Ruminations & Ragers
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Worldview Weekly: Tales from Xiangshan
Anushka Saxena
The 12th Xiangshan Forum, which took place in Beijing between 17 and 19 September 2025, effectively marked the culmination of a trifecta of mega-events in China, following the SCO Summit in Tianjin and the September 3 military parade at Tiananmen Square. Even though multiple panels and interviews were conducted as part of the event, and both senior officials and young scholars were part of the proceedings, I hope to discuss a few ideas articulated by Chinese academicians and scholars below. These essentially present China’s view of the world today, using the themes mentioned at Xiangshan as only a hook to make their point.
First is a commentary by Cui Hongjian, a professor at the Institute for Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University. His piece sets the stage for lessons China draws from history amid sweeping global “epochal shifts.” He argues that humanity urgently needs clear answers to fundamental questions: how to draw the proper lessons from history, judge today’s rapidly changing situation, and chart the path ahead.
He starts by discussing the themes evident from the SCO Summit and the September 3 military parade. The two events witnessed extended debates on two themes: first, how to distill and apply historical experience not only as a guide for present problems but also as a means to forge consensus and illuminate the future; second, how to respond to current crises so that the global governance system can reform and improve while tackling real-world challenges.
He contended that history must guide both present and future, and a correct understanding of history is the foundation for a sound worldview. Many fear that failing to draw the “right” lessons risks repeating past errors and tragedies. The conflicts in Ukraine and between Israel and Palestine, among others, are deeply rooted in complex histories. Only by finding common ground – or even consensus – among competing historical narratives can the world build the conceptual and political basis for solving today’s problems.
Unsurprisingly, many of the values Cui expounds align with Xi Jinping’s latest Global Governance Initiative, advocating sovereign equality, rule of international law, multilateralism, “people-centered” development, and “practical results.” He argues that if countries combine such principles with “pragmatic action” suited to their own circumstances, the initiative can translate into concrete steps with real impact.
Cui also has a few suggestions about how the world can deal with the common security challenges it faces today. He largely argues:
Meeting today’s challenges requires both a commitment to the ideal of a shared human future and a clear-eyed view of today’s volatility. International security commands growing attention not only because crises are multiplying and interacting [he’s essentially describing complexity theory or a ‘polycrisis’], but also because humanity’s understanding of security keeps expanding and its standards rising.
Remedies that address both the root causes and immediate symptoms of traditional security threats and regional conflicts are needed. These must also confront new challenges arising from climate change, technological innovation, and intensified great-power competition over resources and energy.
Why the need for a Xiangshan Forum?
This is perhaps one of the more critical sections of Cui’s commentary, as he gives his perspective here on why China conducts a Xiangshan forum despite the existence of a Munich Security Conference or a Shangri-La Dialogue. He argues the following:
Founded nearly two decades ago as an open and equal multilateral forum, the Xiangshan Forum mirrors China’s steadily increasing voice, influence, and initiative in global governance. The forum’s “openness and inclusiveness” reflects China’s “fair and balanced” stance on reforming the global governance system.
Even where direct bilateral dialogue has broken down, as in many current regional conflicts, officials and scholars can still find channels for communication at the Xiangshan Forum. During this year’s sessions, representatives from the US, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine spoke from their own perspectives on the Ukraine crisis; Middle Eastern delegates and Israeli participants also exchanged views, sometimes sharply [The heated Yan Xuetong-Elad Shoshan exchange, for example, has gone viral].
At a time when divergent ideas and clashing interests fracture the world, China offers an irreplaceable example of pluralism, openness, and balance. It “patiently works” to bridge divides, reduce mistrust, and contribute uniquely to building a community with a shared future for humankind.
Next year marks the forum’s 20th anniversary. There is every reason to believe that China and other progressive forces in the international community will play decisive roles in confronting risks, advancing global governance reform, and helping to realise a “shared future for humanity.”
Next, in an interview with N Video, National Defense University Professor Zhang Chi shared his views on China’s military development, emphasising the importance of “accurately understanding” World War II history. This, again, was on theme with the discussions surrounding the Anti-Japanese War.
Zhang emphasised that assessing a country’s military development cannot be limited to its armed strength or weaponry; its defence policy is even more important. China’s development of weapons and military capabilities, he noted, serves two core purposes: defending national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and safeguarding world and regional peace and stability. He stressed that China has always followed a “defensive national policy.” The strength of China’s armed forces, he added, is aimed at protecting the nation and “supporting global peace and development.”
His main argument was that China’s war of resistance was the “main battlefield of the global war against fascism in the East” and played a decisive role in the overall victory over fascism. He called for upholding a correct understanding of World War II history and firmly safeguarding international fairness and justice to build a better future together. It almost seems as if he is building the rhetorical base to argue that China’s wars and conflicts in the future will all be about ending “fascism” against some contemporary actors, and Beijing’s regional role will be supreme.
Then, Professor Wang Yingjin, Director of the Cross-Strait Relations Research Center at Renmin University of China and a fellow at its National Academy of Development and Strategy, responded to a China Review News question about the recent remarks by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) asserting that “Taiwan’s status is undetermined.” Wang described the AIT’s claim as a malicious fabrication that is both extremely harmful and highly dangerous, saying China must treat it seriously and respond proactively.
Wang explained that although the AIT is technically a private, non-profit organisation, it was established under US law by the State Department specifically to handle Taiwan-related affairs and to carry out “any plans, activities, or other relations that the US President or government agencies wish to conduct with Taiwan.” In practice, Wang explains, it is widely regarded as the “US government’s de facto agency for Taiwan matters.” Therefore, when the AIT on September 12 “distorted” World War II–era international legal documents and referred to Taiwan’s status as “undetermined” narrative, this was “far from a private organisation’s casual opinion;” it was “especially egregious.”
What made it worse, Wang continued, is that the US State Department subsequently endorsed the AIT’s remarks. This means the statement was not merely the AIT’s own policy view but also effectively the policy stance of the State Department and of the US government as a whole, leaving no room to claim that “it does not represent Washington’s position” under a separation-of-powers pretext. He said that such a “statement-plus-endorsement” approach could well be a coordinated performance planned jointly by the AIT and the State Department, making the issue more complex and malignant.
Looking back over past decades, Wang noted that although the US has at times left some ambiguity in its “one-China” policy, both countries have long maintained a “practical consensus” on upholding the one-China principle and the three Joint Communiqués; otherwise, bilateral relations would not have progressed as smoothly as they did. But in recent years, as Washington has tried to “play the “Taiwan card” to contain China’s development,” it has backtracked on the one-China principle and hollowed it out to create a supposed “legal” basis for interfering in Taiwan and obstructing China’s reunification.
From a broader perspective, Wang reiterated international “obligations” China believes support its claims over Taiwan. He stated, the AIT’s move is consistent with earlier US efforts to hollow out the one-China policy and distort UN Resolution 2758. While US references to “undetermined status” were previously “sporadic and veiled,” this latest instance, with the AIT and the State Department jointly and openly dismissing the Taiwan-related provisions of the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, represents a “bold, blatant escalation” and a “great leap forward in Washington’s campaign to undermine the one-China policy.”
Finally, an intern with Science & Technology Daily interviewed scholars who made presentations during the Xiangshan Forum’s ‘Dialogue of Chinese and Foreign Experts’. First was Song Haitao, director of the Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, who opened his presentation by asking: “If a machine can think, it might think more intelligently than we do – so where does that leave us?”
Song also argued that Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a key driver of productivity. Keeping pace with the times, this year’s Xiangshan Forum has not only advanced China’s Global Security and Global Governance Initiatives but also spotlighted the worldwide focal issue of AI technology development and security governance. One can also note that in the few weeks preceding the Forum, in late August, China also launched the ‘AI+ Initiative’, laying the groundwork for the integration of AI in industry and academia, with the goal of making a contribution to ‘AI global governance’ and enhancing total factor productivity domestically.
Chen Zhimin, Vice President of Fudan University and Executive Director of the Global AI Innovation and Governance Center, was also interviewed. He warned of both inherent flaws and derivative risks in AI use, and his overall tone was pessimistic. Inherent risks, he said, stem from problems within AI models themselves – design defects, lack of interpretability due to “black box” issues, and data biases. Derivative risks include malicious uses, such as crimes enabled by deepfake technology.
Chen highlighted the widening “technological imbalance” deepening the global development gap. Core AI technologies, he said, are monopolised mainly by a few developed countries and leading corporations, limiting opportunities for developing nations. Meanwhile, many developing countries lack essential infrastructure and are overly dependent on foreign technologies, making it hard to escape structural disadvantages.
Another primary concern, he said, is the fragmentation of global AI governance. Although many international organisations and multilateral platforms have begun crafting AI governance frameworks, Chen noted that their implementation paths and priority issues remain scattered and lack coordination.
Because AI governance concerns the “shared future of humanity,” Chen said, China has actively taken a “leading role” in promoting inclusive AI development. At the High-Level Meeting on International Cooperation in AI Capacity-Building in September 2024, China proposed the AI Capacity-Building Inclusive Plan, built on five principles: sovereign equality, development orientation, people-centeredness, inclusiveness, and collaborative cooperation.
The story’s author subsequently discussed some of China’s most important internal plans to fix the fragmentation in AI governance. He discussed the launch of China’s ‘International AI Open-Source Cooperation Initiative’, which is about collaborating with other countries to create an open-source ecosystem. Projects such as DeepSeek-R1 and other low-cost, high-efficiency models aim to lower barriers to AI adoption and narrow the intelligence gap between the Global North and South.
Song Haitao added that advancing global governance of military AI should be a fundamental consensus for safeguarding international order and managing security risks. “In the military field,” he said, “we must emphasise global cooperation and joint governance. AI’s ability to achieve precise, all-domain situational awareness offers powerful technological support.”
Guarding the Great Wall: Carrier Carries the Swarm
Anushka Saxena
A recent report in the PLA Daily speak about an interesting demonstration with the navy’s “carrier swords” – the J-15T, J-35, and KJ-600 aircraft – completing their first catapult launches and arrested landings on China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian.
The KJ-600 is now being increasingly seen in demonstrations. It’s China’s first domestically developed fixed-wing carrier-borne early-warning aircraft, and even during the September 3 military parade, the KJ was shown as escorted by four J-15T carrier fighters adapted for electromagnetic catapults.
Reporters speaking of the demonstration with the carrier and jets set the scene a little something like this:
From the island superstructure, the electromagnetic catapult track gleamed with a steely sheen in the sunlight. At the launch signal, each carrier aircraft shot skyward like an arrow from the string. Turning to the arresting-wire area, aircraft streaked in like lightning, dragging the arresting cables into “V” shapes as they came to a halt on deck.
Firstly, this marks the Fujian demonstrating full electromagnetic catapult and recovery capability. The Chinese hailed it as a “breakthrough” in aircraft carrier development and “naval transformation.” Secondly, in this single demonstration, there were multiple test and training missions conducted, wherein navy pilots flew these three aircraft types, taking off and landing on Fujian and “proving” that China’s fully self-developed electromagnetic catapult and arresting systems are well matched to multiple carrier aircraft. This also means that the Fujian has achieved initial full-deck operational capacity. As the Chinese believe, this “lays a solid foundation” for integrating all types of carrier aircraft into the carrier strike group.
It also seems that the transition from single sorties to continual launch cycles is achieved with Fujian. Further, since its first sea trials in May 2024, the Fujian has steadily carried out planned maritime tests, advancing equipment calibration and overall operational stability evaluations.
In the past, the Liaoning set numerous “first-battle, first-victory” records in China’s carrier history, breaking some single-day and single-wave sortie records. This is even though its ski-jump take-off is very basic, and it was the first time a decade ago that a the “Flying Shark” J-15 aircraft first took off there. The Shandong shortened the time to full combat capability of any of China’s CSGs. It overcame tech hurdles which restricted it to shore-based operations and catapult launchers. Now, the Fujian seems to have refined both launch and ship-based capabilities.
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
