New Regulation Alert!
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Guarding the Great Wall: The CMC Approves New Common Regulations for the PLA
Anushka Saxena
On February 21, 2025, after a period of seven years, the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) has approved three regulations pertaining to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Chinese PLA (中国人民解放军内务条令), Regulations on Discipline of the PLA (中国人民解放军纪律条令), and Regulations on Military Formations (or ‘Drills’) of the PLA – together known as ‘Common Regulations’. These regulations, to be promulgated through an executive order signed by CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, and expected to come into force starting April 1, 2025, have been revised for the first time since April 2018, in Xi’s tenure. Then too, the Regulations were in the trial stage of their implementation, and even though the complete texts of the revised regulations are yet to be revealed, it seems they are quite official and here to stay for a while.
Some context
As specified on the Baidu page for ‘Common Regulations’, this term was first introduced in 1951 when the People’s Revolutionary Military Council (a CMC predecessor) proposed drafting common regulations to standardize the discipline and system of the entire military. With Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai at the helm, and military theorists such as Liu Bocheng by their side, various military regulations were formulated, and the Internal Affairs Regulations, Discipline Regulations, and Formation/ Drill Regulations were issued collectively as the Common Regulations. These rules are mandatory for all levels of the military, from high-ranking commanders to ordinary soldiers.
Common Regulations of the PLA are the most comprehensive and minutely-detailed texts standardising how the PLA must act, what kind of wars it must focus on fighting, and what kind of a force it should strive to be. Up till 2002, Jiang Zemin is known to have revised the Common Regulations three times, to better inculcate the ‘objective reality’ of the new situations and internal challenges of discipline facing the PLA. Major articulations of his ‘Three Represents’ theory were also added to these revised regulations.
Subsequently, Hu Jintao is reported to have amended these regulations once in 2011, to include the idea that the PLA must prepare to fight and win “local wars.” Under Xi Jinping, the trial implementation of majorly revised regulations began (i.e. came into force) in May 2018, to reflect the realities of his wide-sweeping military reforms. Now, official Common Regulations for the ‘New Era’ seem to have finally come about. As the official report on the matter says:
“The newly revised Common Regulations are guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and deeply implement Xi Jinping's Thought on Strengthening the Military as well as the military strategy for the new era.”
In this light, it is important to note that politically, the Common Regulations reflect each party-state leader’s political and national security priorities, and eventually become part of their ‘Military Thought’ legacy. Further, the Regulations dictate defence doctrine, instruct commanders of various services and military arms on strategic and operational principles, and further define the types of campaigns the PLA should prioritise. Hence, they have long-standing implications for jointness, integration, and the ability to fight and win wars.
These regulations strictly govern the day-to-day activities of the PLA. For example, on January 11, 2025, as part of new year celebrations, the PLA Eastern Theater Command Army Staff Department organised military drills for its headquarters and directly affiliated units.
The four-part demonstration the Department conducted involved ‘Formation Drill’ as step one, ‘Training Demonstration’ as step two, ‘Bayonet Drill’ as step three, and an ‘Exhibition Tour’ as step four.
The first step on the ‘Formation Drill’, as highlighted in the reportage on the exercise, “followed the Regulations on Military Formation Drills.”
In this light, the drill was structured into six key elements under a “unified command, collective execution” approach. The evaluation focused on formation discipline, overall morale, and the effectiveness of daily training management within each unit. After intense competition, the officer group from a specific center and the soldier-civilian group from the Guard and Service Battalion secured first-place honours.
The whole exercise tells you how formation drills, both for show and in practice (ex. during flank formations in a military campaign), are only considered successful when following Regulations to the T. The honours handed out at the end act as example-setting endeavours to ensure “legal discipline” in the PLA is incentivised and rewarded.
What we know so far about the revisions
Reportage on the announcement rather broadly and vaguely tells us the following about revisions made to each of the three regulations:
Regulations on Internal Affairs of the PLA (has 13 chapters and 311 articles):
Improves basic norms such as military oaths, responsibilities, internal and external relations, military appearance and discipline, and etiquette.
Optimises daily management systems, including duty shifts, internal affairs arrangements, leave and return procedures, and on-base accommodations.
Expands provisions on combat readiness, military training management, use of smart electronic devices, and the management of overseas troops and units.
Regulations on Discipline of the PLA (has 8 chapters and 193 articles):
Differentiates between wartime, peacetime, and major non-war military operations (MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War; Hu Jintao’s legacy operational guidelines).
Enhances the military honours and commendation system.
Refines disciplinary measures, specifies conditions for punishments, and standardises procedures for accountability exemptions, complaints, and appeals.
Regulations on Military Formations of the PLA (has 8 chapters and 100 articles):
Introduces new regulations on handling advanced firearms and bugle calls by military musicians.
Expands protocols for land, naval, and aerial military parades, including dockside ceremonies.
Broadens the scope of military ceremonies and formal events.
As a code of conduct for the PLA, the revised regulations are further expected to:
Emphasise combat effectiveness as the military’s top priority, ensuring that all preparations and actions are directed toward winning battles;
Stress the importance of governing the military per the law, aiming to establish a more standardised and disciplined framework for military readiness, training, work, and daily life;
Balance strict governance with care for personnel, upholding the PLA’s glorious traditions while respecting the rights and roles of officers and soldiers, thus fostering motivation for combat training; and
Play a crucial role in driving high-quality military development and achieving the centennial goal of building a strong military on schedule.
It is important to note that the revised Regulations are being considered central to Xi Jinping’s formulation of the theory of ‘governing the military according to law’ (依法治军) – this is the fundamental argument in a commentary on the revisions, appearing in today’s edition of PLA Daily. Xi has pioneered the concept since the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China (November 2012), and its two main tenets are the ‘Eight Adherences/ Insistences’ (八个坚持) and the ‘Three Fundamental Shifts’ (三个根本性转变) in military governance.
The ‘Eight Adherences’ include adhering to the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, prioritising combat effectiveness, building a distinctive Chinese military legal system, transforming military governance methods per legal requirements, enforcing strict discipline, focusing on the role of key leadership, upholding the rights of military personnel, and integrating military legal governance with the overall rule of law in China. The ‘Three Shifts’ include transitioning from administrative command-based management to governance by law, shifting from experience-based decision-making to a reliance on legal and regulatory frameworks, and replacing ad-hoc approaches with systematic adherence to legal procedures. For a military force that has had a history of ingrained corruption, truly ad-hoc, campaign-style procedures for operations, and disbalance in the roles of the ground, air and naval forces (with the former having been least efficient and given the most importance), this ‘rule by law’ becomes pertinent.
But, and most importantly, another argument made in the above-mentioned PLA Daily commentary needs emphasis: “The Vitality of Regulations Lies in Their Execution.” Just like various units of the PLA study Xi Jinping’s major speeches, or conclusions of the Military Work Conference, they also undertake study sessions for such regulations. In this light, we are likely to see commanders, officers, and soldiers studying the regulations clause-by-clause, while also incorporating them into their national defence education curriculum.
Secondly, their effective implementation is likely to see impetus, and the endeavour would potentially be led by none other than the CMC members Zhang Shengmin (Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission) and Liu Zhenli (Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department). So far, Zhang and Liu seem safe from the crackdown on corruption and inefficiency in the military apparatus. At a time when the political flux in the PLA has reached the highest levels, with the suspension of CMC Political Affairs Department head Miao Hua, greater pressure on ensuring discipline and efficacy is expected.
For reference, I have previously broken down what we know about Miao Hua’s case in the November 24, 2024 edition of ‘Eye on China’:
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In the latest episode of ‘Indo-Pacific Voices’ podcast by the Indo-Pacific Circle (part of a Delhi-based think tank, the Council for Strategic and Defense Research), Manoj Kewalramani and Anushka Saxena discuss the early days of the India-US relations under Trump 2.0, and the China factor in new age US foreign policy. Tune in here.
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
