Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut?

China's latest ICBM test - was it the DF-41?

China’s decision to publicly test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on September 25 indicates that it may be bringing the nuclear option back to light, and has sparked many questions surrounding the potential reasons for such a manoeuvre. While the test has been referred to as “routine,” and a part of the PLA’s “annual training” module, this specific form of ICBM testing, with the warhead landing in the Pacific Ocean, has happened for the first time since 1980.

The missile, which deployed a dummy warhead and landed in the Pacific Ocean (somewhere near French Polynesia), is speculated to be the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) type under command of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), though no official confirmation of the model has come from the Chinese. Nonetheless, an understanding of Chinese missile systems, as well as the internal and geopolitical contexts in which this test was conducted, may give us some clues as to how to interpret the manoeuvre.

The Test Itself

Images from the test, first shared on the official WeChat account of the PLA, show a bushy grassland, suggesting that there was no pre-constructed launchpad on which the launch vehicle was placed. The newest in China’s DF series of missiles are the DF-41 and the DF-31AG, both of which have Transporter-Erector Launchers (TELs). It means they are equipped with a rubber base, which doesn’t require a pre-constructed launch pad due to its adaptive nature on most terrains. They also have an extendable gas tube, which has the capability to absorb the force from the launch – one of the purposes a constructed launch-pad serves.

Further, as a military commentator going by the name of ‘Diānfēng Gāodì’ (Summit/ Peak Heights) suggests on the Chinese social media platform QQ, the plume of smoke surrounding the launcher is indicative of a ‘cold launch’. This, essentially, would mean that the missile in question was propelled not by its internal fuel firing up the launch, but rather an external gas generator. Once in the air, the missile would then fire up and leave behind smoke. This is a mechanism that ensures efficiency of fuel use and a launch backup in case a hot launch fails. 

Most advanced Chinese ICBMs are undoubtedly equipped with cold launch mechanisms. Hence, while there has been confident speculation that the tested missile was the DF-41, it could also be the DF-31A or its more advanced version, the DF-31AG, that was used for the test on September 25. Further, open source research suggests that the range of the missile was about 11,500-11,700 kilometres, and its landing site was about 800 kilometres from the French Polynesian city of Bora Bora. Given that the DF-31A/AG’s range is about 11,000+ km, while that of DF-41 is between 12,000 and 15,000 km, it again, could be either of these missiles put to test.

As for whether the test itself was routine, it is important to note that while a Chinese ICBM (the DF-5) may have been last fired into the Pacific Ocean 44 years ago, China has indeed routinely tested other missile systems across geographies. ICBMs, for example, have been tested domestically, with designated impact sites in the deserts of Xinjiang, while DF-26 missiles have been flight tested in Inner Mongolia in 2017. In 2021, China experimented with a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile, which circled the earth and returned to its landing site. Moreover, shorter-range Ballistic Missiles, such as the DF-21 and DF-26, more specifically their anti-ship versions (DF-21D and DF-26B), have been fired into the South China Sea, with the most recent test being held in August 2020. The Taiwan Strait, of course, has been a site of regular PLA mock missile drills. However, the key difference vis-à-vis the latest test is that it was announced as part of the training plan of the PLARF, indicating that it was a combat preparedness exercise conducted officially by the country’s military forces, and not a mock or equipment testing drill conducted by relevant scientific departments of the CMC (as in the case of domestic tests in Xinjiang).

The PLARF, which manages China’s nuclear arsenal, comes under direct control of the CMC. The secretive Base 69 of the PLARF, whose commander and political commissar are, in open source, unknown, has been designated to conduct test and training for the missile arsenal. It is possible that the logistics of this test were determined by Base 69 and the top leadership in the CMC. 

Geopolitical Context

It is difficult to pin-point what exactly motivated this test, or whether it was a reaction to a particular event. However, the external situation from the Chinese perspective has become increasingly hostile. The South China Sea continues to be a hotspot for tensions between China and the Philippines. In fact, during a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo in Laos in August 2024, Wang expressed “dramatic” concerns over the placement of a US Typhon missile system in the Philippines. This system, the Philippines confirmed recently, will stay in the country despite China’s concerns.

In its ‘2+2’ Dialogue with Japan in July, too, the US affirmed nuclear support to Japan’s defence. In this regard, concerns surrounding the US’s nuclear capabilities could have motivated Beijing to project power and strategic deterrence capabilities. This sentiment is also expressed in a Chinese commentary by “military experts” opining on the launch, wherein one of them states, “This test launch [is]... acting as a warning to certain foreign powers and reminding them of China’s strength as the world’s third-largest nuclear power, in order to deter any potential military adventurism.”

Could it be that recent nuclear test failures in both Russia and the US may have also motivated the Chinese test? Last year, the US had to abort a Minuteman-III ICBM test mission over the Pacific Ocean, due to “anomalies” in the launch. Similarly, just a few hours before the Chinese ICBM was launched, a Russian Sarmat missile exploded within its silo, leading to a catastrophic failure of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces’ test mission. The abovementioned commentary by “military experts” also seems to suggest that this could be a potential reason for the September 25 test, though the intervening time span is quite short, and does not align with the Chinese narrative that this test was a predetermined part of the PLARF’s “annual military training” plan.

Internal Flux

Another factor to consider is the internal challenges that the PLARF has faced. With purges in the top leadership of the PLARF in the last year on charges of corruption and inefficiency, the need to test actual combat capabilities may have seemed urgent. 

The Missile systems domain is a breeding ground for corrupt activities. Especially in the PLA, where a lot of funding is diverted towards their acquisition and maintenance, but where the potential for use or demonstration is minimal, inefficiency, rustiness and graft can lead to corrosion of capabilities over time. In January this year, for example, stories citing US intelligence claimed that Chinese missiles were filled fully or partially with water and not fuel, while a former PLA official took to the papers to claim that he and his fellow officers used solid rocket fuel to cook hotpot. If these are indeed true, the hindrances to PLA’s combat readiness run deep.

This is also a time when domestically, China is facing intense economic troubles, and the test may have been a way to shift the news cycle and project a favourable narrative of Chinese prowess domestically.

Conclusion

Overall, the ICBM launch is a significant milestone in the PLARF’s efforts to project power. China has specified with surety that it informed countries such as the US, Russia, Japan and France of such a test, with a Pentagon official reportedly confirming this to be true. Japan, however, stated it did not receive an advance notice. Also, ‘No fly’ Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) were also issued, and debris-related measures have been activated by countries in the Pacific Ocean, including French Polynesia and Solomon Islands. But with regional tensions simmering, and questions of graft causing a churn in the PLA, it is likely such demonstrations become a more frequent affair, creating a new normal for peace and stability in the world.

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Eye on China is a weekly newsletter curated by the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, a public policy think-tank based out of Bengaluru, India.