The 'Kinmen Incident' + ETW 06: Local Crusade in National Climate Action
Covering Chinese chatters (discourses, narratives, policies and rhetoric) on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Hello to our readers! This week, the curators of ‘Eye on China’ were at the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, and so it has been a bit hectic. Hence, this one is a joint edition, combining a section on the Chinese military and security, and another on the Chinese technology ecosystem. We’ll be resuming our bi-weekly editions from next week. Till then, happy reading!
Guarding the Great Wall: A Deadly Incident near Kinmen
By Anushka Saxena
In 2024, any Valentine’s day plans China and Taiwan had were railroaded, among other things, by an unfortunate incident that resulted in the deaths of two Chinese fishermen close to the coast of Kinmen islands. The incident is testimony to the need for open lines of communication and respect for an established de-facto legal order for operating around the islands of Matsu (马祖列岛), Penghu (澎湖縣) and Kinmen (金門縣) by China.
The story so far
On February 14, the Coast Guard Affairs (CGA) Office of the Taiwanese Government’s Ocean Affairs Office announced that in the afternoon hours (1:45 PM Taipei time), Taiwanese Coast Guard Patrol Vessel CP-1051 undertook an operation near Beiding Island in Kinmen County against a fishermen vessel with no ship name, but registered with mainland China, to prevent any smuggling during Lunar New Year holidays. The vessel that this “operation” (basically, the chasing away) was taken against capsized, killing two of the four fishermen aboard, while the other two were brought back by the Kinmen Coast Guard for further investigation by the Kinmen District Prosecutor’s Office.
The Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) further added to this on February 18 that the mainland Chinese vessel resisted inspection and capsized during its attempt to flee, and a preliminary investigation of the case indicated that the officers of the Kinmen-Matsu-Penghu Branch of the Coast Guard Administration performed their duties in accordance with the law “without any misconduct during the process.”
Kuomintang lawmaker Jessica Chen (陳玉珍), who represents Kinmen, has further argued in favour of engaging Kinmen and Matsu in direct negotiations with China on matters such as fishing rights. This is something the central government in Taiwan has not yet authorised local governments on the off-shore islands to do.
Why did it come to this?
It is no news that China, which considers Taiwan and its off-shore islands to be part of its own territory (while acting as Special Administrative Regions with governments, territories and permanent populations of their own), naturally also considers the waters around these regions open for business for its fishermen.
In 1992, the ROC government passed the ‘Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’ (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), also known as the “Cross-Straits Act.” The Executive Yuan of ROC has since upheld this act as the standard-setting document governing activities of stakeholders between the two sides, and in particular, of Chinese vessels around waters of Taiwan-governed territories.
As per article 29 of this Act:
Mainland ships, civil aircraft, and other transportation vehicles are not allowed to enter restricted or prohibited waters in the Taiwan area or the restricted area of the Taipei Flight Information Region without permission from the competent authority. The restrictions or prohibited waters and restricted areas shall be announced by the Ministry of National Defense. The permit regulations of the first paragraph shall be formulated by the Ministry of Transportation, in conjunction with relevant authorities, and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval.
大陸船舶、民用航空器及其他運輸工具,非經主管機關許可,不得進入臺灣地區限制或禁止水域、臺北飛航情報區限制區域。前項限制或禁止水域及限制區域,由國防部公告之。第一項許可辦法,由交通部會同有關機關擬訂,報請行政院核定之。
Subsequently, “prohibited” waters have been defined in a similar fashion as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defines “territorial seas,” which is the area within 12 nautical miles of Taiwan proper (and varying but close degrees around the three off-shore islands), while “restricted” waters are similar to the UNCLOS’s definition of “contiguous zone,” which is the area within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan proper (and again, varying but close degrees around the three off-shore islands).
Further, Article 32 of the ‘Cross-Straits Act’ states:
Mainland vessels entering restricted or prohibited waters in the Taiwan area without permission may be directly expelled or detained, along with their vessels and items. The personnel may be detained or subject to necessary defense measures.
大陸船舶未經許可進入臺灣地區限制或禁止水域,主管機關得逕行驅離或扣留其船舶、物品,留置其人員或為必要之防衛處置。
As explained by the MAC and the CGA (cited above), the Chinese fishing vessel entered “prohibited waters” around Kinmen (something China refuses to acknowledge), and any action hence taken by the CGA is justified in accordance with the Cross-Straits Act. Upholding these guidelines then becomes essential to avoid unbecoming incidents from occurring in these areas, especially given the highly contested nature of Taiwan’s status in international law and the tense relationship between China and Taiwan.
Further, law enforcement at the CGA’s end is also necessitated by the illicit nature of Chinese vessels, which is defined through “three Noes” by the MAC – no vessel name, no ship certificate, and no registered home port – which was found to be the case with this mainland fishing boat near Kinmen. As per the MAC, such boats often engage in smuggling activities, while also performing risky manoeuvres to evade cooperation and inspection, and that can prove highly dangerous on the seas.
Another is the environmental angle, which further exacerbates the nature of the challenge posed by illicit fishing vessels in the area. The waters around Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu in specific are rich in a host of fish species, and are a huge breeding ground for cephalopods like squids. Extensive fishing by Chinese boats, especially during Lunar New Year celebrations (which is a time to catch and sell “high-value fish”), has led to depletion of marine resources, overfishing, and disruption in the maritime ecosystem. Other vessels, such as sand-mining dredgers, have continued to extract vast amounts of seafloor sand, leading to shallowing of sea levels, reduction in sizes of beaches, and wiping out of seabed marine life.
Wen Lii (now Director of the Democratic Progressive Party International Affairs Office) has elaborated and highlighted more of these concerns in an informative article for The Diplomat in October 2021. He argued that such vessel activity causes residents of Kinmen and Matsu immense difficulty due to loud noises of the dredgers and the beaming green LED lights of the squid-fishing boats. Interesting studies he cites also reveal that the green LED lights that these boats deploy to attract cephalopods, who prefer light with green and blue hues, have become extensive in number. This can have drastic consequences for the internal biological clocks of fishes, that can perceive the lights as morning instead of night, and cause their eventual ill-health and demise. The ROC CGA itself uses yellow or white lights so as to not drastically disrupt the maritime ecosystem.
Further, May to mid-August, which is also referred to as the “Blue Tears” nighttime viewing period for tourists in Matsu (because of the presence of bioluminescent algae causing phosphorescence in the waters around the island), is usually a restricted time period for Chinese fishing vessels. It is a period meant specifically for “dark sky tourism.” But illegal fishing continues, and light pollution from these vessels has also caused significant economic harm to the local Matsu tourism industry.
The sensitive nature of these various issues for local island residents, the resultant law enforcement routine of the CGA to address these issues, as well as the political disagreements in cross-Straits relations, have and will continue to combine to produce events such as the ‘Kinmen incident’.
China Responds
The challenges of overfishing and of unnamed Chinese vessels populating the waters around Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu, which are small islands controlled by Taiwan but most of whose territories lie closer to the mainland (with Penghu being closer to Taiwan proper), are not new. However, the deal-breaker in this recent incident is that it turned deadly. And it has invited a response from China, but not as severe as perhaps one would have expected.
To begin with, Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, expressed deep condolences and sincere sympathy to the victims and their families. Additionally, she “strongly condemned Taiwan for this malicious incident that severely harmed the feelings between compatriots on both sides during the Spring Festival.”
Further, she discussed how while China has done so much to maintain normal ties between fishermen in the waters, including by setting up reception facilities for Taiwanese fishermen in many coastal areas, providing assistance such as shelter, supplies, emergency response, and rescue for Taiwanese fishing boats and fishermen, Taiwanese authorities have responded by “forcefully seizing mainland fishing boats on various pretexts, treating mainland fishermen in a harsh and dangerous manner” (以各种借口强力查扣大陆渔船,以粗暴和危险的方式对待大陆渔民). She then demanded that Taiwan immediately investigate the truth of the incident, assist the families of the deceased fishermen in properly handling the aftermath, and warn the relevant authorities in Taiwan to respect the historical facts of fishermen operating in the traditional fishing areas of the Taiwan Strait (朱凤莲表示,我们强烈要求台方立即查明事件真相,协助遇难渔民家属妥善处理善后事宜。我们正告台湾有关方面,要尊重两岸渔民在台湾海峡传统渔区作业的历史事实,确保大陆渔民人身安全,切实杜绝此类事件再度发生).
Further, on February 18th, the Fujian province Coast Guard announced that it will strengthen maritime law enforcement in the Xiamen-Kinmen area and conduct routine law enforcement patrols. Following that announcement, on the morning of February 20th (9:05 AM Taipei time), Chinese maritime surveillance ship “China Coast Guard 8029” entered the “restricted waters” around Kinmen, and upon its detection by a CGA radar, the ROC Coast Guard was despatched to accompany it till it eventually moved out in about an hour.
A day before this, on February 19th, Chinese coast guard personnel even boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat with 11 crew members and 23 passengers on board. As per a statement by the CGA, their 12th patrol district radar and infrared thermal imaging system detected two mainland coast guard ships alongside a “Jin Xia Cruise” vessel in the afternoon (around 4:47 PM Taipei time), and six officials from these ships came on board the Jin cruise vessel to inspect the vessel’s navigation plan, ship documents, captain and crew licenses, and captain’s signature, eventually departing in around half-an-hour. However, in this instance, the CGA explained that the tourist boat, which was circumnavigating Kinmen, mistakenly drifted towards mainland waters, and just like in the past, Taiwan has forgiven Chinese tourist ships entering Kinmen waters by mistake, China should do the same.
Today, the Fujian Maritime Police has again organized a fleet of vessels to conduct law enforcement patrols in the waters near Kinmen. During the patrol, it is reported that maritime police vessels implemented measures such as formation sailing, identification and verification, guarding and protecting fishing, and issuing warnings through verbal communication. They strengthened law enforcement patrols in key sea areas, effectively maintaining the order of operations in relevant sea areas, and earnestly safeguarding the safety of fishermen's lives and property (今天,福建海警组织舰艇编队在金门附近海域开展执法巡查。巡查期间,海警舰艇采取编队航行、识别查证、警戒护渔、喊话警告等措施,加强重点海域执法巡查,有效维护有关海域作业秩序,切实维护渔民生命财产安全).
No matter the ‘relatively’ muted scale of China’s response, the incident has rocked some boats within the CGA…
When the families of the deceased fishermen and of the two fishermen who are alive and in holding arrived in Kinmen, they obviously asked for a detailed analysis of the incident. What has seemingly struck them, and many others in both China and Taiwan asking questions, is that there is no video footage of the incident.
In this regard, the CGA has not held back, and has provided a detailed explanation of why there is no visual or audio evidence, and why the lack thereof will have no impact on a truthful investigation:
They first argue that the chase was high-speed, and the four crew on board the CP-1051 patrol vessel had to focus on steering the ship with balance as the waves clashed continually against the hull. This led to the vessel experiencing significant rocking, amidst which, the one of the four crew members responsible for surveillance and evidence collection “did not immediately retrieve the evidence-gathering equipment (handheld camera).”
Secondly, they explain, that as reported by Liao Decheng, the deputy director of the fleet division, the entire incident lasted only five minutes, from the despatch of 1051 to the overturning of the fishermen boat. The crew had no time to both balance the ship, prepare for any forceful boarding by the fishermen, and then retrieve equipment to gather evidence.
Further, they argue that if the intention of the CGA was to act impartially, they would not have handed over whatever case they had to the Kinmen judicial authorities (the prosecutor in specific) for investigation – including the custody of the two saved fishermen and the audio of the 12th patrol district of the Kinmen CGA (whose radar caught onto the fishermen boat) requesting action from patrol vessel 1051.
They further say that the actions of the CGA during the incident were not politically motivated, but rather a part of routine law enforcement operations that are conducted against any illegal trespassing of Taiwanese waters. In fact, if they were indeed political and not routine, no emergency treatment mechanisms would have been initiated and the fishermen who lost their lives would not have been treated at the Kinmen hospital till the last minute.
These are interesting times for cross-Straits relations. This is an unfortunate incident adding to the overall woes and tensions in the Taiwan Straits dynamic, highlighting the lack of communication on basic issues on both sides. Chinese rhetoric continues to emphasise the historic nature of rights Chinese fishermen have exercised around the off-shore islands, while Taiwan has introduced “prohibited” and “restricted” categories and encourages China to follow through.
In the past, Kinmen and Matsu have been the sites for missile shelling by China during the ‘Second Taiwan Straits Conflict’ of 1958. Now, analysts argue they could be the sites for China’s first steps towards taking over Taiwan, given their virtually indefensible nature against the People’s Liberation Army. Of course, the military security aspect is exacerbated by environmental concerns surrounding slow degradation of marine resources due to incessant Chinese fishing activities around these waters.
Forgotten for decades, the geopolitical and bilateral relevance of these off-shore islands is immense in cross-Straits dynamics, and this incident has revived some of the debates around safety and security associated with their waters.
Tech Weekly: China’s “1+N” Policy Framework and its Provincial Leadership
By Rakshith Shetty
China is driven by a top-down political system, with the central government setting out key targets, policies and plans in major areas on a national level. Nonetheless, when it comes to policy implementation, provincial-level governments are the ones who act. In this particular edition, we will explore China’s “1+N” Policy Framework and understand in brief the role of provincial governments in combating climate change.
China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), has embarked on a transformative journey in climate action. But it wasn’t always so. Before 2007, climate change wasn’t exactly at the forefront of China’s agenda. Sure, there were talks, but action was minimal. Then came the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC) in 2007, set up by the central government. This move ignited a spark at the provincial level. Provinces started forming their own equivalent bodies to tackle climate issues head-on. They even nudged lower-level governments to join the fight. And they delivered! Provinces rolled out action plans, funded research, and put climate change on their agenda.
It is worth noting that China does not currently use total CO2 emissions or energy consumption as binding targets for its climate change agenda. It’s all about “CO2 intensity” and “energy intensity” – basically, how much emissions and energy are used per unit of GDP. These measurements keep emissions in check while keeping the economy rolling. Plus, there’s a neat incentive system in place. Provinces that meet their targets get a pat on the back – and maybe a promotion for their officials.
But here’s the kicker: The central government linked three issues of energy saving, pollution reduction, and climate change together when it formed the national leading groups, implying that they have been given a parallel significance. So when provinces make action plans, they mostly focus on enhancing energy efficiency, promoting clean technological innovation, and boosting local economies, which is evident in their carbon neutrality action plans.
Fast forward to 2021, and China rolls out its “1+N” Policy Framework. Sounds fancy, right? Well, it is. This framework sets the stage for peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality. Xie Zhenhua, China’s climate envoy, explains that the “1” refers to the “guiding opinions” that set out the overarching principles of all forthcoming policies that aim to facilitate China’s peaking and neutrality goal. The “N” will include a “carbon peaking action plan” – a 10-point plan that sets out Beijing’s expectations on the actions that key sectors are required to take to enable the peaking of emissions.
But why does Provincial Leadership matter? It matters because these leaders hold the reins in China’s crusade against climate change. The central government distributes national climate targets among provinces, encompassing “legally binding” objectives such as carbon peaking timelines, carbon-intensity reduction rates, energy-intensity reduction rates, and “non-binding” indicators like total energy consumption and carbon emissions. And trust me, they take these goals seriously. They even pass these targets to city leaders within their jurisdiction, ensuring everyone's on board.
But how do they ensure everyone's pulling their weight? It’s all about performance and the way they evaluate it. The cadre-performance matrix ensures local leaders take their climate responsibilities seriously and strive to achieve the set goals. Since its launch in 2011, it’s been a game-changer. Few provinces miss their targets, thanks to this nifty evaluation model.
In a nutshell, China's climate action is a team effort – from the central government down to the provinces. With the “1+N” Policy Framework leading the charge and local leaders driving change, China is on track to a greener, cleaner future.
Latest from the Indo-Pacific Studies Team:
In the Spirit of Podcasting
To begin with, on February 19, Anushka Saxena, a Research Analyst with Takshashila-IPSP, hosted Professor (Dr.) Kerry Brown, China Professor and Lau China Institute Director at King’s College London, for a podcast episode on drivers and priorities of Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy under Xi Jinping – hosted only on Takshashila’s daily public policy podcast, ‘All Things Policy’.
Professor Brown shares keen insights on everything – from how Xi's supposed “all-powerful” authority manifests itself in policymaking, to the fundamental factors underpinning US-China and EU-China relations in the past few years. He also answers in brief the million-dollar question – “Why does the Taiwan issue matter?” Tune in for a deep dive into the making of Chinese foreign policy in the contemporary world order, and do keep an eye out for Prof. Brown's upcoming book, “Why Taiwan Matters: A Short History of a Small Island that will Dictate our Future.”
The 2024 Munich Security Conference has recently concluded on February 18, and key discussions surrounded both traditional and non-traditional security issues such as China’s military capabilities, the Russia-Ukraine war, leaps in technology, and climate change. In another episode of All Things Policy from February 21, Anushka Saxena quizzes Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson, Takshashila-IPSP and Fellow, China Studies, on the important insights from the Conference, and what they say about Europe's vision for its own role in the contemporary global order.
Manoj also discusses China’s role at the Conference, highlighting key aspects of Wang Yi's statements, especially during his bilateral meetings with representatives from the US, UK and Ukraine.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has released regulations on studying the Party’s history. It outlines the key objectives and principles embedded in the newly introduced regulations, emphasising the need for regular, long-term study of the Party’s history. Comprising six chapters and 34 articles, the document outlines general principles, leadership structures, responsibilities, content, and methods for the study of the Party's history. In this episode of All Things Policy from February 23, Takshashila-IPSP Research Analyst Rakshith Shetty quizzes Manoj Kewalramaani on the History Learning Regulations by the Party. Manoj also talks about the key objectives of the regulation and, on a broader scale, explains why history and historical narratives matter to the Party.