Trouble Triangulating?
Covering Chinese policy and rhetoric on external events and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology, and bilateral relations with India.
Worldview Weekly: Indian Diplomacy Confronts the Impossible Trinity
Amit Kumar
The past month has witnessed the geopolitical landscape change rather abruptly from New Delhi’s perspective. All of a sudden, its foremost strategic partner, the US, decided to arbitrarily single out and penalise India for aiding Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine.
China, its foremost strategic adversary, sanctioned a high-level official visit led by its Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi for the first time in three years, triggering hopes of greater stability in bilateral relations after a hiatus of five years. And finally, the relationship with Russia - its long-trusted strategic partner - which some condemned as an albatross around India’s neck, has again swelled in importance, marked by back-to-back visits by India’s NSA and EAM within a month.
The shifting sands and changing dynamics exemplify India’s triangulated state in the US-China-Russia ecosystem. India’s relations with these three countries are perhaps the most significant in furthering its developmental and security goals. And yet, together they present the impossible trinity problem for India. New Delhi cannot maximise its relations with all three at once. Any attempt to maximise relations with one will come at the cost of compromising the relations with atleast one of the other two.
The Trilemma
The relationship with the US is essential for India to balance China. In addition, India’s developmental goals dictate that India-US relations deepen in domains of trade, investment, technology and defence. Besides being the world’s largest economy, the US is India’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade in goods stood at US$ 132 billion in 2024, with a surplus of US$ 41 billion in India’s favour. Trade in services is more balanced and near symmetric - accounting for another US$ 83 billion in 2024.
The US is also India’s third-largest source of FDI. The Indian diaspora and talent have played a crucial role in supporting the US economy and its tech leadership. On the other hand, the Indian market has been a lucrative destination for American businesses. This economic integration built over the past many decades has served the two countries exceptionally well.
Thus, the significance of the India-US relations cannot be overstated. But this relationship often pits India in competition and conflict with China. Given that India-China and US-China relations are structurally adversarial, India’s tilt towards the US always breeds suspicion in Beijing. Convinced that the closer India-US ties are aimed at containing China, Beijing has all the incentives to foster instability in India-China relations.
However, it is in India’s interest to cultivate stable ties with China despite the natural adversity that underpins their relationship. To begin with, China enjoys a huge power differential vis-à-vis India, both in economic and military terms. This limits India’s ability to push back against China, while allowing China to destabilise India’s growth prospects.
Lately, Beijing has shown both the capability and the willingness to derail India’s developmental goals and economic objectives. Its toolkit includes engendering instability along the LAC and restricting exports of critical machinery. Thus, it becomes incumbent upon New Delhi to find options to manage relations in ways that dissuade Beijing from undermining the environment conducive to growth.
Effecting such an outcome may sometimes require India to make concessions. Unfortunately, New Delhi’s efforts towards normalising relations, more often than not, tend to be perceived as a sign of bandwagoning by the US. The strategic pundits decry the move as undercutting the foundation of the India-US ties. Back home in India, some equate and even exaggerate New Delhi’s pragmatism as a surrender to Beijing. The northern neighbour is too big a threat for India to not seek stability. China has levers it can pull, especially when it comes to trade, which today stands at US$ 128 billion.
But tread too far, and India risks the possibility of a G2 arrangement between the US and China, leaving India high and dry. And thus, assuaging DC’s concerns and anxiety within the is equally important. Consequently, it requires India to continuously seek expanded and deepened relations with the US.
However, closer India-US ties also have consequences for India-Russia ties. Not only does the India-US proximity unnerve Russia in the first place, but it also renders India susceptible to the US pressure to denounce Russia. Moscow has limited cards to play against India, and thus, has remained relatively tolerant of India’s growing proximity with the US until lately. The frictions have become more pronounced in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to preserving the historical and time-tested relationship with Russia, India has an interest in preventing the prospect of China-Russia collusion against itself.
Furthermore, Russia's attempts at flirting with Pakistan, with which it has so far refrained from upgrading ties owing to India’s sensitivities, should sound alarm bells. For a country like India, that still has a lot of catching up to do, an Asian architecture with three nuclear-armed military heavyweights acting in concert against itself is a terrible situation that is best avoided. Thus, contrary to the opinion of diversifying away from Russian energy and defence purchases, there is a need to objectively evaluate the extent of necessary diversification. There might be a case for minimum credible dependence on Russian energy and defence supplies. However, undertaking such a step may sometimes mean standing up to the US.
Therefore, notwithstanding the convergences, even India’s relations with the US, China, and Russia are not without frictions. These friction points, while acting as inhibitors to cooperation with respective countries, can often act as a catalyst for cooperation with the others.
Trilemma also presents Opportunities
While the system puts constraints and limitations on India, it also provides New Delhi with opportunities. For instance, the new bonhomie between India and China might not have been possible under the previous circumstances. This new dynamic, triggered by Donald Trump’s India policy, has enabled India and China to iron out some of the differences and resume negotiations on the boundary and trade issue - something China was unwilling to concede to before. India can take advantage of the crisis with the US to explore possibilities and reach tangible outcomes with China, which can contribute to the larger stability in the relations.
While it is prudent not to be too optimistic about gains, given China’s lack of seriousness in the past and inclination towards prolonging negotiations. Yet, it should not be a limitation on giving the current negotiations a chance.
Similarly, India’s decision to stand up to the US’s unfair treatment vis-à-vis oil imports from Russia also offers an opportunity to assuage Moscow’s concerns - that closeness to the US doesn’t necessarily have to come at the cost of India-Russia ties.
To conclude, Indian diplomacy will continue to face the constraints of the US-China-Russia triad. Negotiating this trilemma will require undertaking decisions that may not be politically popular and are even contradictory to its previously stated positions.
Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.
Declaration on the use of AI/ML: Translation from Mandarin to English via the use of LLMs.
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