Made in China
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Greetings, Readers!
Before we delve into today’s edition of ‘Eye on China’, I would like to share with you my latest Issue Brief for the Takshashila Institution, ‘Mediation and Interference: Assessing Chinese Views & Analyses on the Latest India-Pak Tensions’. This Issue Brief assesses Chinese officials, analysts, and citizen commentators’ views on the ongoing exchange of hostilities between India and Pakistan, and its context and history.
Three main threads emerge from an assessment of their writings:
Implicitly, China’s support is to Pakistan and its position, even if it is disguised as support for regional stability, peace, and de-escalation. Narratives surrounding the issue are focused on augmenting Islamabad’s rhetoric and policy actions, all the while de-legitimising New Delhi’s counter-measures and general policy approach to terrorism by referring to them as “irrational.”
China is envisioning itself as a mediator in the bilateral tensions between India and Pakistan. But such an articulation of its role is mostly posturing. This is especially given that Chinese commentators either dismiss the possibility that there will be a hot war, or cite China’s military might to prove that it is not in India’s interests to escalate. Beijing’s main goal with proposing mediation is to internationalise an otherwise bilateral issue – an idea Pakistan supports and India opposes.
There is an understanding among Chinese analysts that tensions between India and Pakistan have negative implications for Beijing’s regional interests. Hence, they resort to overblown and misrepresented specifics, often including statements claiming that it is India sponsoring terrorism on Pakistani soil, to prove that India has created great concern for Pakistan.
Please do note that the Brief does not engage with the authenticity of claims and reports, given that the conflict has created, among other things, an oversaturation and anxiety of misinformation. In this light, I appreciate any deliberations in the notes/ comments, and wish you, happy reading!
India-China Relations: Pak’s China Weaponry
Anushka Saxena
Since the escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, Chinese commentary and narratives have been exalting the successes of Chinese military systems used by Pakistan. Even with the ceasefire in place, the fog of war has not lifted, and a lot of information in this domain – systems used, weapons downed, and platforms mobilised – is haywire, uncertain, and unofficial. As I argue in my May 9 piece for The National Interest, what is, indeed, certain, is that with Operation Sindoor, India has set a new normal by expanding the scale of its response to terrorism, and has demonstrated renewed political will and military capability by moving beyond Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and terror camps to striking targets closer to military installations across and deep into Pakistan.
On the question of whether India lost any fighter jets, Indian Air Force Director General of Air Operations (DGAO) Air Marshal AK Bharti said at a press briefing on May 11, 2025, that “We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat.” Further, he added:
As for the details, what could have been... how many numbers... which platform did we lose... at this time, I would not like to comment on that because we are still in a combat situation. If I comment on anything, it will be only advantage adversary.
So, from the DGAO’s statement, one can gather that there was some loss. Nevertheless, it is vital to analyse China’s claims on the downing of a Rafale by Chinese-made Pakistani weapons systems. Hence, I will briefly discuss what we know about the use of Chinese weapons systems by Pakistan, from Chinese writings and chatter.
Firstly, it is important to note that the Chinese are referring to the Pakistani military as ‘Made in China’, and are looking at its successes against the Indian armed forces as a Chinese win against Western defence technology, which India depends on. Even before the conflict, commentators, such as ‘Gu Huoping’ (谷火平; a pen name for an account that frequently writes on military affairs concerning China), argued that in the face of India’s aggressive posture, Pakistan is right to not back down. In fact, in a recent article for the Chinese media platform NetEase, Gu opines that a hot war may be a test of all the ‘Made in China’ defence products the Pakistan armed forces are heavily reliant on. Using examples of India’s retreat in the 1962 war with China, and by misleadingly arguing that India has not held a clear advantage in its historic wars with Pakistan, Gu attempts to propagate the idea that Delhi should best back off. With some unconfirmed accounts here and there of Pakistan’s successes against India, the Chinese believe it’s all a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Secondly, popular Chinese analysts such as Hu Xijin, who served as Editor-in-Chief of Global Times from 2005 till December 2021, lend some credibility to the speculation on which Pakistan may have deployed Chinese weapons against India. In an article for ‘The China Academy’, he writes:
The JF-17 fighter jet, which played a key role in Pakistan’s show of strength in this clash, currently numbers around 150 in the Pakistan Air Force fleet… In addition, Pakistan recently commissioned the Chinese-made HQ-9P long-range air defense missile system… Some analysts suggest that the HQ-9P, when integrated with the LY-80 medium-range air defense system, the ZDK-03 airborne early warning aircraft, and the JF-17 fighters—all sourced from China—forms a multi-layered “long-medium-short” air defense network… The Chinese-made J-10 fighter jets and the export version of the JF-17 Thunder have become widely used in Pakistan.
Hence, Pakistan has likely deployed a China-made/ -supported arsenal, inclusive of:
Air Defence: HQ-9‘P’ (modified for Pakistan) long-range & LY-80/HQ-16 medium-range air defence systems
Fighters: JF-17 (Thunder/ Block III; co-produced) & J-10C (Export Version)
Missiles: PL-15 (Export Version)
There is some surety that Pakistan used Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, one of which was potentially also downed by India. But the specification of the model, and whether it was Chinese-made, remains unclear at this stage. This is especially considering the four China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC)’s ZDK-03 AWACS that Pakistan owned were retired from service earlier this year. Additionally, commentators have speculated that the AWACS Pakistan may have used and lost is one of the nine Swedish SAAB 2000 ‘Erieye’s that it owns.
Pakistan also deployed the US-exported F-16 Vipers, and it is Islamabad’s unsubstantiated claim that 42 of its fighters went up against an arsenal of 72 Indian aircraft, which included the French firm Dassault Aviation’s Rafales, Russia’s SU-30 MKI Flankers and MiG-29 Fulcrums, and Israeli Heron drones alongside IAI Harop loitering munition.
Let’s look at the two most popular Chinese players of this conflict – the J-10CE and the PL-15E. The J-10CE is a single-engine, single-seat, multirole 4th-generation+ fighter aircraft independently developed by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). This particular variant debuted in November 2024 at the Zhuhai Airshow and is best utilised for launching air-to-air missiles in Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) conflict. It features a canard layout, which lends it good maneuverability. Aside from stealth fighters like the US F-22 Raptor, many newly commissioned fighter jets in Europe also adopt the canard design — for example, the Rafale and Sweden’s Gripen.
The J-10CE boasts around 11 external hardpoints to carry weaponry, and is often retrofitted with medium-range radar-guided AAMs like the PL-15E. The PL-15E is likely developed collaboratively by the China Airborne Missile Academy (CAMA; the specialised ‘612th’ institute within AVIC) & the Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute (LETRI; ‘607th’ Institute), and has a range of about 145km.[Check out this US Air Force Air University report discussing the roles and developments of these Institutes under AVIC].
The PL-15E has an interesting phased navigation system:
The two-way data link in both the launch and the mid-course phases enables real-time trajectory adjustments in passive radar mode, meaning that the missile can be precision-guided by the launch aircraft or an AWACS, per the location of its target, without emitting its own radar signals (thus also making it stealthier). In the terminal phase, the AESA radar seeker enables the missile to find its target autonomously and adjust its trajectory accordingly (homing).
As our readers would know, China’s military doctrine focuses on interoperability and fool-proof coordination. Two interesting commentaries from Guancha point to exactly how this perspective is being utilised to explain why, in that one system of conflict (one J-10CE v/s one Rafale), the latter would have been shot down. It is, of course, important to note here that this is only one case study to look at, and which the Chinese are (for obvious reasons) publicising. India’s overall demonstration of top-notch Air Defence against Pakistan’s disproportionate air strikes on Indian cities in the north is one of many feats it can claim.
Bai Yujing, an aerospace commentator, writes on May 9, “The Rafale Fighter That Could Jam F-22's Lock—Why Was It Killed Instantly by the PL-15?” He discusses this through a “full cycle of ‘detect-target-launch’ in a complex electromagnetic environment” lens, to demonstrate why that one system alone had various sub-systems operating in sync to achieve a singular goal. His main argument is that the J-10CE didn’t just serve as the shooter—it was the core platform of the “strike chain.”
Essentially, this means imagining an ecosystem of weapons and platforms, all performing their own actions to lead to the consequence of a PL-15 successfully hitting a Rafale, without being caught by Indian Air Defence or chaff/ flares of the Rafale. In this ecosystem, the JF-17 Block III fighters likely carried out supporting tactical tasks: drawing attention, creating diversions, and compressing the Rafale’s maneuvering space, thereby clearing a clean launch window for the J-10C; American F-16s provided tactical coverage; and the Pakistani AWACS (SAAB or ZDK-03) maintained battlefield awareness. Ground-based air defences would have continued to form a layered blockade. This would be a viable, real-life example of system-on-system conflict.
But why wasn’t that Rafale prepared to counter such a manoeuvre? Bai explains, when faced with an “integrated system,” it is difficult for a singular jet that may not have been tightly knitted with other systems in India’s air-ground defence ecosystem to respond effectively (or at all).
On board the Rafale is the Spectra electronic warfare system, which integrates radar warning receivers (RWR), digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jammers, and chaff/infrared flare dispensers. At this juncture, we cannot confirm if this particular Rafale was locked into the PL-15E, if it deployed any counter-measures/ decoys, or if it jammed the missile mid-course. When the missile’s radar seeker would have switched on in the terminal phase, and the missile would have been emitting signals, the self-protection suit on board the Rafale couldn’t have had enough time to respond, as the distance between the two would be only 20 km or so. And so, it could be, as Bai says, that Spectra “didn’t merely ‘fail to jam’ — it likely didn’t even have time to activate.”
Further, Guancha military commentator ‘Yankee’ credits the outcome of this system to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)’s Chinese-style BVR fighting training. In his 11 May column, ‘Military Review of the Week’ (一周军评), Yankee argues:
In the early stages of the ‘Shaheen’ joint exercises between China and Pakistan, both sides had numerous aircraft lacking BVR combat capability (e.g., J-7s, Mirage fighters)…Particularly, the PAF developed tactics like ‘breaking through mid-range to fight at close-range’ when dealing with aircraft like the Su-27/30 and J-10A. This resulted in the PAF’s only BVR-capable fighter at the time, the JF-17 “Thunder,” being pulled into chaotic close-range engagements alongside second-generation fighters… Although the PAF possessed a small number of F-16s, BVR training was rarely emphasized in joint drills with other aircraft types. This thinking persisted until April 2016, during the ‘Shaheen-5’ joint exercise… when the PAF’s JF-17s faced an unassuming guest: the J-8DF.
As per Yankee’s assessment, even though the J-8D ‘Finback’ has never been a BVR fighter, its fighter pilots have been trained in the same because of their air battle competition, the ‘Golden Helmet’. In fact, in the second of the big 4 PLAAF competitions, the ‘Golden Dart’ exercises, too, the J-8DF has demonstrated BVR capabilities. Eventually, because of the defeat of the Sino-Pakistani JF-17s at the hands of the J-8DF during the Shaheen-5 exercise, Pakistan supposedly learned to invest in its BVR capabilities.
Again, all said arguments must be taken with grains of salt, given that the PAF’s overall performance was not all that tactical and integrated. But assessing the abovementioned narratives gives us some idea of Chinese thinking on air defence and offence doctrine, and what they believe the successes and failures of India and Pakistan’s air defence campaigns have been. Of course, there exist the more jingoistic commentators, who have, based on this single purported incident in the larger scheme of things, declared the overall superiority of J-10s over Rafales.
In a Weibo post by a ‘@来自星云滴Sun’, the user argues:
The overall capability of this French fighter jet [Rafale] is superior to the J-10CE. Saying this might shock a lot of Chinese people, but it’s simply the truth. The reason Pakistan was able to ‘defeat’ the Indian Air Force is the result of the integrated operations made possible by China’s complete weapons system and data link sharing.
Notwithstanding the ill-founded claim of “defeat of the IAF,” the user presents a similar argument as Bai on integrated operations of the PAF. To this, another user going by ‘@韩路’ (Hán Lù) comments:
I really don’t understand – in terms of maneuverability, combat radius, radar, onboard weapons, integrated data link capabilities, maintainability, and cost – in which aspect is the Rafale actually superior to the J-10C? At best, a few parameters might be comparable.
Let’s say, just for the sake of argument, the Rafale is about 10% better across the board – but the J-10C costs only one-sixth as much! That’s still a huge win for the J-10C in terms of overall value. And even this 10% advantage is hypothetical – there’s no solid evidence for it.
Hán Lù’s post is featured under the ‘popular’ section of Weibo when searching the term ‘J-10’, and has 3865 engagements as of May 14, 2025. Much less popular but interesting has been another post on Weibo by a user ‘@用户6429411657’, who argues that the J-10’s radar is more powerful than the Rafale’s, because the former is Gallium Nitride (GaN)-dependent (Type-1475 AESA radar), and the latter is Gallium Arsenide (GaS)-dependent. While this is a tenuous argument, even in India, there is a reported debate on upgrading the core of the IAF’s 36 Rafales with indigenous GaN AESA radars.
Nonetheless, taking this development into account, and citing a quote from a Financial Times article, a Weibo user going by ‘@品茶说酒’ (literally translating to ‘tasting tea and savouring wine/ alcohol’), says:
After the India-Pakistan air battle, a number of foreign military attachés gathered in New Delhi—not to comfort the battered Indian forces, but because they were desperate to know how the J-10 had thrashed the Indian Air Force. For India, fresh from defeat, this was salt rubbed into open wounds. According to the UK’s Financial Times, one foreign defense attaché in New Delhi said Western defense officials were growing “impatient,” eager to understand the details of the Indian Air Force’s engagements with the J-10CP. If the West thinks it can fully assess the PLA Air Force’s capabilities based on Indian battlefield data, that’s laughably naïve. In fact, the J-10C tearing it up over the India-Pakistan frontlines is already considered outdated by Chinese domestic standards.
The video user ‘品茶说酒’ has shared along with their post has been played 320,000 times. And there is a point to be noted about such, albeit obscure, but popular commentators (at least in public discourse) making the case that most China-made Pakistani weapons (which are all export variants) are relatively outdated models. There is also no denying that the Chinese defence R&D and manufacturing ecosystem has indeed significantly evolved in the past decade.
A similar argument is made about the Pakistani LY-80/ HQ-16 (Chinese export version) air defence system on Baidu’s ‘Baijia commentary’ platform, where the user ‘Zongheng Shi’ says:
This “Falcon” [potentially used in the conflict with India] is actually an early export version of China’s HQ-16 missile system. If they had used the current version, it would’ve been even more formidable. This includes the PL-15 missile that shot down the Rafale fighter jet—a missile developed around 2015.
The hostilities between India and Pakistan have, among other things, been one of the first combat-readiness tests of Chinese-made weapons systems, especially fighter jets and ADs. While most weapons used by Pakistan were export models and the actual technological innovation has been preserved for the PLA, the fact is that the Sino-Pakistani defence partnership is enhancing, and China nearly serviced 81% of Pakistan’s arms import demands between 2020-24. If there is also increased doctrinal and systemic integration, the two sides can truly become interoperable. At this juncture, however, that seems like a far cry, given Pakistan’s reliance on Western tech and weaponry too, and China’s relative secrecy vis-à-vis defence indigenisation. Remains to be seen if future iterations of joint military exercises between the two countries can lead to greater cohesion and learning, and how India can respond to developments accordingly.
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Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
