"Resolve Tibet," Says America
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Worldview Weekly: The US is ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute’
By Anushka Saxena
Last week, the US Congress (Senate + House of Representatives) passed a bipartisan legislation, referred to as the ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act’ (H.R.533/ S.138). The bill is now with President Joe Biden to sign into law. Even though the HoR passed it in February and the Senate in May, the final bill with amended language was reintroduced to the House floor on the June 11, and was passed with a 391-26 majority. The bill was not sent to the Senate further, as the House voted to suspend that process on the 12th.
What is the bill about?
The bill, which has stirred quite a frenzy in China, signals a slight shift in US policy on Tibet by indicating that even though the US believes Tibet is part of the territory of PRC, it is only so because the PRC exercises complete assertive control over the autonomous province. Further, it makes it clear that the US’s stance never affirmed that China had historic control over Tibet.
In a previous iteration of a similar bill authored by one of the co-sponsors of H.R. 533, Jeff Merkley, it was argued that the US believes that Tibet only integrated with the PRC after the latter, in 1949-50 launched an “armed invasion of Tibet in contravention to international law” (S. 5306 of 2022). This language has been removed from the current text of the bill, even though it does reiterate that through its amended ‘Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020’, the US has always advocated that Tibet has a distinct culture, religion and identity.
Next, the bill makes the case that under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Tibetans have a right to “determine their own destiny,” including by demanding greater autonomy or declaring independence. It further cites UN Resolution 1724 of December 1961, which called for “cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination.” Overall, the bill makes the case that US policy on Tibet allows the latter to determine its path and future, even separate from the PRC territory and CPC government, and it will have American support.
In terms of policy direction, the bill’s goal is two-fold – to encourage the PRC to communicate and resolve differences with the Dalai Lama and the democratically elected representatives of Tibet; and to counter Chinese disinformation on historical claims over Tibet.
On the first part, the bill makes the case that even though between 2002 and 2010, nine rounds of deliberations took place between the PRC and representatives of the 14th Dalai Lama, no conclusion was reached on resolving the dispute between Tibet and China. Since then, Tibetan exiles have continued to call for greater autonomy, which has become more elusive under Xi Jinping. In this regard, the bill urges “that the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China must be resolved in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter, by peaceful means, through dialogue without preconditions.”
The bill focuses heavily on the second bit regarding countering disinformation, in that:
It calls on the US Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to work with relevant bureaus of the Department of State and the USAgency for International Development to ensure that US government statements and documents effectively counter PRC and CPC disinformation on history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama.
It proposes that under the provisions of Section 613 (b) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (as amended in 2020), in addition to other periodical reports pertaining to Tibet, the US President, in the collaboration with the State Department, must also present to the Congress and publish on the latter’s website, a report on “efforts to counter disinformation about Tibet from the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, including disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama.”
Further, the bill also seeks to accrue funds under Section 346 of the Tibetan Policy Act for countering such disinformation.
What are US Lawmakers saying? And how is China responding?
While the bill had relatively moderate language, in their press releases, bill co-sponsors and supporting lawmakers, such as US Senator Todd Young, Rep. Jim McGovern and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, have expressed more vocally their disdain of China’s aggression in Tibet. Young, for example, argued:
“Congressional passage of this legislation further demonstrates America’s resolve that the CCP’s status quo – both in Tibet and elsewhere – is not acceptable.”
Reiterating his sentiments, McCaul said:
“If the CCP truly does respect ‘sovereignty’ as it claims to do then it will engage in peaceful dialogue with the Tibetans to resolve this conflict, not force the Tibetans to accept a CCP proposal. Passing this bipartisan bill demonstrates America’s resolve that the CCP’s status quo in Tibet is not acceptable.”
McGovern, for whom this bill is close to heart, given that he introduced a similar bill in July 2022 and which never went to vote, stated:
“Let the overwhelming passage of our strong, bipartisan bill be a clear message to the Tibetan people: America stands with you on the side of human dignity, and we support you in your quest to secure the basic rights to which you are entitled under international law.”
For obvious reasons, the passing of the bill has stirred up the Chinese, and commentators have responded harshly. For example, Li Haidong, a China Foreign Affairs University professor, argued:
“The US bill is not truly about showing care for the people of Xizang, but rather about meddling in China's internal affairs, with its underlying purpose being to exploit affairs related to Xizang as a means to undermine China's development, or potentially divide the country.”
He referred to this as the US’s attempt to “balkanise” China by breaking it into parts.
Further, in the past, with developments related to the US’s appointment of the Special Tibet Coordinator, or with its statements on the deprivation of human rights in Tibet, the Chinese Ministry has often said:
“Xizang has been part of China since ancient times.”
“Xizang affairs are purely China’s internal affairs that allow no foreign interference.”
“The human rights conditions in Xizang are at their historical best, as witnessed by the international community.”
Note that in most such comments, the term ‘Xizang’ and not ‘Tibet’ has been used to retaliate to the US’s manoeuvres, attempting a re-writing of history by sinicizing the name and lens by which the international community refers to Tibet. Most of these comments are also part of a set template of narratives deployed by the Chinese party-state to oppose internationalisation of issues pertaining to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
A Field Day for the Press in India
China has often engaged in cartographic aggression through the sinicization of names of cities and other geographical features such as mountains and water bodies, both in its own provinces (Tibet and Xinjiang), as well as in territories of other sovereign countries (such as Arunachal Pradesh in India), for three main reasons:
The first is to rewrite history to solidify claims over territories marred in disputes (even though they may not, in reality, be ‘disputed’).
The second is to introduce Chinese names in the lingo of other countries and governments, so that associated territories only seem to be remembered as a part of the mainland.
And the third is to respond to actions that China may perceive as threatening and in violation of its “red lines.” An example for this is China’s “standardisation” of names of geo-features in Arunachal, which it has done through the issuance of four lists respectively in 2017, 2021, 2023, and 2024 (notice the quick succession). Three of these have evident traceable events preceding them. The 2017 notification, for example, came when the Dalai Lama was finishing a week-long tour in Arunachal. The 2023 notification came when India-China relations were tense owing to the journalist visa spat, amidst the ongoing economic tensions in the aftermath of Galwan and the Pandemic. And the 2024 notification came when EAM Jaishankar visited Manila and expressed support for Philippines’ efforts against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.
Historically too, Chinese officials have often claimed Arunachal as a part of ‘Zangnan’ or ‘Southern Tibet’, and these standardised mandarin and pinyin names have only recently started to reinvigorate the issue.
But now, there is great media buzz around the Indian government releasing its own list of 30-odd Tibetan names for geo-features within the Tibet province of the PRC, to retaliate against Chinese cartographic aggression and remind the world of the old Tibetan names for the now sinicized ones. To begin with, if it is indeed true that such a list is intended to be released, then the fact that it was talked about in the media before a single official statement was made, makes me want to believe that this is a successful psychological operations effort on India’s part. Even if the list never comes out ever after this, the message such a media fire sends the Chinese is that two can play at this game, and India can irk the Chinese by bringing Tibet into the equation, amidst ongoing tensions.
However, it would be a stretch to say that this is India’s way of reversing its stance on Tibet, because effectively, India recognises the Tibetan province to be part of the PRC, and potentially does not envision a political rabbit hole the two countries have been down over seven decades ago. But again, speculation on (and eventual publication of) such a list is a symbolically significant way of returning the favour by “poking the bear,” especially when combined with other long-term measures such as the non-reiteration of a ‘One China policy’ by India, and continued protection of Tibetans-in-exile.
Amidst frenzied deliberations on this news, two things are also important to remember – one, that there is no release of official, governmental list or statement on the matter, which makes much of the debate speculative; and two, that such an endeavour cannot be classified as a “renaming exercise.” In the right context, ‘Re-naming’ is a very specific process of culturally and politically staking claim to a territory by referring to it by a name that was used to describe it in the past. In doing so, one’s goal is to contend a rival nation’s claim to that territory, and project one’s own sovereign authority. If the purported Indian list only highlights the old Tibetan names alongside the new sinicized ones, then it wouldn’t be right to say that it is engaging in ‘re-naming’ – only ‘re-minding’!
At this point, I do not believe that the Indian government is planning to go back to the drawing board on the question of whether Tibet should be autonomous or be part of Chinese territory. On a geopolitical level, it has also made sense to not rework that stance. But at the same time, one cannot discount the significance of under-the-threshold measures such as non-reiteration of the ‘One China policy’ (even though India has maintained it for the longest time, it has stopped using the phrase in official communications since 2009), rejection of sinicized names, and support for the Dalai Lama and Tibetans-in-exile.
India is continuing to also ramp up its military presence and vigour along the Himalayan border. These endeavours form the foundation needed to irk China on the Tibet issue, all the while leaving the questions of autonomy and sovereignty aside. At the same time, they leave room for manoeuvre – down the line, if circumstances indeed dictate that India reverse its position and take a firmer stance on Tibetan autonomy, nothing also stops it from doing so.
Guarding the Great Wall: Military Academies make way for New Talent
By Anushka Saxena
With talent training and cultivation becoming serious themes in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s modernisation efforts, sometime in June 2023, the Ministry of Education, along with the Political Work and Training Management Departments of the Central Military Commission, released the ‘2024 Military Academy Admissions Plan’ to foster military education for new students and active soldiers.
Some of the listed provisions and requirements, as highlighted in the “authoritative” press responses of the head of the Military Education Bureau of the CMC’s Training Management Department (中华人民共和国中央军事委员会训练管理部), may be of interest to those following reforms in the PLA:
The military examination and admission process is to be conducted in five stages, starting with filling of application form for specific college admissions, moving onto release of exam guidelines and notifications by provincial officers, conduction of interview and exam, and broad “political assessment” of candidate, and finally ending with filing and admission based on cut-offs.
The political assessment primarily evaluates the political and ideological performance of the candidate, as well as the political background and any criminal activities of family members and non-cohabiting siblings.
To meet the new requirements (high quality, technologically-fronted footed) for talent cultivation for national defense and military construction, this year, military academies such as the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) will expand the “integrated recruitment and cultivation” of command and technical talents.
For command-technical integrated majors, recruitment does not differentiate between command and technical categories. After enrolment, a unified plan is implemented for the comprehensive cultivation of cadets’ overall qualities, with post-graduation assignments divided into command and technical categories.
For command and technical majors, differentiation in recruitment, cultivation, and assignment is maintained throughout the entire process.
27 military academies are participating in the recruitment, including 1 directly under the Central Military Commission, 10 under the Army, 5 under the Navy, 4 under the Air Force, 1 under the Rocket Force, 1 under the Strategic Support Force, 1 under the Cyber Force, and 4 under the Armed Police Force.
During the recruitment exam period, the recruitment business departments of the Central Military Commission will set up supervision and reporting hotlines for the entire military, and each military unit also establishes its own supervision and reporting hotlines to handle reports and feedback from candidates. As argued in the press conference, this is done “to implement transparent recruitment and protect the legitimate interests of candidates, [focus] on sensitive and key areas of the recruitment process, establishing systems for information disclosure, power restraint, and early warning throughout the recruitment process.”
More on the official Weibo channel of Chinese Military Media Network: https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309405046152293908879.
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