The 'Smart' Grassroots + Tsunami in the South China Sea
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Guarding the Great Wall: Digitising Grassroots Governance
In the July 31 edition of ‘Eye on China’, I discussed the mention of the ideological concept, ‘Fengqiao Masses’. Named after Fengqiao Township (枫桥镇) in the city of Zhuji in Zhejiang province, the ‘experience’ recalls Mao Zedong’s efforts in the 1960s to create a system of grassroots surveillance and ‘rectification’, where people at a community level identified and reported on ‘reactionary elements’ (四类分子) to carry on Mao’s exalted ‘class struggle’ (阶级斗争). In 1963, Mao praised the namesake township for its excellence in this regard.
Now, the Fengqiao experience has entered the “New Era,” and with the emphasis on the concept in the Third Plenum document, security officials at the grassroots are working to integrate its practice in day-to-day affairs. Even though the concept is most prominently associated with mobilisation of grassroots military-police-civilian networks, its use in the digital domain is largely prompted by grassroots officials attempting to pass on the right information to the right higher-ups in no time, and advance the course of action. And a recent example, in this regard, comes from the use of a ‘Digital Service Platform’ (hereby abbreviated as DSP; 数字化服务平台) by the Jiuquan Detachment of the Gansu province’s Armed Police Corps.
The goal of the DSP is to enable grassroots officials to smoothly conduct eight major functions: document and communication control, work coordination, personnel information inquiry, electronic registration, learning and education, grassroots party affairs, troop management, and statistical analysis. It achieves a two-fold goal – curb the ‘Five excesses’ (such excessive or duplicated documentation and statistics, or unnecessarily high number of meetings or bureaucratic hurdles), and make grassroots governance easier and more seamless.
Note: For a discussion on the ‘Five Excesses’, do refer to the August 12 edition of ‘Eye on China’. It extrapolates the concept and its pillars from a discussion of PLA personnel Fu Lingyan’s recent commentary for the Liberation Army Daily.
In the Jiuquan Detachment’s case, the DSP came in handy to recruit command specialist sergeants for the provincial corps, based on instructions received from the Corps Headquarters in Lanzhou. As per the report on the recruitment,
“Yang Gang, a training staff officer [of the Detachment], logged into the detachment’s ‘Digital Service Platform’ and quickly retrieved information on personnel eligible for the pre-selection of command specialist sergeants. After confirming the automatically generated form was accurate, he submitted it for reporting. The entire process was quick and efficient.”
Perhaps the most crucial bit for such a platform is that it standardises database sharing, so that grassroots officers are more relieved when it comes to quickly sharing a bulk of information with police and military superiors. As the report highlights, this database sharing is central because it enables “streamlining information flow between the headquarters and grassroots units in areas such as military training, political work, and logistical support.”
This is not the first instance of the deployment of the DSP. In fact, the Detachment’s Organisation and Discipline Office, the platform was used for compiling data on party member development for the first half of the year, reviewing uploaded meeting records, assessment files, and political evaluation materials from various units, as well as generating tree diagrams and pie charts to provide a basis for grassroots development analysis and the party member development work for the second half of the year. From both the perspective of assessing “development” of cadres (work efficiency and political loyalty), as well as charting out work priorities going forward, the Detachment is relying on digital tools and modes of dissemination.
But the utilisation of a DSP doesn’t mean the problem of the ‘five excesses’ is solved. Human intervention is still a key pillar to ensuring digital services are reliable, even if they are quick and easy. Yang Gang’s own story, for example, tells us that it was necessary for him to assess the accuracy of the automatically generated form for recruitment and personnel evaluation, before it could be passed on to higher ups for selection.
Further, a key example of the use of this DSP, more specifically its ‘intelligent/smart conference terminal system’ (智能会议终端采集系统) comes from its deployment by the Jiuquan Detachment for recording a meeting in real-time, and generating a draft of the meeting minutes. However, even in reportage of this usage, a certain squadron officer Zhong Kunliang was required to modify and verify the meetings before they could be disseminated. In that sense, the platform may equally enable inertia and tedium by doing a half-baked job and relying on personnel for correction.
In either case, curbing the ‘five excesses’ has become an important theme of discussion this year. Before Fu Lingyan published his piece with the PLA Daily on August 12, in July 2024, the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s 73rd group army was already working on curbing the excesses. In an interesting narration of the story of a clerk-turned-gold medalist Wang Xixian, PLA Daily commentators attempted to demonstrate how the reduction in documents and telegrams to read, memorise and discuss, provided more time for group army personnel such as Wang to train harder and longer, and ultimately win the top spot in training competitions such as light weapons disassembly and assembly, automatic rifle shooting, and even 800-meter breaststroke. In January 2024, the Central Theater Command’s 82nd Group Army similarly praised its efforts to streamline “one document for one matter” to beat formalism in favour of combat preparedness.
From the perspective of the DSP, digital governance is also the sweet spot where development and security combine. It makes room for the ideological incorporation of concepts such as the ‘five excesses’ and ‘Fengqiao masses’ in information age politics. If cadres can remove the human element and completely digitise processes of reportage, accountability and communication, it is likely that the time and effort spent towards preparing for war and avoiding duplication of work, especially for the military apparatus, will enhance.
Following up from our previous edition, I once again encourage you to participate in our latest Survey, ‘The China Challenge Survey’.
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Worldview Weekly: Some Thoughts on the South China Sea Developments
Acknowledgement: Modified and Cross-posted from the first source of publication – FirstPost (Read Here).
For the past one year, the China-Philippines relationship has been simmering as a result of regular skirmishes between their navies in the South China Sea. During the ninth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on July 2, the two sides reached a provisional understanding on avoiding miscalculation and miscommunication around the disputed islands in the Sea to allow for a moment of diplomatic respite. But does this provisional understanding indicate a temporary proverbial ceasefire or long-term rapprochement? Recent developments, more specifically the collision between the two sides’ vessels near the Spratly islands on Monday (August 19), suggest neither.
For the past one year, Chinese coast guard (CCG) vessels deployed in the area around the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, in the Spratly islands, have increasingly engaged in threatening manoeuvres to deter movement of Philippine ships in the region. Largely, the targeted vessels are used for rotation and resupply (RORE) missions in collaboration with the Philippine coast guard (PCG). Their destination is the BRP Sierra Madre, a Philippine warship deliberately run aground in the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999 to assert the island country’s claim over the feature.
Since October 2023, the CCG has resorted to ramming into PCG ships accompanied by civilian RORE vessels if they approach the Second Thomas Shoal. Additionally, since November 2023, the CCG has regularly used water cannons to blast Philippine supply ships and harass personnel on board. When water cannons were similarly used against Philippine RORE vessel Unaizah Mae-4 on March 5, it shattered the vessel’s windshield and caused injury to four Filipino fishermen.
In early June, the Philippines changed tact and deployed aircraft to approach BRP Sierra Madre and conduct airdrop of food supplies. However, when CCG rigid hull inflatable boats intercepted the four-part airdrop, they caught one of the food packets and dropped it into the Sea, triggering a gun-pointing response from armed Philippine navy personnel aboard the Sierra Madre.
What is motivating the clashes?
The China-Philippines dispute in the South China Sea is essentially a political conflict regarding the territorial ownership over features such as the Second Thomas and Scarborough shoals, and the resources around them. It has consistently been the Chinese position that these disputed regions have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times.
A white paper issued by the Chinese State Council Information Office (SCIO) in 2016, said:
“China is the first to have discovered, named, and explored and exploited Nanhai Zhudao [the South China Sea islands] and relevant waters, and the first to have continuously, peacefully and effectively exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over them.”
This indicates that the Chinese claim over the islands goes as far back as 2nd BCE — more than 2000 years ago. The solidification of its claims has been done through official maps wherein China depicts over 90 per cent of the South China Sea area as lying within its ‘9-dash-line’ territory.
However, the Philippines contends that Chinese claims impinge on its enjoyment and exercise of sovereign rights with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).
Hence, at the heart of the dispute is a fundamental faultline — while the UNCLOS guarantees that the areas around the disputed shoals —within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines’ coast— are part of the island nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), China objects to such an assertion on historical grounds. It must be noted, in this regard, that the Philippines’ claims have the legal backing of the UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which in its landmark 2016 ruling said clearly that the Chinese 9-dash-line has no legal basis, and that its obstruction of fishing or oil and gas exploration activities by Filipino vessels is in contravention to its obligations under the Convention.
What does the latest ‘understanding of principles’ mean?
Recently, China proposed a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) meeting in a bid to resolve tensions. The meeting took place on July 2 in Manila, and was co-chaired by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Xiaodong and Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro. The differing perceptions of the agreement reached at the meeting are evident from the two sides’ post-facto statements.
As per the statement issued by the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the two sides,
“Reached an understanding of principles and approaches that will be observed by both sides in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ lawful and routine rotation and resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal.”
The Chinese statement, since removed from the Foreign Ministry’s website and accessed via CGTN, claimed:
“Both sides agreed that maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea is in the interests of China and the Philippines, and also the common goal of countries in the region. China reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Nansha Qundao and its adjacent waters, including Ren’ai Jiao, as well as its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters.”
Each party’s statement attempts to clarify their respective stances on their maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. While from the Philippines’ perspective, China is causing “miscommunication and miscalculation” regarding the nation’s lawful RORE activities, the Chinese say the Philippines is violating Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction by continuing such activities. In this regard, the common element in both statements was that neither side agreed to concede their positions on the dispute or believe that the principles and understandings concluded will prejudice said positions moving forward.
On a broader level, the Philippines’ decision to lodge a case against the Chinese government at the PCA in 2013, under the Presidency of Benigno Aquino III, led to a drastic deterioration in the relations between the two countries. However, around the time the PCA delivered a judgement favouring the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency. His approach towards China was friendlier than his predecessor. In fact, in a speech he made in December 2016, Duterte argued, “In the play of politics, now, I will set aside the arbitral ruling. I will not impose anything on China.”
With Rodrigo Duterte stepping down as President in 2022, Manila has reinstated its firm stance on the South China Sea issue. Also the air of cooperation at the BCM has turned stale after years of its formation. In this context, policymakers on both sides have adopted a hardline stance on their national positions vis-à-vis the Sea.
Where are things headed?
In the seven years since the BCM was established, the Mechanism has seen little success in fulfilling its initial agenda of enabling “proper handling” of disputes bilaterally by creating room for cooperation. However, the above-mentioned developments indicate that the BCM may prove to be the right platform to avoid escalatory ladders and leave lines of communication open in an otherwise uncertain and hostile environment. The Mechanism demonstrates great potential for preventive diplomacy, and keeps deliberations on bilateral cooperation ongoing despite the existence of the maritime dispute.
However, from the Chinese perspective, a fundamental rethink of strategy is in order. Neither its deterrence tactics vis-à-vis an aggressive military posture, nor its proposal for a BCM with the Philippines, have kept tensions at bay. In fact, the most important red line the Chinese urge the Filipinos to not cross, which is to go beyond bilateral mechanisms and involve third parties in dispute resolution, has already been breached — most prominently with the involvement of the PCA.
Further, the renewal of Philippines’ Mutual Defence Treaty with the US indicates the shortcomings of China’s military deterrence — that there is little it can achieve just through brute force. In this regard, Beijing must prepare to face a vehement and assertive Manila, which can no longer be manipulated by a simple carrots and sticks approach.
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Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
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