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Guarding the Great Wall: A New Articulation on Joint and Unified Training in the PLA
Anushka Saxena
An interesting report appearing in the ‘News’ Section of the PLA Daily newspaper’s 21 July 2025 edition, proposes that the armed forces are experimenting with a new approach to joint and unified training in the PLA. The editor of the report argues that this novel training model is a result of Xi Jinping’s continued emphasis on the need to “strengthen training support, optimise layouts, improve elements, and innovate methods, in order to construct realistic training environments and accelerate the building of a high-level training support system.”
The basis for this derivation is actually not a recent speech by Xi or some thought article appearing in Qiushi, but rather a 2020-2021 campaign on enhancing the military’s training tactics and modelling to make the PLA better prepared to fight and win wars. First, in November 2020, the Central Military Commission conducted a ‘Military Training Conference’. There, Xi articulated that the “new era” of military training guidelines revolves around preparing for war, and insisting on actual combat training, joint combat training, science and technology training, and training in accordance with the law.
Subsequently, his instructions were encoded in a February 2021 document, ‘Decision on Building a New Military Training System (关于构建新型军事训练体系的决定)’, issued by the CMC, mainly to further doctrine on innovation and optimisation in training techniques and tactics. In January 2022, Xi signed this document into guidelines through ‘CMC Order No. 1’ for that year. With a focus on integrating combat with training, the Order highlighted five pillars:
Increased intensity and difficulty of basic training: Adhering to the principle that troops train as they would fight, units have been deployed to distant seas, remote border areas, high plateaus, frigid regions, deserts, and jungles for realistic combat training.
Solid and in-depth emergency and combat-readiness training: Meeting the requirements of being combat-ready at all times and capable of engaging at any moment; deepening research on war and operational issues, vigorously advancing “front-line training” for military struggles, and further enhancing capabilities to respond to “real-world” security threats across various directions and domains.
Continued deepening of combat-oriented exercises and training activities: Giving full play to the leading role of joint training, efforts have been concentrated on tackling major issues through combined research and practice, conducting scenario-based and realistic drills, promoting cross-service and inter-branch coordinated training, and engaging in joint exercises, training, and competitions with foreign militaries.
Normalisation of technology-driven training practices: Keeping a close eye on strong adversaries, innovative training methods and tools such as ‘technology+’ and ‘network+’ have to be developed.
Steady advancement of military training infrastructure and development: Implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan has been promoted, with enhanced construction of large-scale training bases and simulated adversary (“Blue Force”) units. In this regard, Tan Kefei, then-defence ministry spokesperson, argued that military training regulations and teaching materials have been updated and improved, supporting the transformation and upgrading of military training.
Why is this exclusive emphasis on training important?
As you would intuitively understand, in the past decade, as the international environment has become much more hostile from Beijing’s perspective, and its territorial ambitions have expanded. The PLA’s theaters have attempted to inculcate principles and practices of real-time training in conflict situations. They simulate everything – from being ambushed by enemy fire from behind mountain lines, to operating aircraft in a “complex electromagnetic environment.” The goal is to prepare to win when any of the simulated situations actually show up in a potential future battlefield. Hence, the armed forces have developed intensive training and competitive regimen over the past decade, an assessment of which provides critical insights into the status of preparedness in the PLA.
Further, even though the PLA has been in and out of localised conflicts for a long time now, the last time it engaged in intensive battle was in 1979, when only its ground forces invaded Vietnam to retaliate against the latter’s alliance with the Soviet Union. China’s support for Hanoi’s primary regional nemesis, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, was an added factor for furthering conflict. Eventually, the PLA learned lessons from the losses inflicted on its tanks and personnel by the Vietnamese, and evolved in terms of both doctrine and operational tactics. In fact, the PLA’s unsuccessful campaign in Vietnam enabled Deng Xiaoping to establish the fundamentals of military modernisation in China. He did so when he assumed the post of chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September 1982, where he called on delegates to enable rapid transformation of the PLA in terms of both quality and quantity.
This has been a point of continued deliberation worldwide – that the Chinese forces are not ‘battle-hardened’. So this deficit that the PLA and CMC themselves are well aware of – how to address it? Training is the answer.
Now, let’s get back to the PLA Daily article. In it, the reporters argue that they observed a series of changes taking place in the military’s training support model upon visiting various training sites. Note that since the guidelines were laid down in 2021, the transformation is evident now, in 2025. So, implementation from the top to the grassroots takes time.
What is the transformation? One example the reporters present is that at a “certain army combined training base,” support is provided through a shared “public warehouse” system that allows for one-time procurement and repeated usage, where items purchased by one unit can be shared by many. Then, at a “certain air force training center,” coordination is achieved across more than 10 locations in seven provinces and cities, using various data models and algorithms to enable joint combat forces to engage in multi-dimensional adversarial training.
Speculation: If the language is taken at face value, ‘7 provinces and cities’ could mean the Western Theater Command (excluding autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet), especially also considering that a key PLA training facility, the Xi’an Flying Academy, is based in the theater.
Anyway, further, soldiers told reporters that these new training support models are being rapidly implemented across units, and the concept of “single-point activation, system-wide movement, full-domain support” (一点用, 体系动, 全域保) is taking root, significantly enhancing training support efficiency. In my understanding, this is the first time this concept has been introduced in the public domain on the subject of Training ‘Support’, and it is crucial because, if brought into full force, logistical nightmares vis-à-vis non-availability of resources across a vast theater, and interchange of and training with service- or support arm-specific systems, can be mitigated to quite an extent.
As the reporters themselves argue:
The focus is on resolving key problems such as uneven distribution of resources, unrealistic training environments, and suboptimal comprehensive effectiveness. The transformation of support models is being used to power the force’s training and combat preparedness, driving a transformation in military training overall.
According to information from the CMC Training Management Department, in order to build a new training support pattern that aligns with the “basic–combined/synthetic–joint” (基础—合成—联合) structure of military training organisation, they have used the training base construction of capital-region units (I assume it means PLA troops stationed at training bases in Beijing; 驻京部队), as a demonstration model. This involves integrating foundational, service-specific, tactical action, and live-fire training grounds, while exploring a path of “systematic construction, shared use, and refined management” to create a new training site system. This is supposed to create an idea of “whole army as one chessboard,” and has a more refined, three-tier model:
Basic training is supported locally according to standards, focusing on “intensive specialization.” Training conditions for brigade-level and below units are standardised, and “support zones” (one-click activation points) are designated based on the geographic distribution and density of camps and training areas across the entire PLA. Nearby resources are integrated to ensure that basic training can be completed within or near the garrison.
Combined training is supported through inter-service regional joint construction and shared usage, focusing on “grouped confrontation.” Responsibilities and procedures for demand-supply coordination within and across services are clarified, with higher-level units designated to lead and establish inter-service collaboration zones along specific directions. This enables essential resources to be shared across domains, scattered resources to be shared regionally, and scarce resources to be shared between the military and civilian sectors – achieving rational allocation and efficient utilisation of training resources.
Joint training is supported with a mix of virtual and real elements, system-wide and full-domain, focusing on “systemic optimisation.” Here, building a unified and networked training architecture promotes the integration and interoperability of training grounds. In this regard, a “multi-level, real-time, heterogeneous, and hybrid virtual-real unified training space” is to be constructed.
The reporters supplement their analyses with an example of a recent all-military event showcasing training site construction and exchanges. There, various units presented representative cases from over 10 training grounds in the capital region, demonstrating exemplary environments, conditions for adversarial training, and assessment methods used in military training. Soldiers attending the event generally reflected that they saw model examples and learned practical know-how.
I believe this event reference is that of the ‘PLA-wide Training Site Construction Exchange and Observation Event’ (全军训练场地建设观摩交流活动), conducted under the supervision of CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Youxia on May 27 and 28, 2025. Even at the event, Zhang’s speech pertained to strengthening training support and innovating therein.
Finally, reporters of the PLA Daily report quote an official of the Training Bureau of the CMC Training Management Department on the subject, who says:
“Through years of construction and development, the PLA’s training conditions have undergone fundamental changes. Training methods enhanced by ‘technology+’ and ‘network+’ are increasingly abundant.”
The official also noted that a corresponding legal and regulatory framework has largely been established to support the new training support operational model, and the next step is to promote and scale successful pilot outcomes across the entire force.
One thing is interesting to note vis-à-vis the CMC Training Management Department’s role in training support modelling. On 18 June this year, the Department published its recruitment guidelines for military training enrollment for active service officers as well as new candidates appearing for relevant exams. Even in the process of training before training, new guidelines have been introduced. Compared with the June 2024 training guidelines, there are key changes introduced to the induction model this time:
The number of enrollment schools has been reduced from 27 to 22.
The Army Arms University, Information Support Force Engineering University, and Joint Logistics Support Force Engineering University are newly adjusted and established academies, formed from existing institutions.
For example, the Information Support Force Engineering University is based on the Information and Communication College of the National University of Defense Technology and the Communication NCO School of the Army Engineering University, and the Joint Logistics Support Force Engineering University is based on the Army Service College, the Army Military Transportation College Headquarters and its affiliated Automobile NCO School.
Even for training of NCOs (police seargants), the number of military academies has slightly gone down from 32 in 2024 to 30 in 2025, though the intended number of selections has remained stagnant at 14,000.
Four specific schools – the Army Special Operations College, the Army Border and Coastal Defense College, the Armed Police Special Police College, and the Armed Police Coast Guard College – will no longer directly enroll students. Instead, their junior officers will be enrolled in other designated universities. For instance:
Army Special Operations and Reconnaissance Units Junior Officers are now enrolled in the Army Engineering University, the Army Arms University, and the Army Infantry College.
Border Defense Units Junior Officers are enrolled in the Army Infantry College. Armed Police Special Operations and Reconnaissance Units Junior Police Officers are enrolled in the Armed Police Police Officer College.
Coast Guard Ship Command, Rights Protection and Law Enforcement Junior Police Officers are enrolled by the Navy Dalian Naval Academy and the Armed Police Engineering University.
Hence, there will be additional specialisation-related training requirements and new safeguards before proceeding.
The 2025 plan no longer distinguishes between “command” and “non-command” categories, and recruitment directions pertaining to thathave been cancelled. This could be to standardise training in tech talent from the get-go for all majors.
This contrasts with previous practices, where “command and technology integration majors” had no distinction during enrollment but were assigned positions by category at graduation, while “command and technology majors” were recruited, trained, and assigned by category throughout the entire process.
Requirements surrounding physical capabilities and age, political assessment, application submission process, etc. have remained static.
Clearly, the 2015-16 reforms pertaining to specialised track vocational education and training in the PLA and the PAP are now applying to all military-grade enrollment process. As we go into the second half of 2025 and “comprehensive real combat capabilities” become the norm, more coverage on training support reforms is likely to be evident.
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These are standing training measures adopted by military’s to suit there environment. What would be of interest is on the focus of training and how integration at various levels is being achieved. Is there any theatre specific training, what are operational and NOT tactical aims. Thank you for highlighting CMC perspectives on training