts and misrepresenting receipt facts between 2016 to 2019. The money embezzled was almost squandered by the time he was caught. In November 2020, Zhang Yujie was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Zhang Qi, a former member of the Standing Committee of the Hainan Provincial Party Committee and former secretary of the Haikou Municipal Party Committee, was expelled from the Party in March 2020 after the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission announced that he was suspected of taking bribes. In December 2020, the court sentenced Zhang Qi to life imprisonment.
IV. Intelligent Manufacturing Plan
By Megha Pardhi
The Chinese government has released several Five-year plans to be implemented during the 14th Five Year plan period. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has released some of them recently. In last week’s issue, I covered the National Informatization Plan. This week I am covering “14th Five-Year-Plan for the Development of Intelligent Manufacturing” (十四五”智能制造发展规划).
The 14th Five-Year-Plan for the Development of Intelligent Manufacturing issued by MIIT along with several other ministries and departments is linked to the ambition of becoming a global leader in intelligent manufacturing.
Key development goals are:
The Plan proposes three set goals for 2025:
By 2025, transformation and upgrading should have achieved remarkable results.
70% of the manufacturing enterprises above designated size have basically achieved digital networking and built more than 500 smart manufacturing demonstration factories leading the development of the industry.
The production efficiency, product yield, energy, and resource utilisation rate of manufacturing enterprises have been significantly improved, and the maturity level of intelligent manufacturing capabilities has been significantly improved.
Significantly enhance supply capacity
The technical level and market competitiveness of intelligent manufacturing equipment and industrial software have been significantly improved, and the market satisfaction rate has exceeded 70% and 50% respectively.
Cultivate more than 150 intelligent manufacturing system solution providers with high professional levels and strong service capabilities.
Build solid foundations
Build a batch of intelligent manufacturing innovation carriers and public service platforms.
Build a standard system and network infrastructure suitable for the development of intelligent manufacturing.
Complete the formulation and revision of more than 200 national and industry standards
Build more than 120 industrial Internet platforms with industry and regional influence.
To achieve these goals, the Plan has highlighted four key tasks focussing on innovation, application, supply, and support.
More on this topic in upcoming issue of China Tech Dispatch.
V. Platform Economy Development
By Megha Pardhi
The National Development Reform Council (国家发展和改革委员会 Gònghéguó Guójiā Fāzhǎn hé Gǎigé Wěiyuánhuì ) along with other departments released a document on promoting the development of “platform economy” (平台经济 Píngtái jīngjì).
The platform economy as defined in the document as a type of economy based on the “Internet platform as the main carrier.” Some of the features of platform economy are:
Data as the key production factor.
New-generation information technology as the core driving force.
Network information infrastructure is an important economic support form.
Generally, platform economy means economic activities facilitated on internet platforms. For example, Amazon is a platform that facilitates e-commerce.
The contents of the document can be roughly categorized into three themes:
Development and regulation
Improving supervision
Focus on high-quality development of economy (includes encouraging platform enterprises to increase investment in "hard technology" and improve international competitiveness)
To promote the development of a healthy platform economy, the document highlights following measures:
The document builds upon the goal of “digital China” as envisioned under the 14th Five-Year Plan (2020-2025). The digital China initiative aims to build a digital economy, digital society, digital government, and a healthy digital ecosystem. As per the 14th-Five-Year-Plan (2020-2025), building digital China includes innovation and application of key digital technologies, development of digital industries, digital transformation of traditional industries, open access and sharing public data, IT-enabled government services, data protection, and regulation, etc.
The Chinese government has already initiated some measures mentioned in this document. For example, one of the measures to promote a healthy platform economy mentioned in the document is “clarify the boundaries of platform responsibility and strengthen the responsibility of super-large Internet platforms.” In 2021, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) issued a notification officially classifying the internet platforms into super-large, large, and small-medium platforms. The SAMR guidelines also classified internet platforms into six types. At the same time, SAMR also released a draft of guidelines of responsibilities of internet platforms, especially the super larger platforms which have an advantage over larger, medium, and small platforms. I have covered both these guidelines in Issue 5 of China Tech Dispatch.
Also Read:
VI. Towards the Next Xi-Putin Meeting
by Shrey Khanna
On January 14, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow that the Russia-China summit will take place in Beijing on February 4, on the opening day of the Winter Olympics. Lavrov said:
“We are preparing an official Russian-Chinese summit. Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the invitation of China’s President Xi Jinping, will visit Beijing on February 4, on the opening day of the Olympic Games, and full-scale talks at the highest level will be held on the same day”.
According to a report in TASS on January 18, Putin will brief Xi on Moscow’s ongoing talks on security guarantees with the United States and NATO during their meeting. Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov clarified that:
“There has been no coordination [of Moscow’s and Beijing’s actions on security guarantees] until now, at the same time, Russia and China, as countries maintaining relations of privileged partnership, are in constant exchange of information and views on the most topical matters, including this one. That is why, naturally, President Putin will inform Xi [Jinping] about what is going on in this sphere”.
During their December 15 virtual meet, Xi had said that he looks forward to this “get-together for the Winter Olympics” and stands ready to work with President Putin “for a shared future” to open a new chapter in post-COVID China-Russia relations jointly.
According to recent data from China’s General Administration of Customs, the trade between China and Russia reached a record $146.88 billion in 2021, up 35.8% from the previous year, reported Nikkei Asia. The newspaper reported that the two countries are “expected to sign a number of high-profile political and economic deals during the upcoming meet, potentially including a final contract for the Power of Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline.” If Russia faces trade sanctions due to a crisis in Ukraine, Putin’s dependence on China would likely increase.
An article by Michael Schuman in The Atlantic argues that with Taiwan in mind,
“Xi will be scrutinizing the situation in Ukraine for useful intelligence about which tools Biden can and ultimately will employ to pressure Russia to back off, how much he is willing to give up in a potential compromise with Putin, and how effectively the U.S. president works with allies and even his own diplomats.”
Yet, he cautions that “Xi can learn only so much from what Biden does about Ukraine”.
“As a link in the alliance system that forms the backbone of U.S. power in the Pacific, as well as within crucial supply chains for semiconductors and other high-tech components, Taiwan may be more essential to American national interests [than Ukraine].”
Writing in The Diplomat, Igor Denisov, a senior research fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, affiliated to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cautioned that China will have to reassess its influence in Central Asia after the Kazakhstan crisis.
He argued that strengthening of the Russian reputation as a “security provider” in Central Asia means that Beijing has far less political leverage than Moscow. Denisov wrote that “China’s poor understanding of internal power shifts” due to its “limited access to first-hand information” signals that Beijing neither have the “skill, nor the proper instruments” to take advantage of the “new great chaos” in the region.
“As my contacts in Kazakhstan indicate, PRC Embassy officials have often preferred to contact loyal figures who only mirror the Chinese narrative but provide no knowledge of the actual situation in their country. We can assume that cables were sent to Beijing concerning the effectiveness of Chinese soft power, and occasional anti-Chinese demonstrations were attributed solely to U.S. interference.”
Further, he explained:
“The Chinese response to Kazakhstan’s recent unrest was reactive, lagging behind the swift pace of events, and certainly less informed than the Russian one. The crisis has highlighted the fact that unlike Russia, with its strong and long-standing ties with the political, military, and business elite, China remains in a certain information vacuum in Kazakhstan, rendering Beijing unable to predict power processes in a state with which it shares a 1,782-kilometer border.”
Denisov concluded that the division of labour between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia, with Russia responsible for security and China in charge of the economy, has become “outdated” in “an era of global transformation”. This is “forcing Moscow and Beijing to look for a new model of interaction, and in some cases, to act independently of each other.”
Meanwhile, an article in RFE/RL notes that the crisis in Kazakhstan has pushed China and Russia Closer. The article assesses that “the elite reshuffling under way in Kazakhstan could also undercut some of China’s sway in the country, with Nazarbaev and Masimov -- two well-known interlocutors with Beijing -- being sidelined.” However, “despite such shifts and potential points of tension, Beijing and Moscow have used the crisis in Kazakhstan to increase their support for each other”. According to Jakub Jakobowski, senior fellow at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw:
“They both share an overarching goal of keeping Central Asia stable. China isn’t trying to unseat Russia. Beijing thinks it has more important issues globally on its radar than to be the exclusive actor in Central Asia and there is a respect for Moscow’s ambitions.”
Also Read:
VII. Region Watch
by Shibani Mehta
One Friday every month, I attend a seminar where new, upcoming research on South Asia’s security is discussed. At the most recent one, the conversation was about defining a ‘swing’ state. It got me thinking of the region, which is the primary site of one major power competition that is playing out at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, as well as across multiple elements - political, economic, technological and ideological, and is only likely to intensify. Smaller states in the region exercise agency and take advantage of major power rivalries while safeguarding themselves from fallout, thereby swinging? I cannot give a conclusive answer at this point but what transpires in the region certainly defines how the major power competition plays out internationally.
On 14 January, Pakistan released its first national security policy. The document underscores 'deep-rooted historical ties, shared interests, mutual understanding and strategic convergence' with China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is present having support across Pakistan and one that can facilitate domestic economic growth. This is poignant, considering the document places economic security as the priority.
But not everyone is pleased with the BRI-induced infrastructure boom in the region. The construction of hydropower plants in Nepal has been criticised by environmental associations and local communities for destroying biological ecosystems. The last couple of weeks has seen rising discontent against China’s profound influence, particularly regarding creating barriers at border points which violates China’s trade commitment with the Himalayan nation. Beijing, however, maintains:
‘China and Nepal are traditional friendly neighbors. China unswervingly adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and develops bilateral friendly relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs,’
On interference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who recently held talks with Sri Lanka's leadership, said that a ‘third country’ should not ‘interfere’ in Beijing's relations with Colombo. The Foreign Minister is also reported to have said:
‘During my visit to several Indian Ocean island countries this time (January 2022), I feel that all island countries share similar experiences and common needs, with similar natural endowment and development goals, and have favourable conditions and full potential for strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation,’
It has been debated that China has constructed an image of a patient listener to countries’ needs. When it comes to effective posturing to manage concerns and outcomes in the region, it’s advantage Beijing.
VIII. The Long & Short of It…
by Manoj Kewalramani
a. Fan Yongpeng’s Critique of the US System
This week, the People’s Daily published a long piece by Fan Yongpeng from the China Institute at Fudan University. This was a blistering attack on the American system of governance. Fan basically argued that the US’ political problems are a product of “the deep contradictions between the nature of its society, its institutional design and its hegemonic system.” He adds that blame-shifting, which has led to accusations about China being the “chief culprit” for America’s woes, is a product of the structure of the US system, political culture and psychology. You can read my breakdown and analysis of the article here.
b. Protecting Gig Workers’ Rights
SCMP reports that the Chinese government has told 11 internet platforms including Alibaba Group Holding and Tencent Holdings to better protect gig workers’ rights.
The report says that:
“At a meeting held by four government agencies, the companies were instructed to ‘have political, ideological and actionable consciousness of’ gig workers, according to a statement from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) released on Friday. The statement noted progress the companies have made in implementing new rules on worker rights, but concluded that they could do more. Also present at the meeting were ride-hailing giants Didi Chuxing and Geely-backed Cao Cao Mobility and food delivery services Meituan and Ele.me, a subsidiary of Alibaba… In addition to the MHRSS, the Ministry of Transport, State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and All-China Federation of Trade Unions were involved in what the statement called ‘administrative instruction’. The platforms shall ‘deeply understand the workers’ needs, increase the supervision of employment partners’ protection of their rights, keep improving algorithms and labour rules on the platforms and improve the institutional mechanism’ for protecting their rights and interests, the authorities said. The new order comes as part of a review of workers’ rights following guidelines issued in July last year by seven government agencies.”
c. Xi’s New Generals
On January 21, seven senior officers of the PLA and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force were promoted to the military rank of general.
The promoted officers are:
Admiral Liu Qingsong, political commissar of the PLA Northern Theater Command.
General Wu Yanan, commander of the PLA Central Theater Command
General Xu Deqing, political commissar of the PLA Central Theater Command
General Qin Shutong, political commissar of the PLA Army
Admiral Yuan Huazhi, political commissar of the PLA Navy
General Li Yuchao, commander of the PLA Rocket Force
General Zhang Hongbing, political commissar of the People’s Armed Police Force.
Do recall that in September last year, five people were promoted to the rank of general. And before that, four others were promoted in July 2021. So with these latest promotions, ever since he assumed power in 2012, Xi has promoted 65 people to the rank of general.
d. Tweets, Podcasts & Discussions
I thought I’d use this space to highlight some interesting Twitter posts/threads and podcasts/discussions that I would like to recommend.
Along with this, I highly recommend listening to these two discussions.
First, the Little Red Podcast had this fascinating episode on “common prosperity.” There are two incredibly different views by Andy Rothman, from Matthews Asia, and Anne Stevenson-Yang, the co-founder of J Capital Research. It’s worth your time.
Also, do check out this two-part panel by Brookings looking ahead to the 20th Party Congress.
Other Stories:
French parliament puts pressure on Macron by declaring Chinese treatment of Uyghurs a ‘genocide’: Do Read/ Also See: European Parliament debates resolution over ‘deterioration’ of media freedoms in Hong Kong
China-US relations: diplomats pave way for Yang Jiechi-Jake Sullivan rematch: Do Read
China Notifies Firms of Tougher Investment Rules for Big Tech/ China’s internet watchdog says it has not issued a policy requiring vetting of investment deals at Big Tech firms — The official denial came after reports circulated online that platforms with at least 100 million users would have to seek approval for external investment deals
US seeks to speed up delivery of new F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan
China needs a new growth model, but that requires serious reform
A Covid Contact-Tracing Contrast Lays Bare China’s Inequalities
Analysis: German big business piles pressure on Lithuania in China row
Public trust surges in China, falls dramatically in world’s democracies
China’s factories face ‘rather large’ downward pressure in the first quarter, official says