'Self-Revolution' in Theory and Practice
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, and India.
Guarding the Great Wall #1: Achieving ‘Self-Revolution’ amidst China’s War against Military Corruption
By Anushka Saxena
Purges in the People’s Liberation Army have exacerbated as part of a massive internal campaign to crackdown on corruption in the Chinese military apparatus, particularly the equipment development and acquisition system. In this context, the recently concluded third plenary of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) witnessed the codification of a new strand of Xi Jinping Thought, entitled “important thought of the Party’s self-revolution,” to encourage cadres to undertake ‘self-revolution’ to sweep out their desire to be corrupt. And even though the ‘Thought’ has been just introduced at the Plenary for the Party as a whole to grasp and follow, I argue that its implementation is already underway, and has significantly impacted the PLA, especially in the past few months.
Although this is the first time the ‘Thought’ has been articulated, the concept of self-revolution is not new. Xi introduced the idea of self-revolution at the 12th meeting of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in May 2015, emphasising the “courage to revolutionise oneself and the courage to face problems” in an era of reform. Subsequently, in December 2015, Xi announced sweeping reforms in the PLA. Specifically, reforms pertaining to the dissolution of the four General Departments of the Central Military Commission and their breakdown into six departments, three commissions and five offices, aimed to root out corruption among top PLA officials that ran rampant under predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Now, the re-emphasising of self-revolution serves as a reminder to military cadres that their inability to “resolve their own prominent problems” will have inevitable punitive consequences and corrective measures. The ‘Thought’ defines these “prominent problems” as the “four major dangers” (四大危险) – ideological laxity, inadequate capabilities and incompetence, detachment from the masses, and passive corruption.
An understanding of these four dangers is complemented by various rhetorical and legislative endeavours the Party has undertaken since the current set of reforms in the PLA have been underway. For example, in his speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi described ideals and beliefs as the “calcium” of the Party, and ideological laxity is comparable to “calcium deficiency” and contracting rickets. Similarly, as per a circular released by the CCDI in 2018 on intensifying crackdown on cadres’ detachment from the masses, such detachment has been described as manifesting in four forms of corrupt activities – formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagance. In the quest for self-revolution, ridding cadres of these “ailments” is key to achieve the major goals of reform and progress in the PLA.
In this backdrop, in addition to the purges themselves, the past few months have seen multiple ideological and legislative developments to actualise self-revolution in the PLA.
These are largely focused on three aspects – promoting self-improvement and self-purification, rule of law in training, and building accountability in the eyes of the people.
To begin with, there is a renewed insistence on the concept of ‘purification of circles’. Termed by Chinese state theorists as Xi’s ‘Circle Theory’, the concept has now become a significant part of China’s anti-corruption corpus. The idea behind it is that all cadres, especially military cadres, live in an environment where interpersonal interactions are unavoidable. But they must keep their social and familial circles clean and tidy. This pertains directly to graft investigations that have surfaced in the past few months, wherein cadres have colluded with friends in the military-industrial complex to rig the official bidding system of the CMC Equipment Development Department. With the release of the Code of Conduct for Social Interactions of Military Leading Cadres by the CMC in June 2023, the force of the law is also behind implementation of the ‘Circle Theory’.
Second is the focus on “combining self-supervision and people’s supervision as a powerful driving force,” which Xi also discussed in his speech at the third CCDI plenary. As highlighted above, detachment from the masses is considered a challenge to the ability to revolutionise the self, and therefore, staying true to the people is a mandatory requirement for the PLA. Hence, in the past few months, there has been an effort to strengthen the foundations of “double support work,” which stands for mutual support between the military, the government and the people, and creates a military-to-people accountability mechanism for the PLA to follow.
The focus of double support work is also to enhance the armed forces’ crisis preparedness, but through soft measures such as military-civilian information sharing and convening of political forums, aggregation of social resources to enhance the military’s technological, cultural and legal knowledge, and to support local troops stationed at the grassroots in their duties during disaster management and relief events. Most recently, this has been advocated in the December 2023 ‘Notice on Doing Well in the Work of Supporting the Army and Caring for the Military and Civilian Personnel During the New Year Spring Festival,” issued jointly by various authorities such as the CMC Political Work Department and the Veteran Affairs Ministry.
‘Double support work’ has also manifested itself in an enhanced national defence mobilisation campaign that features joint study of the history of revolution in the party and the PLA. Gansu province officials have been leading the campaign. For example, between January 8 and 17 this year, the Gansu military region has organised exhibitions at local military history galleries and “honour rooms,” as well as tours at the Lanzhou Battle Memorial Hall and the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army Western Route Memorial Hall. Each of these educational tours focused on the Red Army’s revolutionary victories during the August 1949 Lanzhou Battles between the CPC and the nationalist Kuomintang Party. In January itself, similar campaigns have been underway in Shaanxi, Jiangsu, Shandong and Beijing, and their goals are two-pronged – to augur expectations of the people, and to set examples for the PLA.
Thirdly, in the usual combat preparedness work of the PLA, an element of “training by rule of law” (依法治训) has been introduced to ensure commanders follow relevant legal principles in cultivating a strict governance atmosphere for their juniors. On January 23, for example, a commentary appearing in the PLA Daily, authored by an officer from Unit 31697 of the PLA under the 79th Group Army of the Northern Theater Command, argued that training supervision in the military is incomplete without practical actions that display a “conscious commitment to the rule of law.” The aim is to avoid determining training content arbitrarily and without due consideration of “rule of law,” which ultimately encourages personnel to accommodate mediocrity.
For those interested, please refer to this excellent article by China Media Project on what ‘Rule of Law’ or fazhi (法治) means in the Chinese conception, and how it is key to revolution in general.
Even though the basis of the practice of “training by rule of law” precedes the formulation of the ‘Thought on Self-Revolution’, going back to the issuance of a new military training outline in October 2022, its implementation has amplified in the last year, with the Northern Theater Command taking the lead. The Communiqué of the CCDI plenary, too, has highlighted that the ‘practice of law” is fundamental to the strict governance of the military and its goal of achieving self-revolution. Going further, legal work will become a cornerstone in the drafting of standardised PLA training manuals across Theaters, and non-adherence to rule of law may come to be punished as a sabotage of the ideals of self-revolution.
Amidst the recent purges, the PLA is at a key moment in history, when there is both a pressure to achieve excellence amidst a hostile geopolitical environment, and a test of the core beliefs foundational to the political command of the forces is underway. In this light, it is not unusual that there is a multi-pronged effort to articulate ideas of self-revolution, self-purification, self-improvement, and accountability. The canonisation of the Thought on Self-Revolution has already seen endeavours in example-setting through both hard and soft measures, and these are likely to continue, with both the top brass and the grassroots personnel in the spotlight.
Guarding the Great Wall #2: Breakdown of ‘China's Anti-Terrorism Legal System and Practice White Paper’
By Anushka Saxena
Amidst a lot of talk on self-revolution, yesterday, the State Council Information Office released a White Paper on “China's Anti-Terrorism Legal System and Practice” (中国的反恐怖主义法律制度体系与实践). This is an elaborate White Paper which, in 5 sections, lays down the need for a clear and practical system of responsibility and accountability for authorities within the Chinese security and legal apparatus. Its focus is not to define terrorism or elucidate the types of crimes and their punishments, but to standardises procedures for prosecuting minor offenses and crimes under the ambit of terrorism that have already been specified and defined in various domestic laws on counter-terrorism work in China, as well as in local laws and departmental or procuratorial guidelines.
The Interesting Bit – A Reminder of Legal Remedies Available
From a preliminary reading, it seems that even as the White Paper highlights the seriousness of the crimes of terrorism, it goes softer on the perpetrators than the procuratorates and the courts, in that it thoroughly cautions relevant authorities (which hereon would mean public security organs, procuratorates and the courts, unless specified otherwise) to take such crimes’ investigation, prosecution and sentencing very seriously, and follow a thorough process of evidence, human rights, and appropriate self-defence. It also prohibits capital punishment as a punitive measure (especially for “minor offenses” of terrorism), unless otherwise specified in a different pre-existing legislation or set of guidelines. The purpose of this stance is to enhance the transparency of law enforcement and justice, and prevent the abuse of law enforcement and judicial powers.
Sections II, III and IV of the White Paper offer a set of principles on legal remedies to keep in mind for those being investigated or convicted, in this regard. For example, section II, entitled Clear Identification and Standardized Punishment of Terrorist Activities (恐怖活动认定清晰、处罚规范), urges relevant authorities to make a clear distinction between “illegal/ unlawful actions” (违法行为) and “criminal acts/ behaviour” (犯罪行为) under the ambit of terrorism. As per the White Paper, it is important for this distinction to reflect in legal doctrine and practice because illegal/ unlawful actions are considered [relatively, and ironically] a minor set of offenses (including promoting terrorism, extremism, or inciting the implementation of terrorist or extremist activities), and therefore warrant only administrative penalties imposed by public security organs. But the latter constitutes more serious offenses that are manifested kinetically.
As per various Chinese laws, whether the crimes are ‘minor’ is determined by law enforcement and judicial agencies based on factors such as whether the terrorist activities meet the elements of a ‘crime’ (which, in my understanding, constitutes not just the mens rea or the ‘will’ to commit a crime, but also an actus reus or ‘behaviour’ committing said crime), the subjective malice of the perpetrator, the role played, and the social harm caused (which, as per the Paper, can range from deaths and violence to economic displacement of a section of the population).
Further, this Section specifies that the specific distinctions made in the Criminal Law of the PRC between crimes and non-crimes, different crimes, and multiple crimes should be followed through in legal practice on counterterrorism, because such a distinction then determines the punishment to be allocated. For example, the Paper argues that once it has been determined that the criteria for ‘multiple crimes’ has been met in a case, the penalty applicable will be the highest fine/sentence of all the penalties across the multiple crimes, and not any other arbitrarily decided penalty or a cumulative of two or more penalties. Similar guidelines have previously also been laid down in the ‘Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in Handling Cases of Terrorism and Extremism Crimes’, jointly issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and others in 2018.
Section III, entitled Standardizing the Operation of Power in Counter-Terrorism Work (在反恐怖主义工作中规范权力运行), makes clear the power relevant authorities can exercise in counterterrorism enforcement and adjudication. The key takeaways from this section are as follows:
Broadly, it is argued that law enforcement and judicial authorities, in handling cases involving terrorist activities, must strictly adhere to the legal authorization, exercise powers according to the law, and ensure accurate and effective law enforcement.
Next, there is a significant cost attached to impropriety vis-a-vis case filing or evidence collection. For example, the Paper stipulates that when public security organs are filing cases, any improper work in filing documentation would mean that public security organs would have to withdraw the case, and people’s procuratorates would ensure such a withdrawal goes through.
Similarly, in the collection and retrieval of evidence, public security organs are required to collect evidence both favourable and unfavourable to the suspect, and there is no scope for the use of illegal methods such as torture to obtain evidence (at least as implored in the Paper).
After all this, if the case does indeed go to trial, it is argued that people’s courts must render acquittals for cases with insufficient evidence or those that do not constitute crimes. It seems that the hope with this one is to make the evidence collection and presentation process solid, lest public security organs or people’s procuratorates fail to secure a conviction.
A lot of the onus for these requirements is on the people’s procuratorates, which will have to supervise and fine-tune both the case filing and the evidence collecting procedures. Even in approving arrests and examining prosecutions, people’s procuratorates are required to not approve arrests or prosecutions that do not meet standards.
The hierarchy of supervision and “strict and comprehensive governance” (全面从严治党, another key aspect of ‘Self-Revolution’, by the way) is further clarified, as the Paper stipulates that “in addition to the constraints imposed by legal and internal supervision mechanisms, the powers of Chinese law enforcement and judicial authorities are subject to external supervision from the National People's Congress (NPC), democratic supervision, and social supervision,” and “the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference conducts democratic supervision over law enforcement and judicial authorities.”
Section IV of the Paper, entitled Legally Safeguarding Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Work (在反恐怖主义工作中依法保障人权), details human rights considerations for both victims and perpetrators of terrorism.
It is interesting that on the rights of the suspects/ convicts/ perpetrators, the Paper has laid down strict requirements vis-a-vis non-discrimination on the basis of religion, defence of their case and filing of their documents in native/ local languages, if any, and insurance of safety and hygiene in custody. Illegal methods to collect evidence, including torture, threats, inducement, deception, and other unlawful means, are again reiterated as being prohibited. Why this is interesting is because these are the exact things the Chinese state has been accused of perpetrating in Xinjiang under the veil of eliminating extremism and terrorism. And it’s not like the timing of this Paper is highly convenient, but it does seem as an effort on one of the many fronts China’s name has been smeared in, internationally.
There are some recommendations in the Paper, under Section V (Effectively Safeguarding People's Safety and National Security; 有力维护人民安全和国家安全), on moving forward in conducting counter-terrorism work in accordance with the law. This, the Paper stipulates, is a four-step process:
Continuously enhancing counter-terrorism and prevention capabilities;
Better coordinating security and stability with social development;
Eliminating the ideological foundations of terrorism; and
Actively contributing to global and regional security stability.
Xinjiang, the testing ground of China’s counterterrorism work, finds a special mention under the second step of coordinating security with social development, in that the lifting of 3.06 million rural residents out of poverty in the province and the growth of their per capita income by a rate of 1.4 per cent, are depicted as examples of how investment in social development can lead to thwarting of terrorism links and safeguarding of national security.
The Paper concludes by arguing that China firmly oppose “double standards” in counter-terrorism, and this is a stab China has taken at India just last month, when FM Spokesperson Mao Ning accused India of double standards in terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, while apparently being involved in Baloch terror.
Overall, the Paper articulates China’s emphasis on rule of law in the specific field of counterterrorism, while setting out its domestic and global priorities in the field. At the same time, its intensive and principled requirements for relevant authorities and organs are bound to present difficult and ironic dilemmas for both implementors and observers moving forward. For a full (untranslated) copy of the Paper, please refer to 81.cn.
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